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1 Chapter 1
General introduction
This chapter draws upon: 
Baji P, Boncz I, Jenei Gy, Gulácsi L. (2012): Comparing Cost-sharing practices for 
pharmaceuticals and health care services among four Central European Countries. 
Society and Economy, 34 (2):221–240.
Baji P, Boncz I, Jenei Gy, Gulácsi L. (2010): The short story of co-payments for 
health care services in Hungary - lessons for neighbouring countries. Zeszyty Naukowe 
Ochrony Zdrowia Zdrowie Publiczne i Zarzadzanie, VIII(1): 37–47.
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1.1 The scope of the dissertation
This dissertation is focused on out-of-pocket patient payments for health care 
services covered by the social health insurance in Hungary. These payments include 
direct patient payments, both formal, i.e. official user fees or co-payments, as well as 
informal payments, defined as unofficial cash payments and gifts in kinds given to 
the health care personnel. In Hungary, official co-payments for health care services 
(referred to as “user fees”, “formal fees”, and “official fees” in this dissertation) play 
only a minor role in financing health care, as most of the services covered by the 
social health insurance are provided free of charge. However, patients regularly 
pay for health care services directly to the health care provider through informal 
payment channels (referred to as “informal payments” or “informal patient 
payments” in this dissertation). In 2007, there was an attempt to implement official 
user fees for health care services with the policy objectives to control utilization and 
contain public expenditure, as well as to eradicate informal payments. However, the 
implementation of these fees met with political resistance and unpopularity among 
the public, which finally led to the abolishment of user fees one year after their 
implementation. Since then, politicians have refrained from (re)implementation of 
such fees to avoid becoming unpopular among the public. These short-lived user 
fees policies are not unique for Hungary, in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, user 
fees were also abolished a few years after their implementation (Szalay et al., 2011; 
Bryndova et al., 2009). 
The implementation of user fees for health care services is a frequently applied policy 
tool to control demand and contain costs. It is also applied to increase resources in 
health care financing, especially when public resources are limited or the increase of 
the income related contributions is not feasible or not desirable. During a period of 
the economic recession, the issue of user fees has become even more relevant as an 
alternative to increase income related contributions (as this can result in a decrease 
in the net income of employees and might create a barrier to competitiveness). 
However, the implementation of official co-payments or user fees has proved to be 
rather controversial and a sensitive political issue for several reasons. First, the shift 
of the financing burden from the working population to the actual users of health 
care services means a shift away from solidarity principles (i.e. not the ability to pay 
but health care use determines these payments). Furthermore, user fees can create a 
barrier to access, as those who are less able to pay can forgo the utilization of health 
care, which can result in higher morbidity (Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008; Atella et 
al., 2006; Newhouse, 1997; Manning et al., 1987). 
In addition, in Hungary, as in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the 
existence of informal patient payments makes the implementation of user charges even 
more challenging. The implementation of user fees is often considered by politicians 
and policy makers as a potential tool to eradicate, “formalize” informal payments 
(Stepurko et al., 2010; Schneider, 2008; Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2000). However, there is 
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no evidence, which clearly supports this expectation. On the contrary, there is evidence 
to suggest that patients continue to pay informally after the introduction of user fees 
(Atanasova et al., 2011; Gaál et al., 2010). In this case, user fees induce a double 
financial burden on patients, aggravating the existing problems caused by informal 
payments, and make user fees even more unpopular among the public.
Thus, the complexity and sensitivity of the issue makes the topic of out-of-pocket 
patient payments for health care services in Hungary challenging, raises plenty of 
questions to answer and calls for further research. First of all, the elaboration of 
past experience with user fees is necessary to enable an informed policy discussion 
on patient payments in Hungary. Some effects of the introduction of user fees have 
already been reported (e.g. the drop in the utilization of services as well as the revenues 
collected). However, further evidence is needed on the effects of the implementation 
of these fees on equity and efficiency, as well as on informal patient payments. Also, 
experiences with the implementation of user fees in Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries show that the acceptance of patient payments policies by the public 
is crucial for a successful implementation of the fees (e.g. Szalay et al., 2011; Baji and 
Gulácsi, 2010; Bryndova et al., 2009; Hall, 2009). Thus, insight in the attitudes and 
expectations of health care consumers towards these fees is also essential to establish 
formal patient payment mechanisms acceptable for health care consumers. Evidence 
on this issue is lacking in Hungary and some questions remain unanswered: Are 
Hungarian health care consumers really against user fees? If not, on what conditions 
would these fees be more acceptable? Would health care consumers be willing to pay 
official user fees for health care services? Or do they prefer to pay informally, which 
makes user fees less acceptable? The literature provides deep knowledge about the 
phenomenon of informal payments in Hungary. However, little is known about the 
relation between formal and informal payments. This relation should be taken into 
account when implementing policies on formal charges. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide more knowledge and insight on out-
of-pocket patient payments for health care services in Hungary by exploring past 
experiences as well as the public acceptance of user fees. It provides evidence for 
further policy discussion on the implementation of user fees and on the interrelation 
between formal and informal patient payments. Although this dissertation is focused 
on Hungary, its relevance is not exclusive for the Hungarian context, the topic is 
relevant for other countries facing similar challenges with out-of-pocket patient 
payments as well, especially in the CEE region.
In this introductory chapter, we provide a short overview of the Hungarian health 
care system, as well as of out-of-pocket patient payments in Hungary. After that, we 
present the research objectives and the outline of the dissertation.
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1.2 Brief overview of the Hungarian health care system
1.2.1 Organization of the health care system
The Hungarian health care system is financed based on a mandatory social health 
insurance mechanism. The health insurance system is funded by income-related 
social health insurance contributions. The contributions of those who are eligible 
for services, but are not obligated to pay contributions (e.g. children under the age 
18, students, pensioners, disabled people, women on maternity leave) are covered 
by the state budget. Health insurance contributions are pooled in the Health 
Insurance Fund (HIF), which is administered by the National Health Insurance 
Fund Administration (NHIFA), the single health insurance payer in Hungary. 
NHIFA covers the recurrent costs of health services, and finances certain cash 
benefits, such as sick pay, child care and maternity benefits. Capital costs have to 
be covered by the owners of the health care facilities, usually the local or the central 
government. The central government also finances public health programmes and 
vaccination, emergency ambulance services, blood supply as well as high-cost and 
high-technology treatments.
The HIF is divided into more than 30 sub-budgets according to the type of service. 
Primary care is mostly organized based on private practices and reimbursed by 
the NHIFA on a capitation base. Patients are allowed to choose their family 
doctor freely, but may only switch to a new family doctor once a year. Family 
doctors have a gatekeeper role in the system, a referral from the GP is needed 
to visit a specialist except for some services (e.g. dermatological, gynaecological, 
laryngological, ophthalmological psychiatric services). Out-patient specialist 
services are provided by polyclinics, dispensaries, municipal hospitals, county 
hospitals, clinical departments of universities. A fee-for-service point system works 
as a basis for financing out-patient specialist care. Acute in-patient care is financed 
based on diagnosis-related groups, while chronic care is based on per diem rates. 
The vast majority of polyclinics and hospitals are owned by municipalities or the 
state. Regarding the health care personnel, physicians are either employees or 
private entrepreneurs contracted by the NHIFA, while other health professionals 
are mostly paid by salary (Gaál et al., 2011). More details on the organization of 
the Hungarian health care system can be found in Gaál et al., 2011; Boncz et al., 
2004; Gulácsi et al., 2002a; Gulácsi, 2001.
1.2.2 Health care financing
Since the political changes in Hungry in 1989, total health care expenditure has been 
fluctuating between 6.8 percent of GDP in 1996 and 8.6 percent of GDP in 2003 
(OECD Health Data, 2012), as increases were followed by declines due to cost-
containment measures and budget cuts (Gaál et al., 2011), see Figure 1.1. According 
to the latest available statistic, in 2010, Hungary spent 7.8 percent of GDP on health 
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care, which was lower than the average of OECD countries (9.1 percent), but similar 
to other CEE countries (e.g. Czech Republic 7.5 percent and Poland 7.0 percent) 
(OECD Health Data, 2012).
Figure 1.1 Health care expenditure per capita and the share of public resources for 
health care in Hungary, 1991-2010
Source: OECD Health Data, 2012
Public fi nancing
Th e major part of health care expenditure, 64.8 percent in 2010, is covered by public 
resources, i.e. by income-related health insurance contributions and tax revenues 
from the central government budget. However, the share of these resources has been 
decreasing for the last decades from 6.3 percent of the GDP in 1991 to 5.1 percent 
of the GDP in 2010. 
While the level of the health insurance contribution has decreased during the last 
decades (from 23.5 percent to 8 percent of the gross income), the reliance on general 
and local taxes has increased. At the moment, the central government budget is the 
source of more than half of the public expenditure (Gaál et al., 2011). As mentioned 
before, the central government covers the insurance contribution of those who are 
not entitled to pay, fi nances some services, and also contributes to the capital costs of 
providers. Besides, the central government budget covers any shortfall of the NHIFA, 
which has led to an increased burden on the state budget (Gaál et al., 2011).
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Figure 1.2 Revenue and expenditure of the National Health Insurance Fund 
Administration in Hungary, 1993-2011
Note: Amounts are in billion HUF, real values on 2008 price level. Th e exchange rate in 2012 
is approximately 1 EUR = 300 HUF in 2012. Data for 2010 and 2011 are offi  cial estimates. 
Source: ESKI, 2012a; ESKI, 2012b.
Th e NHIFA has been facing continuous defi cits since its foundation in 1993. 
Th e defi cit varied from 3.4 percent of total revenue of the Fund in 1994, with the 
highest level of 31.2 percent of total revenue (or 23.8 percent of total expenditure) 
of the Fund in 2005. Th e cumulative defi cit amounted to 1,500 billion HUF (c.a. 
6 billion EUR) in 2005, which is equal to the annual budget of the Fund (Boncz 
and Sebestyén, 2006). From time to time, cost-containment measures both on the 
revenue and the expenditure side were carried out to control the defi cit, such as 
the increase of health insurance contributions, the extension of entitlements, the 
shrinkage of the scope and depth of coverage as well as structural reforms in health 
service provision, changes in the provider payment mechanisms and the regulation 
of the pharmaceutical market. However, the defi cit could be controlled only for 
short periods of time, and continued to increase during the periods characterized 
by loose fi scal policy, which usually coincide with the election periods (Boncz and 
Sebestyén, 2006), see Figure 1.2.
Private fi nancing
In parallel with the decrease of public resources, the role of private resources has been 
increasing from 0.8 percent of GDP in 1991 to 2.7 percent of the GDP in 2010 (see 
Figure 1.1). Most of these payments are out-of-pocket payments, the role of voluntary 
health insurance is minor (9.1 percent of the total health expenditure). Th e share of 
out-of-pocket payments in total health expenditure has increased considerably during 
the last decades, and has reached 26.2 percent in 2010 (see Figure 1.3). Th is level is 
relatively high compared to the OECD average (20.1 percent), and one of the highest 
among European OECD countries (following Greece with 38.4 percent, and Portugal 
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with 26.0 percent).  Th e increase in out-of-pocket expenditure was mostly the result of 
measures, which shifted costs to the consumers, i.e. the implementation and extension 
of offi  cial co-payments as well as the exclusion of some risks and products from the 
coverage of the social health insurance (see in Section 1.3) 
Figure 1.3 Th e increase of out-of-pocket payments in Hungary, 1991-2010
Source: OECD Health Data, 2012
In total, out-of-pocket payments (formal and informal) represent an increasing part 
of household expenditure, 4.7 percent in 2010. Households contribute to the health 
care cost through diff erent payment channels. According to the statistics of the 
Central Statistical Offi  ce the major part of these payments (80.4 percent in 2010) 
consists of expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical aids (see Table 1.1). Th e 
remaining part represents payment for health care services, i.e. direct payments for 
health care services purchased on the private health care market (which is developed 
in the case of dental treatment, gynecology, ophthalmology or diagnostics) as well 
as formal and informal patient payments for health care services covered by the 
social health insurance. Table 1.1 presents the pattern of out-of-pocket health care 
expenditure. 
Table 1.1 Household expenditure on health care in Hungary, 2000-2010
Household expenditure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Health Care Total (HUF) 13719 17059 19304 22412 24519 26502 26577 30772 33300 34969 37084
% of total household expenditure 3,4% 3,6% 3,7% 3,8% 3,8% 3,9% 3,7% 4,2% 4,3% 4,5% 4,7%
Th e share in total household expenditure on health care spent on:
Medicine (%) 61% 65% 70% 65% 65% 66% 65% 69% 71% 71% 71%
Medical aids (%) 10% 13% 12% 17% 16% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9%
Physician care (%) 8% 10% 10% 8% 7% 7% 8% 7% 5% 5% 6%
Dental care (%) 19% 6% 4% 4% 4% 9% 10% 9% 7% 7% 7%
Other out-patient care (%) 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
Source: Central Statistical Offi  ce, 2012
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1.2.3 Challenges in the health care system
According to the OECD Economic Surveys, Hungary has serious problems with the 
outcome of the health care system (Eris, 2012; OECD, 2012). Despite the substantial 
increase during the last decade, life expectancy at birth in Hungary is the lowest among 
OECD countries (74.3 years, the same as in Turkey), five years less than the EU27 
average and about six years less than the OECD average (Gaál et al., 2011; Eris, 
2012). Non–communicable diseases are the leading cause of morbidity and death. In 
particular, ischemic heart diseases, stroke and cancer mortality rates in Hungary were 
among the highest in the OECD in 2009 (Eris, 2012). These health outcomes are 
not in line with the development of the country neither with the level of health care 
expenditure, which indicates the limited effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2012).
The utilization of services is among the highest in OECD countries. The number of 
physician visits was the highest among European OECD countries, (11.4 per person 
per year, double the OECD average of 6.4) and hospital discharges are exceeding 
the OECD average by nearly 20 percent in 2009 (Eris, 2012; OECD Health Data, 
2012). There is some evidence on the poor quality of the provided services, however 
the number of available health care quality indicators for Hungary is limited (Eris, 
2012; OECD, 2012). Previous studies have provided evidence on the use of less 
effective technologies and the inappropriateness of care (Gulácsi et al., 2011, Makai 
et al., 2009; Wagner et al., 2006; Gulácsi et al., 2004; Gulácsi et al., 2002b; Gulácsi, 
2001; Gulácsi et al., 2000). Furthermore, quality problems can also be explained by 
the limited resources and the lack of investments in health care facilities. Investment 
decisions are separated from the utilization of services (i.e. NHIFA covers only the 
running costs of providers, while owners are responsible for the capital costs), which 
can contribute to the decline in service quality (OECD, 2012).
Furthermore, the outflow of the health care workers is also a pressing issue in 
Hungary. In 2010, the number of physicians per 1000 population was 2.9, slightly 
lower than the OECD average (3.1), while the density of nurses (6.2) is well below 
the OECD average (8.7). The emigration of health care workers is motivated by the 
low salary levels, which are below the average salary in the economy (Eris, 2012; Eke, 
2011). Last, but not least, the practice of informal payments  is also identified as one 
of the main challenges in the system, as these payments undermine policy objectives, 
which lead to inefficient use of the resources and unequal access to services (see more 
information on informal payments in Section 1.3.2). 
To conclude, according to the evaluative of the OECD, health care reforms should 
address the efficient use of current resources in the health care system in the short 
run, and as a medium term goal an increase in available resources would be necessary 
to significantly improve health outcomes and the quality of services (OECD, 2012). 
Furthermore, fighting corruption and retaining health care professionals should be 
also enhanced (Eris, 2012; OECD, 2012).
15
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1.3 Out-of-pocket payments in health care financing 
1.3.1 Official co-payments
As mentioned before, the increase in out-of-pocket expenditure in the last 
decades was mostly the result of measures, which shifted costs to the consumers, 
i.e. the implementation and extension of official co-payments as well as the 
exclusion of some risks and products from the coverage of the social health 
insurance.
The first attempts to shift costs to patients in order to contain public expenditure 
included the increase of co-payments for pharmaceuticals and medical aids, as 
well as a decrease of entitlements for subsidized pharmaceuticals (Gaál et al., 
2011). Due to these changes, patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals have 
increased considerably and they represent the major part of out-of-pocket 
household expenditure on health care. At the moment, patients are obliged to pay 
co-payments for the vast majority of the drugs prescribed. The “Act on the secure 
and efficient supply of pharmaceuticals and medical aids and on the general rules of 
pharmaceutical trade” adopted by Parliament in 2006 defines the reimbursement 
categories for pharmaceuticals as well as the subsidy rates for drugs in each 
category. In the category of “indication dependent drugs” (physicians with a 
special permit or recognition are authorized to prescribe these medications) there 
are four subsidy categories: 50, 70, 90 percent and 100 percent for drugs for life-
threatening chronic conditions and orphan drugs in selected indications, with 
the co-payments of 50, 30 and 10 percent of the full price. For drugs which are 
100 percent subsidized a 300 HUF (~1 euro) fixed fee per box should be paid 
since 2007. Drugs that belong to the category of “normative reimbursement” (i.e. 
drugs for chronic diseases, that all physicians are authorized to prescribe) patient 
co-payments account for 15, 45 and 75 percent of the price. In addition to these 
categories, reference pricing (both generic and therapeutic reference pricing) 
is also used, where the difference between the reference price and the actual 
price should be paid by the patients. In Hungary, some patients with a special 
certificate (i.e. low-income or disabled whose medical expenses exceed a certain 
limit) have the right to get prescribed medicine for free, but the amount should 
not exceed a certain budget (max. 12000 HUF ~ 42 euro) per months. The 
increase of co-payments for pharmaceuticals and medical aids is continuous and 
substantial. Recently, according to the policy objectives, a 47 percent cut of the 
public pharmaceutical budget is to be carried out till 2013, during a two years 
period, which can contribute to the further increase of out-of-pocket payments 
(Gulácsi et al., 2012).
Regarding health care services, slower and minor changes have characterized the last 
decades. Some risks have been excluded from the benefit package and official co-
payments were implemented for some services. In 1995, for example, the cost of 
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some treatments (e.g. tooth-preserving dental services1) was not covered any more 
by the social health insurance and co-payments for patient transportation were 
introduced. Since 1997, Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the Services of Compulsory Health 
Insurance and related decrees define a negative list of services, which are not covered 
by the social health insurance or require official patient co-payments/user charges 
(Gaál et al., 2011).
At the moment, besides the co-payments for pharmaceuticals and medical aids, co-
payments are only applied for prostheses, balneotherapy (spa-treatment), dental 
prostheses, treatment in sanatoria, long-term chronic care and in in-patient care (e.g. 
for hotel services, i.e. extra meals and accommodation). Furthermore, co-payments 
are charged if: (1) patients use non-emergency specialist services without a referral 
from their GP; (2) patients choose to visit a provider other than the one they were 
referred to (excluding delivery and maternity care); and (3) when patients desire 
more services than those prescribed by their physician (based on Act CLIV of 
1997 on Health and Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the Services of Compulsory Health 
Insurance, Government Decree No. 284/1997 (XII. 23.) on the Fees for Certain 
Health Services which Can Be Utilized with Co-payments Only). 2
However, Hungary has an interesting experience with the implementation of user fees. 
In 2007, officialuser fees were introduced for the use of health care services covered 
by the social health insurance. The introduction of these fees was one element of the 
reform package, defined by the Convergence Program of Hungary (Government of 
the Republic of Hungary, 2006). The objective of the Convergence Program was to 
cut the increasing government deficit in order to meet the Maastricht criteria of the 
EU for joining the Euro zone3. According to the policy objectives, the introduction 
of user fees was expected to control the utilization of health care services, decrease the 
high number of “unnecessary visits” (see above) and diminish informal payments, 
which are widespread in Hungary (Ministry of Health, 2006). See more details on 
informal payments in Section 1.3.2.
Although the amount of the fees was relatively low (about one euro per physician visit 
and per day spent in hospital), the implementation met with strong political opposition 
and unpopularity among the public. One year later, in April 2008, the payments were 
abolished as a result of a population referendum initiated by the opposition party in 
1 In 1996, tooth-preserving dental services were reintroduced into the benefit package with some co-payments. 
The next government abolished co-payments for tooth preserving dental treatments in 2001 (Gaál et al., 2011).
2 In addition „Special rules apply to a few services, such as infertility treatments, for which the number of 
attempts covered by HIF is limited. Excluded services: medical examinations required to certify an individual’s 
fitness to drive or hold firearms; treatments for aesthetic or recreational purposes; cosmetic surgery; massage; 
abortion or sterilization without medical indication, and the prostate-specific antigen test for screening purposes 
are not covered as well as treatments with not proven effectiveness in improving health (not included in the 
International Classification of Procedures in Medicine, introduced in 1976 by WHO). Since 2007, treatment 
for injuries resulting from extreme sport activities and vaccinations that are not part of the government’s 
mandatory immunization program are also not covered by public sources.” (Gaál et al., 2011, p. 73-74).
3 The ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic product must not exceed 3% at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year and the total state debt not more than 60% of GDP (European Commission, 1992).
17
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parliament, where more than 80 percent of the voters supported the abolishment of the 
fees. During this one year period, the number of visits as well as days spent in hospital 
dropped by 15-20 percent (Boncz et al., 2008; Kőrösi et al., 2009; Nagy et al., 2009). 
The amount of revenues generated by the user fees was estimated to 20-21 billion HUF 
(Ministry of Health, 2008), i.e. 4-5 percent of public health care expenditure.
Since the abolishment of these fees, most of the health care services covered by the 
social health insurance have been provided free of charge for consumers, however, 
patients regularly pay informally for health care services to the health care personnel. 
1.3.2 Informal patient payments for health care services
Although the role of official user fees for health care services is limited, Hungarian 
patients are regularly paying for health care services through informal payment 
channels. Informal payments (called “gratitude payments” in Hungary) are especially 
widespread in in-patient care, where around half of the patients pay informally to 
health care personnel (Gaál et al., 2006b; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Bognár et al., 
2000). Some authors consider these payments as the heritage of the socialist system, 
while others argue that these payments existed even before the socialist period 
(Mihályi, 2004; Angelus, 1996; Andréka, 1995; Ajkay, 1994; Antal, 1992; Adám, 
1989; Adám, 1986). Nevertheless, these payments are still widespread in Hungary 
even after the 20-years transition period. 
There are different explanations of the motivation to pay and accept informal payments. 
The literature suggest that these payments are not only an expression of gratitude of the 
patients, but they rather work as a “fee-for-service” for better quality care (e.g. more 
personal attention, quicker access) (Gaál et al., 2005). Gaál and McKee (2004) argue 
that these payments can be interpreted as a reaction to the declining performance of the 
health care system (Gaál and McKee, 2004), while the Medical Chamber in Hungary 
explains these payments by the low salary of physicians and the dysfunctioning of the 
health care system4. 
There are various estimations about the magnitude of informal payments (Gaál et al., 
2006b; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Bognár et al., 2000). Gaál et al. (2006) compare 
these statistics and estimate that they amount to 16.2-50.9 billion HUF (64.8-203.6 
million euro), i.e. 1.5-4.6 percent of the total health expenditure. Informal payments 
contribute to the income of the health care personnel, however they are rather 
unequally distributed between them. According to the same estimations, 5 percent 
of the physicians receive 60 percent of the informal payments (Gaál et al., 2006b). 
The literature on informal payments suggests that these payments violate the 
transparency of health care financing and the accountability of providers, which results 
4 Available at: http://www.mok.hu/upload/mok/document/MOK_etikai_kodex.pdf. Accessed: 07-07-2012.
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in an inefficient use of health care resources (Ensor, 2004; Gaál and McKee, 2004; Lewis, 
2002) and inequalities in access to health care (Szende and Culyer, 2006; Balabanova 
et al., 2004; Mastilica and Bozikov, 1999). Furthermore, informal payments create 
adverse incentives for their beneficiaries which can be in conflict with the government’s 
policy objectives. The beneficiaries might have the power to block important changes 
in health care system to maintain the status-quo (Gaál et al., 2006a).  Thus, in the last 
decades, several Ministry Committees and policy measures (including media campaigns 
against informal payments, the increase in salaries in the public sector as well as the 
introduction of official user fees for health care services) have addressed the problem of 
informal payments in Hungary without appreciable results (Bognár et al., 2000). 
1.4 The research aims of the dissertation
Given the relevance of research on out-of-pocket payments as outlined above, the 
goal of this dissertation is to study out-of-pocket patient payments (including both 
formal and informal payments) for health care services covered by the social health 
insurance in Hungary. 5 The main aims of the dissertations are formulated as follows:
1) To show the lessons to be learned from the experience with the implementation 
of user charges in 2007.
2) To identify challenges and perspectives for patient payments in the future, focusing 
on the public attitudes toward patient payments (formal and informal), as well as 
on the willingness of the health care consumers to pay official fees for health care 
services.
The first research aim focuses on the past experiences with user fees. It is already 
known from previous studies that the introduction of user fees has resulted in a 15-
20 percent drop of the utilization of health care services (Kőrösi et al., 2009; Nagy 
et al., 2009; Boncz et al., 2008). This dissertation, addresses other questions related 
to this reform, which have not been analyzed before. In particular, the research 
focuses on the impact of these fees on equity and the effect of these fees on informal 
payments of health care consumers. 
The second research aim is more focused on the future perspectives of patient 
payments in Hungary. As suggested by previous research (as well as past experiences), 
public acceptance is crucial to the successful implementation of user charges (Tambor 
et al., 2011; Rechel and McKee, 2009; Hall, 2009). Therefore, the dissertation 
aims to reveal the experiences and expectations of health care actors towards user 
5 Patient payments for health care services cover both formal and informal payments paid directly at the use of 
health care services. User fees are defined as direct official payments charged from patients for the use of health 
care services covered by the social health insurance. Informal payments are defined as unofficial payments and 
gifts in kinds given to the health care personnel.
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fees for services as well as the acceptance of these fees, which might explain their 
unpopularity among the public. The willingness of Hungarian health care consumers 
to pay formally for health care services as well as their preferences for different service 
attributes are also in the focus of this dissertation.
Talking about the implementation of user charges in Hungary, we cannot avoid taking 
into account the existence of informal payments. In this dissertation, special attention 
is paid to the relation between formal and informal payments when analyzing the 
two main research questions defined above. When analyzing past experiences with 
the health care reforms carried out in 2007, one of the main research objectives is 
to examine the changes in the distribution of informal payments in the context of 
increasing official fees, as well as the effect of the introduction of user fees on the 
probability of paying informally. Regarding public acceptance of patient payments, 
we aim to examine attitudes and perspectives towards informal payments as well, 
in order to better understand why these payments are still widespread. Moreover, 
we examine the link between the willingness to pay formally and past informal 
payments, which can help to identify whether consumers prefer to pay formally or 
informally. 
1.5 The relevance of the dissertation
The results of the dissertation have policy relevance and implications. The exploration 
of past experiences with the implementation of user fees (the first research aim) 
might serve as a lesson for policy makers in the future to develop sustainable policies 
on patient payments. Furthermore better insight in the attitudes and expectations of 
health care consumers towards these fees (i.e. objective, scope, measure, exemptions) 
can help to establish policies that are more acceptable for health care consumers. The 
results also provide information about consumer preferences and the social values of 
the improvement of services derived from willingness to pay estimates, which can be 
relevant for the NHIFA and other funders (i.e. the local and central governments) 
to identify investment priorities in the system. However, as this dissertation focuses 
on the issue of patient payments (user fees and informal payments) for publicly 
financed health care services, our results might be useful regarding other forms of 
private financing as well. Some of the results, especially on the willingness to pay and 
consumer preferences, can be relevant for the private market of services as well as for 
voluntary health insurance. The extension of the private health insurance market is 
also an important issue in Hungary, as since the beginning of 2012, the government 
offers tax-subsidies for companies to purchase private health insurance for their 
employees. 
Although this dissertation is focused on Hungary, the topic is relevant in a broader 
geographical context, especially for CEE countries. These countries  have been facing 
similar challenges during the last decades concerning the transition of the health 
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care system, and the continuous financial problems of their health insurance funds 
(Bryndova et al., 2009; Rechel and McKee, 2009; Kuszewski and Gericke, 2005; 
Hlavačka et al., 2004). Among the CEE countries, we also find similarities with 
Hungary regarding the structure of health care financing, e.g. the increasing and 
relatively high share of out-of-pocket payments in health care financing, which is 
driven by expenditures on medicine as well as the wide spread informal payments. 
Furthermore, similarly to Hungary, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia user fees 
were also revoked a few years after their implementation due to political resistance 
in both countries.
1.6 The outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into three main parts, each part containing two Chapters. 
The first part focuses on the past experiences with patient payments during the 
reform period 2006-2007. The second part considers the attitude of the population 
towards formal and informal patient payments. The third part reveals the willingness 
of health care consumers to pay formal fees for health care services.
In Chapter 2, we examine the equity effects of the reforms carried out in 2007 in 
Hungary. This issue has not yet been analyzed in previous studies. Based on the 
existing literature, we expect that out-of-pocket payments are regressive, i.e. lower-
income households pay a relatively higher share of their income on health care than 
better-off households (de Graeve and van Ourti, 2003; van Doorslaer et al., 1999; 
Wagstaff et al., 1999; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992). Furthermore, previous 
experiences suggest, that reforms which aim to increase official co-payments, lead to 
a relatively greater burden on worse-off households (de Graeve and van Ourti, 2003; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992). We test these expectations in Chapter 2.
First, we review the reform arrangements focusing on the changes in patient payment 
mechanism. After that, we present the scope and magnitude of out-of-pocket payments 
in Hungary (separately for expenditures on pharmaceuticals, formal payments 
and informal payments for health care services) as well as the distribution of these 
payments before during and after the reform period. We examine the changes in the 
progressivity of these payments during a four year period (2005-2008) using data on 
household expenditure from the Household Budget Survey carried out by the Central 
Statistical Office of Hungary every year. We calculate Kakwani indexes as the measure 
of inequality.
In Chapter 3, we focus on the effect of the introduction of user fees in 2007 on 
informal payments. As mentioned before, in CEE countries, where informal payments 
are widespread, the introduction of user fees is also motivated by their potential to 
eradicate or “formalize” informal payments (Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2000; Schneider, 
2008; Stepurko et al., 2010). In Hungary, one of the main policy objectives of the 
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introduction of user fees in 2007 was also to diminish informal payments. In Chapter 
3, we address this issue, and examine whether the introduction of user fees affected 
informal payments of health care consumers as expected by the policy makers. 
For the analysis, we use cross-sectional data collected in a household survey carried 
out in April 2007 - two months after the implementation of user fees - to study the 
short term effect of the introduction of user fees. We present the pattern of informal 
payments in primary, out-patient specialist and in in-patient care in the period before 
and shortly after user fees for health care services were introduced. We also examine 
whether we can observe a change in the probability of paying informally in the short 
run using probit regression analysis.
In Chapter 4, we focus on the attitude of health care stakeholders towards user fees. 
No previous research has been carried out on the expectations and acceptance of 
user fees in Hungary. Experiences of health care actors with user fees introduced in 
2007, has not been reported either. However, the Hungarian example with user fees 
also shows that public acceptance is crucial to the successful implementation of these 
fees. We expect that the analysis of the experiences, the expectations of health care 
actors towards these fees, as well as their acceptance, can explain the outcome of the 
population referendum. Moreover, the results can help to establish policies that are 
more acceptable for the public in the future. 
In the analysis, we combine qualitative and quantitative methods to reveal the 
experiences and expectations of health system stakeholders in Hungary related to 
user fees as well as their approval of such fees. Qualitative as well as quantitative 
data collected in 2009 during focus-group discussions with health care consumers 
and physicians, and in-depth interviews with policy makers and health insurance 
representatives are used. To examine experiences, expectations as well as acceptance of 
formal fees, we use content analysis of transcripts. We combine qualitative methods 
with cluster analysis, to identify the main attitude groups. Quantitative data are 
derived from a questionnaire which was filled in by the participants and respondents.
In Chapter 5, we analyze the attitudes and perceptions of health care consumers 
towards informal payments. One of the reasons that informal payments are still 
widespread might be that these payments are tolerated or even accepted by health 
care consumers. Based on previous literature, we expect that informal payments are 
a reaction to the declining performance of the health care system, as dissatisfied 
health care consumers who have no possibility to satisfy their needs elsewhere are 
using informal channels to obtain services with better quality or access (Gaál and 
McKee, 2005). A better understanding of the perception of the population, can 
explain why informal payments are still widespread in Hungary even 20 years after 
the change of the socialist regime. The results can also help to work out solutions for 
the eradication of these payments.
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To analyze perceptions of informal payments, we use data from a quantitative 
household survey carried out as part of an international research project in 2010 on 
a representative sample of 1037 respondents (see Appendix A for more details). To 
identify main perception groups of informal payments, we combine cluster analysis 
with multinomial logistic regression.
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, we apply stated preference methods to elicit 
the willingness of Hungarian health care consumers to pay formal fees for the 
improvement of health care service attributes. Based on previous studies in CEE 
countries, we expect that health care consumers are not against paying an extra 
contribution to the cost of health care services if they are provided with better quality 
or access (Pavlova et al., 2003, Baji and Gulácsi, 2010). Informal payments by the 
population also indicate a willingness of health care consumers to pay for improved 
quality and access.
For the analysis, we use the same dataset as was used in Chapter 5. The quantitative 
household survey included contingent valuation and discrete choice experiment 
tasks in order to reveal the willingness of health care consumers to pay user fees.
In Chapter 6, a contingent valuation method is used to elicit information on the 
willingness of the Hungarian health care consumers to pay officially for health care 
services. Besides, a bivariate probit model is applied to examine the relationship 
between willingness to pay and past informal payments.
In Chapter 7, we use data from a discrete choice experiment included in the survey, to 
elicit preferences of health care consumers about the choice of health care providers. 
We estimate the effect of the improvement of service attributes (quality, access, and 
price) on patients’ choice, as well as the differences in preferences among different 
socio-demographic groups. We also estimate the marginal willingness to pay for the 
improvement in attribute levels by calculating marginal rates of substitution.
Finally, Chapter 8 is devoted to the general discussion of the research results. In this 
chapter, we summarize and discuss the main findings following the research aims of 
the dissertation. The chapter also outlines the policy implications of the results, as 
well as prospects for further research. 
2 Chapter 2
Changes in equity in out-of-pocket payments 
during the period of health care reforms 
– evidence from Hungary
This chapter draws upon: 
Baji P, Pavlova M, Gulácsi L, Groot W. (2012): Changes in equity in out-of-
pocket payments during the period of health care reforms: evidence from Hungary. 
International Journal for Equity in Health, 11(1):36.
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Abstract
Background: At the beginning of 2007, health care reforms were implemented in 
Hungary in order to decrease public expenditures on health care. Reforms included 
the increase of co-payments for pharmaceuticals and the introduction of co-payments 
for health care services. 
Objective: The objective of this chapter is to examine the progressivity of household 
expenditure on health care during the reform period, separately for expenditures 
on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and expenditures on formal and informal 
patient payments for health care services. 
Method: We use data on household expenditure from the Household Budget Survey 
carried out by the Central Statistical Office of Hungary. We present household 
expenditure as a percentage of household income across different income quintiles 
and we calculate Kakwani indexes as a measure of progressivity for a four years period 
(2005-2008): before, during and after the implementation of the health care reforms. 
Results: We find that expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices are the 
most regressive types of expenditure (Kakwani index -0.23/-0.24), and at the same 
time, they represent the major part of the total household expenditure on health 
care (78-85 percent of total out-of-pocket household expenditure on health care). 
Informal payments are also regressive, while expenditures on formal payments for 
services are the most proportional to income. We find that expenditures on formal 
payments became regressive after the introduction of user fees (Kakwani index -0.1). 
At the same time, we observe that expenditures on informal payments became more 
proportional during the reform period (Kakwani index increases from -0.20/-0.18 
to -0.12).
Conclusion: More attention should be paid on the protection of low-income social 
groups when increasing or introducing co-payments especially for pharmaceuticals 
but also for services. Also, it is important to eliminate the practice of informal 
payments in order to improve equity in health care financing.
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2.1 Introduction
Out-of-pocket payments already represent a considerable part of total health care 
expenditure in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (de Graeve and van 
Ourti, 2003). However, reform arrangements, intended to decrease public expenditure 
on health care, often lead to the further increase of out-of-pocket payments in health 
care financing. According to the results of previous studies, out-of-pocket payments 
are a regressive means of financing health care (e.g. Doorslaer et al., 1999; Wagstaff 
et al., 1999; van Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992). Thus, households with lower-
income spend a relatively higher share of their income on health care than those with 
higher income. This is in conflict with the European health policy targets, which 
argue that the ability to pay rather than the health status should determine health care 
payments. In other words, the distribution of health care payments should be in line 
with the distribution of households’ income rather than with the actual consumption 
of health care (e.g. de Graeve and van Ourti, 2003; Wagstaff et al., 1999). Reform 
arrangements, which lead to the increase of out-of-pocket payments in health care 
financing, might lead to even higher differences between income groups, inducing a 
greater burden falling on the worse-off households (Gelormino et al., 2011; Albreht 
and Klazinga, 2009; Mastilica and Bozikov, 1999).
In this chapter we analyze the progressivity of households’ out-of-pocket payments 
for health care in Hungary, where at the beginning of 2007, health care reforms 
were carried out in order to decrease public expenditures on health care. Besides 
structural and regulative arrangements, the austerity measures resulted in increased 
patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals and in the introduction of co-payments for 
using health care services. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the progressivity of household expenditure 
on health care during a four years period (2005-2008): before, during and after the 
implementation of the health care reforms. We are particularly interested in whether 
we can observe significant changes in the distribution of household expenditure on 
health care across income groups after the implementation of the reforms. For the 
analysis, we use data from the Household Budget Survey carried out by the Central 
Statistical Office of Hungary6. We consider total household expenditure on health 
care as well as its comprising elements, namely expenditures on pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices, and on formal and informal patient payments for health care services. 
Kakwani indexes by types of expenditures are estimated to indicate the progressivity 
of household expenditure on health care (see Kakwani et al., 1997; Kakwani, 1977).
Our study provides evidence on how austerity measures in the health care system, 
such as those carried out in Hungary at the beginning of 2007, can affect the 
progressivity of households’ out-of-pocket payments and whether the changes can 
6 For more details on the survey see: http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/ksh_web.meta.objektum?p_lang=EN&p_
menu_id=110&p_ot_id=100&p_obj_id=ZHC&p_session_id=48488026;
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lead to a relatively greater burden on lower-income households. Our results are 
relevant to countries with a similar structure of health care financing, facing similar 
challenges, especially to countries in the CEE region. 
2.2 Background: Overview of the reforms in the Hungarian 
health care sector in 2006-2007
Due to the continuous deficit of the National Health Insurance Fund (see more 
information in Chapter 1), the health care system was one of the fields where 
the Hungarian government had to consider reforms as a part of the Convergence 
Program of Hungary at the end of 2006 (Government of the Republic of Hungary, 
2006). The objective of the Convergence Program was to contain the government 
deficit and meet the Maastricht criteria of the EU for joining the Euro zone (i.e. the 
ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic product must not exceed 
3 percent at the end of the preceding fiscal year and the total state debt must not 
go beyond 60 percent of the GDP (European Comission, 1992). The resulting 
austerity measures in the health care system in 2006-2007 aimed to decrease public 
health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The reforms affected the regulation, 
structure and financing of the health care system. Reforms involved the increase of 
patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals as well as the introduction of co-payments 
for the use of public health care services, and co-insurance in the case of a free choice 
of physician, which led to the increasing role of out-of-pocket patient payments in 
health care financing. However co-payments for health care services were abolished 
at the beginning of 2008, as a result of a population referendum (see Chapter 1 and 
later in Chapter 3 and 4). A summary of the reform measures is presented in Box 2.1.
As a result of the reform arrangements, total health care expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP decreased from 8.3 percent in 2006 to 7.7 percent in 2007. Public 
health care expenditure decreased compared to the year before by 1.8 percent in 
nominal terms and 9.1 percent in real terms. In fact, the share of public health care 
expenditure dropped from 72.6 to 70.4 percent (OECD Health Data, 2012). Also, 
the NHIFA registered savings in 2007. During this period, the NHIFA’s expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals decreased by 17 percent due to the cost-containment measures 
such as the increase of patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals (ESKI, 2012a; ESKI, 
2012b; Inotai et al., 2010).
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Box 2.1 The summary of health care reforms carried out in 2007
The expansion of contributing payers
The reforms aimed to settle the eligibility criteria for the health for insurance coverage. According to the new regu-
lations, the contributions of those who are eligible for services, but are not obligated to pay contributions (children 
under the age 18, students, pensioners, disability pensioners, women on maternity leave) is  to be covered by the 
state budget. Those, who do not belong to these categories and who are either employees or self-employed workers 
are obliged to pay insurance contributions. The payment obligations have also been expanded to dependent fam-
ily members and agricultural workers. According to the NHIFA’s estimations, the status of more than 1 million 
citizens in the NHIFA register was uncertain before the reform (NHIFA, 2007).
Changes in the health insurance coverage
The introduction of co-payments. Co-payments for public health care services (called a “visit fee”) were introduced in 
February, 2007. The policy objectives of the user fees were to control demand for public health care services, as well as 
to eradicate informal patient payments in Hungary (Ministry of Health, 2006). The amount of co-payments was 300 
HUF (~1.1 euro) for each visit to a GP and out-patient specialist with a referral, and 600 HUF (~2.2 euro) if the patients 
use out-patient specialist care without a referral. In in-patient care, an amount of 300 HUF (~1.1 euro) was introduced 
per day of hospitalization. In case of unnecessary use of emergency care, 1000 HUF (~3.7 euro) had to be paid. The 
beneficiary of the revenue was the provider institution, or the GP praxis physician in the case of primary care. Children 
under the age 18 and users of certain health care services (e.g. emergency care, some chronic care/treatments, prenatal 
and preventive care) were exempted. Moreover, a stop-loss was introduced and defined by a maximum of 20 visits/days 
hospitalization per year. The payments after these 20 visits/days hospitalization a year were reimbursed by the state.
Restricted choice of patients to use health care services. The government also aimed to enforce a system of referrals in 
the public health care sector. According to the regulation out-patient and in-patient care could only be accessed 
based on a referral issued at the lower levels of the health care system. In addition, patients’ choice of health care 
provider has been restricted. Patients could be admitted only to 2-3 hospitals in the region where the patients are 
living. Higher co-payments (30 percent of the hospital cost) should be paid, if patients wanted to attend hospitals 
(or physicians) in another region.
A new act on pharmaceuticals
The “Act on the Secure and Efficient Supply of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Aids and on the General Rules of Phar-
maceutical trade” was adopted by Parliament in November 2006 (Act 2006/XCVIII.). This reform was expected 
to reduce public expenditure on pharmaceuticals by (1) enforcing the role of patients in financing (i.e. by decreas-
ing subsidies on pharmaceuticals) as well as the role of pharmaceutical companies (by the introduction of risk 
sharing mechanisms between payer and the pharmaceutical companies and the increasing taxes on promotion), 
(2) supporting generics by regulating the drug prescription system; (3) and to create price-competition between 
pharmaceutical companies by the liberalisation of the pharmaceutical market.
Decreasing subsidies and increasing co-payments. NHIFA reimburses drugs in three categories: (1) Fully reimbursed 
drugs (2) Indication dependent drugs (3) Normative reimbursement. The measure of the subsidies is a defined 
percentage of the negotiated gross price of the medicine. In 2007 reimbursements on pharmaceuticals were de-
creased. First, for drugs belonging to the category of “normative reimbursement”, the reimbursement rates have 
been decreased from 5 to 25 percent; from 70 to 55 percent; and from 90 to 85 percent. For drugs in the category 
of “indication dependent pharmaceuticals” the reimbursement rate of 90 percent was reconsidered, and replaced 
by three subsidy categories (50, 70, 90 percent). In the third category, where drugs are 100 percent subsidized, a 
minimum 300 HUF (c.a. 1.1 euro) co-payment per box was introduced (Inotai et al., 2010). 
Structural reforms
The new system of high priority and territorial hospitals was established in April 2007, based on the Act 2006/
CXXXII. In total, 77 territorial hospitals and 37 high priority hospitals were set up. Structural reforms concerned 
the decease of the number of hospital beds in in-patient care as well. Acute bed capacity was cut by 16 000 beds (~ 
27 percent), while chronic bed capacity increased by 7500 (~31 percent) in 2007(Vas et al., 2009).
The establishment of Health Insurance Supervisory Authority
The Health Insurance Supervisory Authority was established in December 2006, to monitor contracts between the 
NHIFA and the providers. The Authority was also responsible for investigating patients complaints.
Note: Beyond these changes, the transformation of the health insurance system was planned as well. However, the 
idea of replacing the single-payer insurance model by competing Health Insurance Management Funds never ma-
terialised in practice. The Act on Health Insurance Management Funds was revoked by Parliament in May 2008.
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2.3 Data and method
We use data on household expenditure from the Household Budget Survey carried 
out by the Central Statistical Office of Hungary for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2008. The Central Household Budget Survey (HBS) provides detailed information 
on yearly expenditure on housing conditions and consumer durables according to the 
detailed grouping of Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) 
international nomenclature. It also provides data on the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the household7.
The data collection consists of two parts: 1/12 of the selected households (about 750 
households) keep a diary on their expenses and income for a month followed by a 
retrospective interview about their income and exceptional expenditures at the next 
year after the reference year.8 The dataset contains data for 9058 households in 2005, 
8975 households in 2006, 8547 households in 2007, and 7650 households in 2008.
In this analysis, we examine four types of household expenditure on health care: 
•	 expenditures on pharmaceutical products, medical aids and other medical 
products (appliances and equipments) – henceforth called as “pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices”.
•	 formal payments for public and private health care services (including fees for 
GPs, out-patient physicians, dental care and hospital services both the private 
and the public sector, services of laboratories and x-ray centres, ambulance 
services, services of freelance nurses, midwives and acupuncturists, chiropractors, 
optometrists and various types of therapists)
•	 informal payments for health care services (informal payments for GP, out-patient 
and in-patient care, dentist and  ambulance);
•	 total health care expenditure (incl. the sum of the first three types of expenditure 
described above).
We present these types of expenditures by income quintiles as a percentage of the 
net yearly household income (also available from the HBS survey). To examine the 
progressivity of household expenditure on health care, we also calculate the Kakwani 
index. Kakwani indexes are estimated using the regression formula suggested by 
Kakwani et al. (1997) (Kakwani et al., 1997).
This index is widely used for measuring progression in taxation and also, the progression 
of out-of-pocket payments (e.g. van Doorslaer et al., 1999; Wagstaff et al., 1999; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992). Recent applications of the index in health care 
can be found in the literature (e.g. Hanley et al., 2008; Smith, 2010, Akazili et al., 
2011). The index is defined as twice the area between the payments’ concentration 
7 For more details on the classification see: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=352;
8 For more details see: http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/ksh_web.meta.objektum?p_lang=EN&p_menu_id=410&p_
almenu_id=101&p_ot_id=100&p_level=1&p_session_id=15276620&p_obj_id=ZHC; 
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curve and the income (Lorenz) curve. The value of Kakwani index ranges from –2 to 
1. A negative value indicates regressive payments, i.e. in households with lower income, 
the share of expenditure as a percentage of income is higher than in households with 
higher income. A positive value indicates a progressive distribution, i.e. in households 
with lower income, the share of expenditure is lower than in households with higher 
income. In the case of proportionality, the concentration curve coincides with the 
Lorenz curve and the Kakwani index is zero (O’Donnell et al., 2004).
2.4 Results
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics on the different types of health care 
expenditure as well as the net yearly household income of the households by income 
quintiles during the period 2005-2008. In that period, total household expenditure 
on health care increased from 3.7 to 4.4 percent of the net household income. This 
share varies between 2.1-2.5 percent of the household income in the highest income 
quintile to 6.1-7.3 percent of the household income in the lower-income quintiles. 
The major cost driver of households’ health care expenditure are the expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which represent 78 percent of total expenditure 
in 2005, and this share increases to 85 percent in 2008. This share is the highest in 
the lower-income quintiles, varying between 81-89 percent of total household health 
care expenditure, while the share is the lowest (70-79 percent) in the higher income 
quintiles. Expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices increase from 2.9 
percent in 2005 and 2006 to 3.7 percent of net household income in 2008.
Formal payments for health care services account for 0.5-0.6 percent of household 
income. Its share in total household expenditure on health care is 13 percent in 
2005 and 2006, which increases to 15 percent in 2007 with the introduction of 
co-payments for health care services, and decreases to 11 percent in 2008 with the 
abolishment of these fees. Households in the lowest income quintile pay a 3.2-3.6 
times higher share of their income on these items. The share of the expenditures 
on formal payments is the highest in the highest income quintile (17-22 percent), 
while it is lowest in the lowest income quintile (7-13 percent). Households from the 
highest income quintile pay only a 1.2-1.9 times higher share of their income on 
these items than households from the lowest quintile.
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Table 2.1 Out-of-pocket household expenditure on health care in Hungary, 2005-2008
2005 2006 2007 2008
Expenditure Quintile Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Income
(Thousand 
HUF)
1st 920 213 951*** 245 889*** 208 882 202
2nd 1 539 159 1 586*** 159 1 468*** 160 1 442*** 165
3rd 2101 175 2157*** 174 2 020*** 166 1 972*** 161
4th 2 790 239 2 840*** 238 2 686*** 227 2 609*** 214
5th 4 622 1 802 4 627*** 1 992 4 333*** 1 726 4 062*** 1 171
Total 2 394 1 518 2 433*** 1 556 2 279*** 1 426 2 193*** 1 225
Pharmaceu-
ticals
and medical 
devices
(% of income)
1st 4.96% 5.41% 5.29% 6.75% 6.00%*** 6.96% 6.56%** 8.05%
2nd 3.53% 4.20% 3.43% 4.10% 4.10%*** 4.67% 4.40%* 5.02%
3rd 2.38% 3.02% 2.42% 2.95% 3.03%*** 3.87% 3.26%* 3.73%
4th 1.90% 2.34% 1.89% 2.15% 2.26%*** 2.69% 2.33% 2.75%
5th 1.54% 1.72% 1.47% 1.67% 1.75%*** 2.14% 1.97%*** 2.20%
Total 2.86% 3.80% 2.90% 4.19% 3.43%*** 4.66% 3.71%*** 5.10%
Formal 
payments
(% of income)
1st 0.62% 2.36% 0.77% 6.04% 0.91% 2.86% 0.49%*** 2.06%
2nd 0.42% 1.36% 0.45% 1.56% 0.67%*** 1.57% 0.43%*** 1.49%
3rd 0.50% 1.47% 0.36%*** 1.10% 0.61%*** 1.57% 0.46%** 2.12%
4th 0.41% 1.15% 0.45% 1.49% 0.52% 1.64% 0.49% 1.70%
5th 0.48% 1.28% 0.41%* 0.95% 0.49%** 1.26% 0.42% 1.27%
Total 0.49% 1.58% 0.49% 2.95% 0.64%*** 1.87% 0.46%*** 1.76%
Informal 
payments
(% of income)
 
1st 0.51% 1.50% 0.56% 1.92% 0.26%*** 0.81% 0.28% 1.37%
2nd 0.43% 1.59% 0.38% 1.13% 0.23%*** 0.70% 0.29%** 1.01%
3rd 0.27% 0.71% 0.29% 1.38% 0.19%*** 0.67% 0.18% 0.61%
4th 0.25% 0.78% 0.22% 0.66% 0.15%*** 0.52% 0.19% 1.65%
5th 0.18% 0.61% 0.20% 0.62% 0.14%** 0.63% 0.10%** 0.36%
Total 0.33% 1.13% 0.33% 1.25% 0.19%*** 0.67% 0.21% 1.11%
Total
(% of income)
1st 6.10% 6.60% 6.62%* 11.54% 7.18% 8.20% 7.34% 9.13%
2nd 4.38% 5.10% 4.26% 4.89% 5.00%*** 5.32% 5.11% 5.87%
3rd 3.14% 3.72% 3.07% 3.69% 3.82%*** 4.54% 3.90% 4.53%
4th 2.56% 2.96% 2.56% 2.95% 2.93%*** 3.42% 3.01% 3.86%
5th 2.20% 2.46% 2.08% 2.21% 2.38%*** 2.81% 2.50% 2.75%
Total 3.68% 4.65% 3.72% 6.28% 4.26%*** 5.48% 4.37% 5.93%
Note: 1 EUR~250 HUF during the examined period; income is indicated on 2007 price level indexed by 
CPI 2005-2006:+3.9%; 2006-2007:+0.8%; 2007-2008:+0.61%; t-test is used to compare the values 
between the years (H0:the share equal to the share in the previous year): *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001. 
The grey area present the period of health care reforms.
Informal payments account for 0.2-0.3 percent of the household income. These 
payments represent 9 percent of the total expenditure in 2005 and 2007, and 
decrease to 4 percent and 5 percent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The share of 
these payments in total expenditure is rather equal among income quintiles varying 
between 8-10 percent before the reform period, and 4-6 percent after the reform. 
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Table 2.2 presents the value of the Kakwani index for the diff erent types of health 
care expenditure, and Graph 2.1 graphically illustrates the equity in the payments. 
Th e negative values of the Kakwani index indicate that the distribution is regressive 
for the total household expenditure on health care, approximately -0.22 in all four 
years examined. Th is indicates that, lower-income households spend a higher share 
of their income on health care than better-off  households. 
Figure 2.1 Th e trend and concentration of out-of-pocket household 
expenditure on health care
Note: In the case of pharmaceuticals and medical devices grey area represent the period 
with increased co-payments. In the case of formal and informal payments the grey area represent the period 
when user fees were charges for health care services.
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
(% of income)
Formal payments
(% of income)
Informal payments
(% of income)
Formal payments
(Concentration curve)
Informal payments
(Concentration curve)
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
(Concentration curve)
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Table 2.2 Kakwani indexes by types of household expenditure on health care
Kakwani index by type of 
expenditure 2005 2006 2007 2008
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices -0.235***(-32.03)
-0.238***
(-32.39)
-0.240***
(-31.11)
-0.233***
(-30.99)
Formal payments for health care 
services
-0.004
(-0.19)
-0.024
(-1.21)
-0.096***
(-5.13)
-0.009
(-0.36)
Informal payments for health care services -0.203***(-10.04)
-0.182***
(-8.64)
-0.121***
(-5.07)
-0.200***
(-5.48)
Total expenditure on health care -0.220***(-32.79)
-0.224***
(-33.00)
-0.220***
(-29.94)
-0.215***
(-29.44)
Note: *** p<0.01; t-statistics are in parenthesis. The grey area present the period of health care reforms.
The lowest value of the Kakwani index is found for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, 
varying between -0.24 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and -0.23 in 2008, which indicates that 
this is the most regressive type of payment. Graphically, the curve of the expenditures 
on pharmaceuticals and medical devices is close to diagonal (see Figure 2.1). The 
Kakwani index is close to 0 in the case of formal payments, i.e. the coefficient is not 
statistically significant different from zero in 2005, 2006 and 2008, and significantly 
different from 0 in 2007 with the value of -0.10. This indicates proportionality of 
formal payments in 2005, 2006 and 2008. The graphs also show that formal payments 
for health care services follow the income (Lorenz) curve. Expenditures on informal 
payments are regressive as well. The Kakwani index for informal payments varies 
between -0.18/-0.20 before and after the reforms. Its value increases to -0.12 in 2007. 
From Figure 2.1, we can also visually observe the changes in the expenditures during 
the examined period. We observe no relevant changes in the progressivity of the 
payments during the examined period concerning expenditures on pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices. However, we do observe, that in 2007, with the introduction 
of co-payments, the curve of the expenditures on formal payments diverges from the 
diagonal, which indicates that these payments become more regressive. However, the 
curve converge to the diagonal again in 2008 (which indicates proportionality of the 
expenditures), after the abolishment of co-payments. The curve of the expenditures 
on informal payments converges to the diagonal in 2007 compared to the other years 
examined, which indicates that informal payments became less regressive in 2007.
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2.5 Discussion
Discussion of the results
Out-of-pocket payments
We find that the burden of household expenditure on health care is not equally 
distributed among different income groups. Households from the lowest income 
quintile pay an about three times larger share of their income on health care compared 
to households in the highest income quintile. 
Our results confirm the conclusion of previous studies, which found that out-of-
pocket payments are a regressive means of raising health care revenues (van Doorslaer 
et al., 1999; Mastilica and Bozikov, 1999; Wagstaff et al., 1999; Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer, 1992). Examining some OECD countries, Wagstaff et al. (1999) 
found that out-of-pocket payments are most proportional to income in Germany 
and the Netherlands (Kakwani index higher than -0.1 percent) and the highest in 
Switzerland (-0.36) and France (-0.34), similar to the US (-0.38), where the poor 
without insurance coverage rely mostly on out-of-pocket payments (Wagstaff et al., 
1999). We find that the Kakwani index of total household expenditure on health is 
approximately -0.22 during the examined period in Hungary, which is comparable 
to the findings for the United Kingdom and Finland (Wagstaff et al., 1999; Klavus 
and Hakkinen, 1998). 
Concerning the neighbouring countries and countries from the Central-European 
region, in Slovakia the Kakwani index of out-of-pocket payments is -0.25 in 2004 
and -0.23 in 2005 (Szalay et al., 2011), which is comparable to our findings for 
Hungary. In Croatia, even higher inequalities can be found. Persons from the lowest 
income deciles pay an about six times larger share of their income on health care 
than the highest income deciles (Mastilica and Bozikov, 1999). However, from the 
Central European region, the Czech Republic is an exception, where the share of out-
of-pocket payments as a percentage of household income is much lower than found 
in our study (1.9 percent in 2007, 2.2 percent in 2008) and it is also distributed 
quite evenly across households (Bryndova et al., 2009).
Two previous studies reported Kakwani indexes of the out-of-pocket payments in 
Hungary (Gaál et al., 2011). Szende et al. (2002) find Kakwani indexes of -0.28 in 
1999 and Csaba (2007) -0.27 in 2007 (Szende et al., 2002; Csaba et al., 2007). These 
values are slightly lower than those that we find in our study. The difference might be 
explained by differences in the methodology as previous studies calculated the index 
based on individual-level data, while we use expenditure data on household level. 
These studies, however, focus on data from one year and do not examine the trends 
in the equity of the payments.
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We find that expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices are the most 
regressive types of expenditures (the lowest income quintile pays 3.6 times more as a 
share of income than the highest quintile in 2007). At the same time, these payments 
represent the major share of the total household expenditure on health care (75-85 
percent). The lack of adequate protection mechanisms in the pharmaceutical subsidy 
system might be the main reason for this finding. In Hungary, no ceiling for co-
payments for pharmaceuticals and medical devices is applied, and the co-payments 
do not depend on income either. However, there is a rather controversial system for 
the exemptions of vulnerable social groups from such co-payments. Some patients 
with a disability or with an income below a certain level9 are eligible for exemption 
from paying co-payments. During the examined period relevant changes took place in 
the exemption system. Since July 2006, for patients who are eligible for exemptions, 
a certain budget is defined by their GP based on their medical needs. This budget 
should not exceed 12 000 HUF (~ 44 euro) per months. Before, there was a list of 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices which were available free of charge for patients 
with a special certificate, without any limitation of the quantity or the amount.10 
However, according to the monitor of the National Auditory Office (NAO), the 
number of patients eligible for exemption because of their income  decreased by 56 
percent from 2005 to 2006, moreover the office found the system non-transparent, 
exemptions are not based on the real needs (National Audit Office, 2009). Our 
results suggest that the protection of vulnerable social groups should be revised and 
extended to improve equity of these payments. Nevertheless, it has been shown in 
previous studies that the lack of exemption mechanisms can produce inequalities in 
access to health care, which can lead to higher morbidity, emergency care admissions 
and mortality (Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008; Atella et al., 2006;. Here, we have 
to highlight that the health status of the Hungarian population is already lagging 
behind other European countries (Gaál et al., 2011).
The high share of expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which was 
observed in Hungary, is a common characteristic observed in most of the CEE countries 
that joined the EU after 2004. Here, the expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices account for more than 70 percent of total health expenditure, while this share is 
below 50 percent in the EU15 countries (Eurostat, 2009). In CEE countries, medicines 
are rarely included in the basic package, so patients are obliged to pay out-of-pocket. 
The relatively low labour costs in these countries could hold the prices of services low 
even in the private sector in contrast with the price of pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, which are comparable with those in Western European countries. 
Payments for health care services represent a minor share of total household 
expenditure on health care. According to our results around 20-40 percent of these 
9 Disabled and those persons are enabled for the certificate, whose medical expenses exceed 10% of the minimum 
pension and the family income per person do not exceed the minimum pension (in 2010 around 100 Euro) or 
150% in case of the person is living alone.
10 For more details see: http://www.oep.hu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/LAKOSSAG/OEPHULAK_EBELLAT/
ACH%C3%8DVUM%202010/KOZGYOGYELLATAS.PDF
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payments are informal payments. We find that household expenditures on informal 
payments are regressive, which confirms previous results of Szende and Culyer 
(2006) on informal payments in Hungary (Szende and Culyer, 2006). This implies 
that the amount of informal payments initiated by patients or requested by medical 
staff is not related to the patients’ ability to pay. Thus, expenditures on informal 
payments impose a relatively higher burden on worse-off households, and might lead 
to inequalities to access. 
However, expenditures on formal payments are found to be the most proportional to 
income. The explanation of this finding might be that before the introduction of co-
payments in 2007 (as well as after the abolishment of the fees), most of the health care 
services covered by the social health insurance could be used free of charge and formal 
payments were mostly paid for private services. We assume that households with higher 
income use proportionally more private services. The finding that the expenditures on 
formal payments increase proportionally to income indicates that the private health 
care services are seen as a luxury goods which is in accordance with previous findings 
(e.g. Yu et al., 2008). 
Changes in the progressivity of out-of-pocket payments during the reform period
Based on previous results, we expect that health care reforms, which increase the role 
of out-of-pocket payments in health care financing, lead to a relatively greater burden 
(of private payments) falling on the low-income groups (Mastilica and Bozikov, 
1999; Albreht and Klazinga, 2009; Gelormino et al., 2011). We find the same in the 
case of expenditures on formal payments. Compared to the observed proportionality 
in the previous years, in 2007, when co-payments for public health care services 
were introduced, expenditures on formal payments became more regressive despite 
of the application of exemption categories (which were mainly based on the type 
of care not on income situation) and a stop-loss. On the other hand, we find that 
despite of the increase of the co-payments for pharmaceuticals, the progressivity of 
expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices did not change during the 
reform period. Thus, they remain regressive as before the reforms. 
Finally, we have interesting findings concerning household expenditure on informal 
payments. In CEE countries, the introduction of co-payments is often motivated by 
their potential to eradicate or formalize informal payments (Schneider, 2008; Ensor, 
2004; Thompson and Witter, 2000). This was also the case in Hungary where one 
of the main aims of the introduction of official user fees, besides the objective of 
curbing the unnecessary use of health care services, was to eradicate informal payments 
(Ministry of Health, 2006). In this study, we observe a decrease in informal payments 
of households in parallel to the increase of formal payments. Also, this expenditure 
became less regressive during the reform period, i.e. the decrease was higher in the 
lower-income households. This finding might suggest that worse-off households tried 
to compensate the increasing burden of formal co-payments with a decrease in their 
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expenditure on informal payments. However, we cannot really measure the causality 
of this association. Furthermore, the improvement observed in the equity of informal 
payments might also be the resultant of the larger drop in the utilization of services 
among worse-off households, which leads to less informal payments. Further research 
is needed to clarify the relationship between formal and informal expenditure.
Discussion of the limitations
We have to acknowledge some limitations of our study. First, we have to highlight 
that the National Household Budget Survey does not contain data on the utilization 
of services. However, according to previous literature, the reform arrangements have 
resulted in major changes in the utilization of health care (Kőrösi et al., 2009; Boncz 
et al., 2008; Nagy et al., 2008). Due to the lack of utilization data in the dataset, 
we cannot quantify the effect of the increase in co-payments on the access to health 
care across households with different income. However, it is possible that in worse-
off households the drop in utilization is higher, as based on previous studies they are 
assumed to be the most sensitive to price changes (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 
1993). In this case, we underestimate the increase of the burden in these households. 
To have a better insight in the effect of the reforms on equity, equity in access to the 
services should be also considered and should be the topic further research.
We have to highlight that for the calculations, we use a data on household level. This 
might result in slight differences with previous results from Hungary (Csaba et al., 
2007; Szende et al., 2002),  which are estimated based on individual data. Finally, 
we also have to consider that during the examined period, multiple, simultaneous 
reforms (in and outside of the health care sector as a result of the Convergence 
Program) took place in Hungary. It is difficult to differentiate between the effects of 
separate reform arrangements on the household expenditure.
2.6 Conclusion and policy implications
In this chapter, we have examined the progressivity of households’ out-of-pocket 
payments and the distribution of these payments across income quintiles between 
2005-2008: before, during and after the period of health care reforms in Hungary 
(2006-2007). In 2007, comprehensive health care reforms took place in the country, 
with arrangements aimed at shifting costs to consumers (e.g. the increase of the 
co-payments for pharmaceuticals, the introduction of co-payments for health care 
services).
Expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices are the most regressive payments 
and represents the highest share of households’ health care expenditure (more than 
75 percent). However the progressivity of these payments has not changed during 
the reform period. Future health care reforms should consider the improvement 
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of the equity of these payments by the improvement of protection mechanisms, 
e.g. the introduction of a maximum limit for co-payments for pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices or the implementations of exemption mechanisms of vulnerable 
social groups. 
We find that in the case of formal payments, changes such as the introduction of 
co-payments for public health care services, led to a relatively greater burden falling 
on low-income groups despite of the application of exemption categories and a stop-
loss. These effects on access to health care services should be carefully considered 
before the increase or the introduction of co-payments and special attention should 
be paid to the protection of vulnerable households from an increased burden on their 
household budgets. It is necessary to assure access to health care services of those 
who are not able to pay for the services. Our results also suggest that households, 
especially in the lower-income deciles tried to compensate the increasing burden of 
health care expenditure by decreasing expenditures on informal payments. However, 
further research is needed to study the causality of these relations. 
The results of our study might serve as a useful example for other European 
countries, where the expansion of patient cost-sharing is considered. Especially in 
the CEE countries that joined the EU in and after 2004, since in these countries, 
the structure, financing and operation of the health care system are similar to those 
in Hungary. Furthermore, in the last decades, these countries all considered or have 
been considering an increase of out-of-pocket payments to cope with the continuous 
deficit of the health insurance funds, and financial difficulties of health care providers. 
More attention should be paid to the protection of the poor when implementing 
patient charges, especially for pharmaceuticals but also for services. Also, it is 
important to eliminate the practice of informal payments in order to improve equity 
in health care financing and to avoid inequalities in access to health care.
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Informal payments for healthcare services and 
short-term effects of the introduction of user 
fees on these payments in Hungary
This chapter draws upon: 
Baji P, Pavlova M, Gulácsi L, Homolyáné Csete Zs, Groot W. (2012): Informal 
payments for healthcare services and short-term effects of the introduction of visit 
fees on these payments in Hungary. International Journal for Health Planning and 
Management, 27(1):63-79.
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Abstract
Background: In 2007 user fees for health care services were implemented in Hungary 
as a part of health care reforms, with the objective to control utilization of services 
and eradicate informal payments.
Objective: The objective of this chapter is to study the short-term effects of the 
introduction of user fees in Hungary in 2007 on informal patient payments. We 
present the pattern of informal payments in primary, out-patient specialist and in-
patient care in the period before and shortly after user fees were introduced. We 
also analyze whether in the short run, the introduction of user fees decreased the 
probability of paying informally. 
Method: For the analysis we use a dataset for a representative sample of 2500 
respondents collected in 2007 shortly after the introduction of user fees. The dataset 
contains data on informal payments for health care services. 
Results: According to our results, for GP care, 9 percent of the patients paid 
informally during their last visit (2 euro on average), 14 percent paid informally for 
specialist care (35 euro on average), and 50 percent paid informally for hospitalization 
(58 euro on average). We find a significant reduction in the probability of paying 
informally only for elderly patients in case of in-patient care. 
Conclusion: Our results suggest that informal payments are widely spread, especially 
in in-patient care. The short run potential of the introduction of user fees to reduce 
informal payments seems to be minor. 
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3.1 Introduction
In most of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, where informal patient 
payments are widespread, the introduction of official co-payments (user fees) is often 
promoted as a policy tool to eradicate “formalize” informal payments (Baschieri and 
Falkingham, 2006; Ministry of Health, 2006). Although the effectiveness of this 
strategy has not been adequately studied and there is no evidence in the literature 
which clearly supports this expectation. Thus, the introduction of user fees in the 
context of informal patient payments raises concerns that official fees might impose 
a double financial burden on consumers (Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2000).
Previous studies concerning the issue of the relationship between formal and 
informal payments mostly have focused on the experiences of low-income African 
and Asian countries, where health care services are mainly financed through out-of-
pocket payments (or community financing systems) due to the lack of public health 
insurance systems (Lewis, 2007; James et al., 2006; Baschieri and Falkingham, 2006; 
Akashi et al., 2004; Balabanova et al., 2004; Barber et al., 2004; Belli et al., 2004; 
Burnham et al., 2004; Soeters and Griffiths, 2003; Xu et al., 2003). Besides the 
conflicting results reported in these studies, the transferability of this evidence to 
European countries is rather limited. 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to our knowledge by studying the short-
term effects of the introduction of user fees on informal payments in Hungary, 
where user fees were implemented in 2007. The policy objective of user fees, 
besides curbing the utilization of services, was to eradicate informal payments, 
which are still a notable source of health care financing (Ministry of Health, 
2006)11. However, the effect of the implementation of user fees on informal 
payments has not been extensively analyzed yet. Two studies reported estimations 
on informal payments during the period when user fees were charged (MEDIÁN, 
2008; TÁRKI, 2007). The study of a Research Institute (TÁRKI, 2007) indicated 
that less patients paid informally for hospital physicians in 2007 compared to 
2003, while no change was observed for out-patient specialist care. The study of 
MEDIÁN (MEDIÁN, 2008) found that one year after the implementation of 
user fees, the aggregated amount of household expenditure on informal payments 
had decreased, but this decrease did not compensate household expenditures on 
the formal fees. Consequently, household expenditure on health care services 
(formal and informal payments) increased. However, it is unclear from these 
studies whether these changes are the resultant of the introduction of user fees. 
In Chapter 2, we also found a decrease in informal payments of households after 
the implementation of user fees, however we could not prove the causality of this 
relation. The decrease of informal payments can be also the resultant of a drop in 
11 For more information on informal payments in Hungary see Chapter 1 and more details about the 
implementation of user fees in Hungary can be found in Chapter 1 and 2.
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utilization after the introduction of user fees. In this chapter, we address this issue 
and examine the changes in the probability of paying informally shortly after the 
implementation of user fees.
For the analysis, we use a dataset collected two months after user fees were introduced, 
consisting of a representative sample of 2500 respondents. First, we present the 
pattern of informal payments in primary and out-patient specialist care as well as 
in in-patient care in the period before and shortly after user fees were introduced. 
Second, we analyze whether in the short run, we observe a decrease in the probability 
of paying informally after the introduction of user fees. 
3.2 Data and method
To examine the pattern of informal payments and the relation between formal and 
informal payments, we use cross-sectional data collected in a survey carried out in 
April 2007, two months after the implementation of user fees. The data were col-
lected by MEDIÁN Survey Institute as a part of a research project of the István Szé-
chényi College of Advanced Studies and Generali Providencia Insurance Company 
via face-to-face household interviews. The sample of 2500 respondents is representa-
tive for the Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, education level and type 
of settlement. Households in the sample were selected by the “random walk” method 
and the respondent in the household was selected by the “Leslie Kish” method (see in 
Oldendick et al., 1988). The dataset provides micro-level data on informal payments 
of respondents for the last visit to a GP and to an out-patient specialist, and for the 
last hospitalization, as well as on the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. 
To describe the existence of informal payments, we present the share of respondents 
who paid informally during their last physician visit/hospitalization, as well as the 
average amount of informal payments for the last visit/hospitalization separately 
for three types of care: GP, out-patient specialist and in-patient care. The results 
are stratified by gender, age category, education category, type of settlement, 
the three types of specialists that are the most frequently visited (internist, 
rheumatologist and gynecologist) in case of out-patient specialist care, and the 
reason of hospitalization (surgical admission, medical examination or delivery) 
in case of in-patient care.
To examine the changes in the probability of paying informally after the introduction 
of user fees among different socio-demographic groups, we use probit regression 
analysis. Data related to informal payments are used to define three binary dependent 
variables indicating whether the respondent paid informally during their last visit to 
GP, out-patient specialist, and for the last hospitalization respectively.
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The set of independent variables consists of data on socio-demographic 
characteristics (namely age, gender, perceived health status, family income, 
education level, number of persons in the household, type of settlement) and 
satisfaction variables (respondents’ satisfaction with GP, out-patient and in-
patient care). In addition to this, we include independent variables related to 
the characteristics of the health care service, i.e. type of specialist and reason for 
hospitalization (see Table 3.1). 
To analyze how the introduction of user fees affected the probability of paying 
informally, we also include a dummy variable in the probit models, which indicates 
whether the last out-patient specialist visit or the last hospitalization was before or 
after the implementation of user fees. We have no information about the exact date 
of the last visit. We are interested in whether the date of the last visit/hospitalization 
(before or after the introduction of user fees), has a statistically significant coefficient, 
which indicates whether in the short run, the probability of paying informally 
changed after the implementation of user fees. 
The groups of respondents who had their last visit/hospitalization before the 
introduction of user fees, differ significantly from the group, who had the last 
visit/hospitalization after the introduction, in terms of age and perceived health 
status (p<0.05). Therefore, in the regression analysis, we include interactions 
between age and the date of last visit/hospitalization, as well as between perceived 
health status and date of last visit/hospitalization to filter out the effect of different 
comparison groups. 
We examine only the variation in the probability of paying informally as the sample 
size is not large enough to build significant models for analyzing the variation in the 
amount of informal payments.
3.3 Results
Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 shows the 
percentage of respondents who paid informally for their last visit/hospitalization, 
and the average amount of the informal payments. As indicated in Table 3.2, in 
the last 12 months, 72.7 percent of the respondents visited their GP at least once 
and 8.7 percent of those who visited a GP paid informally during the last visit (on 
average 2 euro). In out-patient specialist care, 14.0 percent of the patients paid 
informally for their last visits to a specialist (on average 35 euro). With regard 
to in-patient care, 16.8 percent of the respondents were hospitalized during the 
last 12 months. The average age of this population was 58.9 years, 68.7 percent 
of them were female, and 39.1 percent of the hospitalizations were surgical 
admissions. Every second (49.7 percent) patient paid informally during the last 
hospitalizations (on average 58 euro).
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Table 3.1 Informal payments for health care services - descriptive statistics of the sample
Variables Measure-ment Value range
Frequency 
N(%) Median Mean Sd
Number 
of obser-
vations 
Age Scale 18-93 - 51 50.7 17.4 2499
Persons within 
household Scale 1-9 - 2 2.5 1.3 2500
Household income * Scale 0.44-190 - 15 18.44 14.16 2406
Gender Nominal 0=male1=female
1002 (40.0)
1498 (60.0) - - - 2500
Perceived health 
status Ordinal
1=very bad
2=bad
3=average
4=good
5=quite good
65 (2.6)
378 (15.1)
983 (39.4)
909 (36.4)
162 (6.5)
3 3.3 0.9 2497
Education level Ordinal
1=less than primary
2=primary school
3=secondary school
4=university, collage
172 (6.9)
1343 (53.7)
731 (29.3)
253 (10.1)
2 2.4 0.8 2499
Village Dummy 0=not village1=village
1644 (65.8)
856 (34.2) - - - 2500
Satisfaction with 
out-patient care Ordinal
1=not at all satisfied
2
3
4
5=very satisfied
154 (6.4)
422 (17.5)
890 (36.9)
696 (28.9)
250 (10.4)
3 3.2 1.0 2412
Satisfaction  with 
in-patient care Ordinal
1=not at all satisfied
2
3
4
5=very satisfied
182 (8.2)
430 (19.4)
875 (39.6)
541 (24.5)
183 (8.3)
3 3.1 1.0 2211
* Amounts in 10 000 HUF; Exchange rate in 2007 is 270 HUF~1EUR.
Further analysis of the results in Table 3.2 shows that the probability of paying 
informally before and after the introduction of user fees differs significantly only in 
the case of in-patient care (p=0.0038). The amount of informal payments decreased 
significantly in primary (p=0.0023) and in-patient care (p=0.0816), and it has not 
changed significantly in out-patient specialist care after the introduction of user fees.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3.3. For GP care, we find 
that the probability of paying informally increases significantly with age, and education. 
However, the marginal effects are moderate, namely 3 percentage points for education, 
and 0.1 percentage points for age. For out-patient specialist care, we find a significant 
association between the probability of paying informal payments and income, perceived 
health status as well as education level. High-income respondents as well as those with 
better health status and higher education pay more frequently during their last visit than 
others (marginal effects are 0.1, 2 and 4 percentage points respectively). Considering the 
type of services, the probability of paying informally is significantly higher in the case of 
gynecologist visits (with the marginal effect of 12 percentage points).
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The probability of paying informally for in-patient care is significantly higher for 
women, for respondents with higher income, from smaller households and for 
people living in towns (marginal effects are 17, 0.2, 7 and 10 percentage points 
respectively). A significantly higher probability of paying informally is also observed 
in the case of surgical admission and delivery with the marginal effects of 18 and 39 
percentage points.
Table 3.2 Informal payments of respondents for the last visit/hospitalization in 2007
GP visits Out-patient visits Hospitalizations
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Total sample 1817 9% 427 607 1917 14% 9525 21185 419 50% 15645 16118
Gender
Male 652 9% 400 510 583 13% 8009 9099 129 43% 17472 17250
Female 1165 10% 442 652 1,334 15% 10118 24330 290 53% 14958 15680
Age
<40 years 484 9% 665 981 439 14% 11792 12191 80 61% 24477 22211
40-59 years 579 10% 382 470 718 15% 9171 29800 123 52% 15200 15477
>60 years 754 9% 307 230 760 13% 8306 12353 216 44% 11623 10542
Education
Less than elementary 150 5% 267 361 149 9% 15846 19765 56 41% 10636 8220
Elementary 971 8% 359 347 992 12% 7174 8376 228 45% 14792 14889
Secondary 508 11% 530 836 549 14% 12527 35021 95 58% 15949 16928
Higher education 187 15% 419 567 226 26% 8565 12032 40 68% 22800 21941
Settlement
Town 1209 10% 439 647 1,357 15% 9639 23527 271 55% 15964 15291
Village 608 8% 383 414 560 12% 9182 11693 148 41% 14877 18073
Date of last visit/hospitalization
Before the introduc-
tion 642 9% 620 896 1,261 14% 9914 24626 330 53% 16336 17105
After the introduc-
tion 1167 10% 321 314 656 14% 8774 12139 89 37% 11867 8182
Type of specialist
Gynecologist - - - - 232 24% 10713 11659 - - - -
Rheumatologist - - - - 214 13% 7276 13087 - - - -
internist - - - - 324 14% 13574 46092 - - - -
Reason of hospitalization
Operation - - - - - - - - 167 56% 18511 15893
Examination - - - - - - - - 115 43% 8969 7219
Delivery - - - - - - - - 25 84% 31563 23361
Note: Amounts are presented in HUF. Exchange rate in 2007 is 270 HUF=1EUR
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Table 3.3 Probability of paying informally for the last visit/hospitalization in 2007 – 
results of the probit regression analysis 
Type of service GP visits Out-patient visits Hospitalizations
Variable Coefficient(st.error)
Marginal 
effect at 
mean
(st.error)
Coefficient
(st.error)
Marginal 
effect 
at mean
(st.error)
Coefficient
(st.error)
Marginal 
effect at 
mean
(st.error)
Age 0.0102**(0.0042)
0.0016
(0.0007)
0.0042
(0.0034)
0.0009
(0.0007)
-0.0031
(0.0057)
-0.0012
(0.0023)
Gender 0.0605(0.0904)
0.0095
(0.0140)
0.0705
(0.0872)
0.0147
(0.0179)
0.4399***
(0.1521)
0.1734
(0.0586)
Perceived health-status 0.0023(0.0779)
0.0004
(0.0123)
-0.1088*
(0.0579)
-0.0230
(0.0122)
-0.0385
(0.0969)
-0.0154
(0.0387)
Persons in household -0.0152(0.0423)
-0.0024
(0.0067)
-0.0283
(0.0383)
-0.0060
(0.0081)
-0.1821*** 
(0.0632)
-0.0727
(0.0252)
Household income 0.0045(0.0032)
0.0007
(0.0005)
0.0084***
(0.0031)
0.0018
(0.0007)
0.0243***
(0.0070)
0.0097
(0.0028)
Education 0.1971***(0.0611)
0.0312
(0.0096)
0.1702***
(0.0533)
0.0360
(0.0112)
0.0360
(0.0970)
0.0143
(0.0387)
Village -0.0805(0.0956)
-0.0125
(0.0146)
-0.0404
(0.0856)
-0.0085
(0.0178)
-0.2468*
(0.1448)
-0.0981
(0.0572)
Satisfaction with GP 
services
-0.0207
(0.0419)
-0.0033
(0.0066)
-0.0470
(0.0355)
-0.0099
(0.0075)
-0.0643
(0.0600)
-0.0257
(0.0239)
Date of visit
(before/after user fees)
0.1551
(0.1092)
0.0238
(0.0162)
0.0988
(0.1055)
0.0213
(0.0231)
-0.0599
(0.2853)
-0.0239
(0.1137)
Specialist
(internist) - -
0.0870
(0.1038)
0.0190
(0.0234) - -
Specialist
(gynecologist) - -
0.4707***
(0.1180)
0.1194
(0.0346) - -
Specialist
(rheumatologist) - -
0.0097
(0.1242)
0.0021
(0.0265) - -
Reason of 
hospitalization
(surgical admission)
- - - - 0.4632***(0.1735)
0.1830
(0.0672)
Reason of 
hospitalization
(examination)
- - - - 0.1453(0.1896)
0.0579
(0.0754)
Reason of 
hospitalization
(delivery)
- - - - 1.1690***(0.4023)
0.3932
(0.0926)
Days in hospital - - - - 0.0085(0.0064)
0.0034
(0.0026)
Date_age -0.1902(0.1417)
-0.0288
(0.0205)
-0.1689
(0.1529)
-0.0333
(0.0280)
-0.6649**
(0.3268)
-0.2525
(0.1123)
Date_health -0.0380(0.1596)
-0.0059
(0.0245)
-0.0778
(0.1594)
-0.0159
(0.0315)
0.0466
(0.3319)
0.0186
(0.1323)
Constant 2.4004***(0.4827) -
2.0900***
(0.5911) -
1.4932***
(0.3673)- -
Number of 
respondents 1740 1838 396
Log-likelihood -520.04 -709.78 -243.04
Chi-squared (p-value) 23.83 (0.0135)
49.64 
(0.0000)
62.88 
(0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0224 0.0338 0.1146
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable indicates whether the respondent paid informally for the last visit/
hospitalization.
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We do not find a significant change in the probability of paying informal payments 
after the introduction of user fees for neither primary care not out-patient specialist 
care, except for elderly respondents. Given the level of significance of the interaction 
terms, respondents over the age of 60 less often paid informally after the introduction 
of user fees compared to the period before. The probability of paying informally is 
25 percentage points lower for the elderly after the implementation of the fees. The 
interaction term between date and health status is not significant, which suggest that the 
probability of paying informally did not change for respondents in worse health status.
3.4 Discussion
Discussion of the limitations
We need to acknowledge some potential biases in our study. First, recall bias might affect 
data on past health care utilization and payments (De Bruin et al., 1996). However, in 
our case, this bias is moderated by asking the respondents only about their last visit/
hospitalization. Second, respondents may feel uncomfortable when answering questions 
on informal payments, as these payments represents a potentially sensitive issue due to 
their informal nature. The collection of sensitive data via a self-administrated questionnaire 
has the potential to reduce this bias. On the other hand, face-to-face interviews, used to 
collect the data in our study, can help to avoid missing data as a result of the presence of 
an interviewer to guide the respondent (Saris and Gallhofer, 2007).
The utilization of services presented in our study seems to be relatively high for a 
European country, especially in case of GP visits. However, in Hungary, the number 
of physician contacts per person is extremely high compared to the OECD average of 
6.6 visits per year. From 2006 to 2007, the number of physician contacts in Hungary 
decreased from 12.9 to 10.8 visits per year, which still indicates approximately 1 visit 
per month per person (OECD, 2009). Thus, the high number of visits reported 
by the sample in our study is not surprising. It should be acknowledged that the 
physician visits include not only visits due to health problems but also routine check-
ups and visits to obtain health certificates. 
The method that we use for the analysis of the effect of user fees on informal payments 
has also some limitations. In particular, the dataset that we use for the analysis, 
contains data only for a very short period (i.e. 2 months) after the introduction 
of user fees. Therefore, our results reflect only the short-term effect of user fees on 
informal payments. It is probable that more time is needed to observe any change 
in the behavior of consumers and providers. Although, the decrease in health care 
utilization was noticeable right after the implementation of user fees (Kőrösi et al., 
2009; Boncz et al., 2008; Nagy et al., 2008), we do not observe such reduction in 
informal payments on the short-run. It is also possible that patients respond with a 
decrease of the amount of informal payments instead of not paying, which can be the 
48
Chapter 3  
topic of further research. Moreover, we do not account for the effect of exemptions 
from user fees since we do not have data on whether the respondent was eligible for 
exemptions. Follow up data collection could have been more convenient to study the 
long-term effects of user fees. However, user fees were anyway abolished 1 year after 
their introduction.
Discussion of the results
Our results suggest that informal payments are highly widespread in in-patient care. 
This is in accordance with previous studies for Hungary (Gaál et al., 2006b; Szende 
and Culyer, 2006; Gaál and McKee, 2004). Every second respondent in our sample, 
who used hospital services, paid for the last hospitalization. The amount of these 
informal payments (58 euro on average) is a significant expense for patients, as it 
equals to 13.7 percent of the average net monthly salary and 20.5 percent of the 
average pension in 2007.
In out-patient specialist care, every 6-7th respondent paid for the last visits on average 
35 euro. The differences in the probability of paying and the amount of payments 
indicate that some sectors, like gynecology, seem to be “informally privatized” by 
informal payments. Here, the amount of informal payments is similar to those in the 
private sector. For example in Hungary, the tariff of a gynecology visit in the private 
sector varies between 19-37 euro. This means that physicians use public resources to 
provide public services but obtain an informal fee similar to the price of private visits.
According to our results, informal payments are the least frequent in primary care, 
patients pay for every 10-11th visit, and lower amounts, on average 2 euro. This finding 
is also in accordance with previous studies (Bognár et al., 2000; Gaál et al., 2006b; 
TÁRKI, 2007). The lower occurrence of informal payments in GP care might be 
related to the content of the visits – i.e. most of the GPs visits are for routine medical 
check-up, prescriptions or referrals where patient may not need to pay informally. 
Considering the type of services, the probability of paying informally is significantly 
higher in case of gynecologist visits than for other out-patient specialist services as 
well as for surgical admission and delivery compared to examination. Other studies 
on informal patient payments in Hungary also report that informal payments 
are most widespread in the case of gynecology and surgery (Bognár et al., 2000). 
Also, our findings confirm previous results on the unequal distribution of informal 
payments between physicians (Gaál et al., 2006b).
Our findings for Hungary appear to be within the range of informal payments 
reported in other studies from European countries. A study in Greece (Liaropoulos 
et al., 2008), for example, reports that 36 percent of the patients paid informally for 
hospital care, which share is slightly lower than our findings for Hungary. Estimations 
of the frequency of paying informally were somewhat higher for the 1990’s. Poland 
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(Lewis, 2000). In contrast, in the Czech Republic, the level of informal payments 
seems to be lower than in Hungary (Belli, 2003). Compared to Bulgaria, the 
amounts of informal payments are similar to our findings for out- and in-patient 
care estimated as a percentage of monthly salary (Delcheva et al., 1997). 
We do not find a significant effect of respondents’ satisfaction on the probability of 
paying informally. However, we find differences in paying informally between different 
socio-demographic groups. Similar to previous studies (TÁRKI, 2007; Belli, 2003; 
Bognár et al., 2000), we also find that women, elderly, those with worse health status, 
higher education, and from the capital are more frequently paying informally. In 
contrast to other studies (TÁRKI, 2007; Belli, 2003; Bognár et al., 2000), we observe 
a significant relation between informal payments and income as well. 
In our analysis, we also find a change in the probability of paying informally shortly 
after user fees were introduced, but only in case of hospitalization of elderly patients. 
Thus, in our study elderly patients proved to be the most sensitive to the price changes. 
The reason for this finding could be that they are the most frequent users of health care 
services and they also belong to lower-income groups (Medgyesi et al., 1999). At the same 
time, we do not observe significant changes for patients with bad perceived health status. 
The reason why we do not observe relevant changes regarding informal payments 
of the patients might be that a longer period is needed to perceive changes in patients’ 
behavior regarding informal payments. Furthermore, we have to consider that neither the 
objectives, nor the beneficiaries of informal payments are the same as those of user fees. 
The beneficiaries of the collected fees were neither the physicians nor the nurses but the 
health care institution itself, except for GPs with private practices. Therefore, user fees could 
not substitute for the informal payment flows, which are directly pocketed by the medical 
staff, at least in the short run. Also, it is quite probable that patients rather pay informally 
directly to their physician, in the hope of getting extra services or more personal attention. 
3.5 Conclusion and policy implications
In this chapter we have examined the pattern of informal patient payments for GP 
and out-patient specialists as well as for hospitalization in Hungary, during the period 
before and shortly after the implementation of user fees (2006-2007). We have also 
analyzed the short-term effect of the introduction of user fees on informal payments. 
We have found that, in the short run, after the implementation of user fees the 
probability of paying informally decreased only for hospitalizations in the case of 
elderly patients. We have not found any short-term changes in the probability of 
paying informally for the rest of the population. This suggest that the introduction 
of user fees is more effective as a policy tool to reduce service utilization than to 
eradicate informal payments, which was one of the policy aims of the implementation 
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of user fees in Hungary (Kőrösi et al., 2009; Boncz et al., 2008; Mihályi, 2008; 
Nagy et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, our results suggest that Hungarian patients pay informally for medical 
services on a routine basis. The existence of informal payments indicates that patients 
are willing to pay for medical services. However, the protest of the population 
against user fees, expressed during the population referendum that resulted in the 
abolishment of this fee, may show that health care consumers do not consider user 
fees as an alternative to informal payments.
According to our results, in the short-run, the introduction of official co-payments is 
not sufficient on its own to change the behavior of patients paying informally. This 
should be taken into account by health policy makers who plan to implement user 
fees in the context of informal payments.
4 Chapter 4
User fees for public health care services in 
Hungary – expectations, experience, 
and acceptability from the perspectives of 
different stakeholders
This chapter draws upon: 
Baji P, Pavlova M, Gulácsi L, Groot W. (2011). User fees for public health care 
services in Hungary: expectations, experience, and acceptability from the perspectives 
of different stakeholders. Health Policy, 102(2-3):255-62.
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Abstract
Background: User fees for health care services are a rather new phenomenon in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, user fees were first introduced in 2007, but 
abolished one year later as a result of a population referendum.
Objective: The aim of our study is to describe the experiences and expectations of 
health system stakeholders in Hungary related to user fees as well as the stakeholders’ 
approval of such fees.
Method: For the analysis, we use both qualitative and quantitative data collected 
during focus group discussions with health care consumers and physicians, and in-
depth interviews with policy makers and health insurance representatives.
Results: Our findings suggest that the reasons behind the unpopularity of user fees 
might be (a) the rejection of the policy objectives of user fees stated by the government, 
(b) the negative personal experiences with user fees, and (c) the general mistrust of the 
Hungarian population when it comes to the utilization of public resources.
Conclusion: Successful implementation of user fees requires a social consensus 
on the policy objectives. Furthermore, improvements in the quality of health care 
provision should be noticeable for consumers to assure the acceptance of the fees.
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4.1 Introduction
The issue of official patient co-payments or user fees is occupying political discussions 
in Europe, since its importance as a tool to control the increasing public spending on 
health care is rising considerably. This is also the case in the EU member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that joined the EU in 2004, (e.g. the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland). In these countries, cost-sharing for  pharmaceuti-
cals and medical devices and payments for services which fall (partly or fully) outside 
the coverage of the social health insurance, has long been applied, and constitutes a 
notable share of total health care expenditure (Tambor et al., 2010; Rechel and McKee, 
2009; Schneider, 2008). However, some of these countries also have experiences with 
the implementation of official user fees for primary, out-patient and in-patient services 
covered by social health insurance. Such user fees have been recently introduced in the 
Czech Republic. In Slovakia and Hungary, user fees for services were implemented 
and abolished shortly after their introduction (Kossarova and Madarová, 2008; Pazitny 
and Szalay, 2006). Experiences from the Central European countries show that the 
introduction of user fees for health care services meets strong opposition by political 
opponents and the general public (Hall, 2009). Their unpopularity is often explained 
by social perceptions rooted in the communist period, which holds that public health 
care services should be provided free for all (Hall, 2009; Akkazieva et al., 2006).
In Hungary, user fees were introduced in 2007 with the aim to control utilization 
and eradicate informal payments. (For more information on the implementation of 
user fees, see Chapter 1-3). However, the system of user fees worked for only one 
year. The fees were abolished in April 2008 as a result of a population referendum 
initiated by the opposition, where more than 80 percent of the voters supported the 
abolishment of the fees. Participation in this referendum was high, higher than in the 
parliamentary elections in 2010. About 50.5% of the population who was entitled to 
vote took part. In total, 82.4% of the voters supported the abolishment of user fees 
for physician visits, and 84.0% of voters supported the abolishment of the user fees 
for hospitalizations (National Election Office, 2008).
The aim of this chapter is to describe the experiences and expectations of the 
stakeholders in the Hungarian health system (namely consumers, providers, policy 
makers and insurers) regarding user fees as well as the approval of these fees. To 
achieve this aim, we analyze data collected via focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews in Hungary in 2009. Our results provide a better insight into the causes of 
the opposition to user fees in Hungary, which was expressed during the population 
referendum in 2008. Our analysis also serves as an instructive case study for other 
countries in the region and may contribute to the establishment of sustainable 
patient payment policies. 
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4.2 Data and method
In this chapter a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods is applied to 
describe expectations, experiences of health system stakeholders in Hungary toward 
user fees as well as the approval of such fees. The mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods enables us to map different attitudes, opinions and emotions towards user fees.
Data collection
For the purpose of the study, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were 
carried out in Hungary in 2009, as part of an international research project. The 
objective was to study the opinions and attitudes of health system stakeholders, namely 
health care consumers, providers, insurers and policy makers, toward user fees. 
Data among policy makers and health insurance representatives were collected via 
face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews: 3 interviews with policy makers 
and 4 interviews with health insurance representatives working at different levels of 
the health care system were carried out. On average, each interview took 1-1.5 hours.
Data for health care consumers and providers were collected via focus group 
discussions. We included various society and professional groups to account for 
different backgrounds and interests among the Hungarian population. At the same 
time, the objective was to assure the homogeneity of participants in each group to 
be able to share and discuss own experiences and opinions. As a result, 8 focus group 
discussions were organized: 5 focus groups with health care consumers and 3 with 
health care providers. Consumer groups included working individuals, families with 
children, pensioners, students and individuals living in rural areas respectively. With 
regard to health care providers, the three focus groups included GPs, out-patient 
specialists and physicians in hospitals, respectively. Each focus group included 5 
participants and the discussion took 1.5-2 hours. In total, 40 people participated in 
the focus group discussions.
A list with key questions was prepared as a guide to the focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews. The same key questions were used to develop a standardized 
questionnaire to collect quantitative data among the participants on the same topic 
as well. The guide for focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, as well as the 
standardized questionnaire included questions about respondents’ opinion on user fees: 
•	 whether user fees should exist in Hungary (in the questionnaire a 5-point Likert 
scale was applied: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree); 
•	 for which services should user fees be applied (possible answers in the question-
naire: GP, out-patient, in-patient, emergency, dental); 
•	 whether there should be a maximum limit (stop loss) on user fees per patient 
(possible answers in the questionnaire: yes/no); 
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•	 whether some population groups should pay reduced fees or be exempted from 
user fees (in the questionnaire: yes/no);
•	 which population groups should be exempted (possible answers in the question-
naire: children, pensioners, people with low income, people with chronic dis-
eases, pregnant women, disabled people, other); 
•	 who should be the beneficiary of the collected revenues (possible answers in the 
questionnaire: the national or regional health insurance fund, the state, munici-
palities, the provider institution, the physician).
Data analysis
To analyze the expectations, experiences and approval of user fees by the groups of 
stakeholders, a direct content analysis is carried out based on the transcripts of the 
focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. A procedure described in previous 
research is followed (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Morgan, 1993; Graneheim and 
Lundman, 2004; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).
Using the transcripts, we have coded the statements and opinions expressed by 
participants and respondents, using meaningful units related to the three categories 
indicated in our research aim, namely expectations, experiences and approval of user 
fees. These include: 
•	 Units, where participants/respondents expressed their opinion about the objec-
tives and role of user fees and their perceptions on how these objectives and 
expectations meet the stated policy objectives of user fees introduced in Hungary 
in 2007, are classified in the category “Expectations”.
•	 Units, mentioning experiences with user fees implemented in 2007 in Hungary 
are classified in the category “Experience” 
•	 Units, concerning the approval of user fees, i.e. whether and what kind of pay-
ments/fees for health care services would be acceptable for participants/respond-
ents, are classified in the category “Acceptability”.
We use individual quantitative data collected via focus group discussions and 
interviews as additional information to complement our qualitative analysis. In 
particular, we divide the participants and respondents into attitude groups based 
on their individual responses by applying the method of cluster analysis. Due to the 
low sample size, only the following three binary variables, generated based on the 
standardized questionnaire, are used in this analysis: 
•	 Participants/respondents’ agreement with the existence of user fees, i.e. whether 
such fees should exist in Hungary; 
•	 Participants/respondents’ opinion about the desirable objectives of user fees (if 
implemented), namely the decrease of unnecessary services utilization or the gen-
eration of additional resource; 
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•	 Participants/respondents’ opinion about exemptions, i.e. whether exemptions 
should be applied if user fees are implemented.
We use the Ward method to ensure homogeneity and relatively equal size of the 
attitude groups. Differences between the binary variables are calculated by the 
method of simple matching (see Romesburg, 2004). Participants/respondents are 
classified in the basic attitude groups based on their responses in the standardized 
questionnaire.
4.3 Results
Qualitative data analysis
Tables 4.1-4.3 summarize the statements related to experiences, expectations and 
approval of user fees expressed by the participants/respondents during the focus 
group discussions and in-depth interviews.
Expectations
Policy makers and insurers consider unnecessary utilization of services as a relevant 
problem in the Hungarian health care system and indicate that user fees would be an 
effective instrument for decreasing unnecessary visits. They overall support user fees 
in Hungary to promote the health- and cost-consciousness of patients. According to 
them the fees motivate patients to behave as conscious consumers when using health 
care services. 
In contrast, consumers and providers mostly consider user fees as an additional 
resource for the health care provision. According to them, the introduction of 
user fees would be acceptable if the revenue collected was reinvested in health care 
provision in order to improve quality of services and increase the salary of physicians. 
Consumers, especially the group of families with children and pensioners, who are 
the most frequent users of services, as well as physicians, consider the lack of resources 
and poor service quality as the main problems in the Hungarian health care system. 
However, they point out that there is a high risk that the money collected through 
user fees would not be reinvested in service provision because of abuses.
None of the stakeholder groups consider the decrease of informal payments as an 
appropriate policy objective of user fees due to the differences in the magnitude, 
the beneficiaries and the objectives of these payments. According to their opinion, 
informal payments are paid directly to physicians to get better quality care and more 
personal attention, which cannot be purchased by user fees. 
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Table 4.1 Opinion of health care stakeholders about user fees – expectations
General statements from interviews and focus group discussions
Expectations
  C
onsum
ers
  Physicians
  Policy m
akers
Utilization
The most important aim of user fees is to decrease unnecessary utilization of health care 
services. x x x
The decrease of unnecessary utilization of health care services is an important goal. x
User fees induce cost-and health-consciousness of the consumers. x x x
People usually go to doctor to “live social life”. x x
People do not go to see the doctor if it is not necessary. x
Those, who cannot afford, might forgo physician visits. x x
Mostly providers (and medical protocols) induce the utilization of health care services, 
not the patient. x x
Those who use services unnecessary, should pay. x
The utilization could be controlled also by the referral system. x
Resource
The most important aim of user fees is to generate additional revenue for the health care 
system or health care providers. x x
The revenue should be reinvested in provision, to improve the quality of services. x
Physicians should benefit from the revenues. x x
Generation of additional resources is not the elemental goal of user fees. x
Need for additional resource in health care, but not user fees (introduced in 2007). x
Informal payments
User fees have no potential to deal with informal payments (due to the low amount of 
fees, and tradition). x x x
Note: “x” indicates if the statement occurs in the discussions with the stakeholder groups.
Experiences
All stakeholder groups in our study agree that the amount of the user fees introduced 
in 2007 was low (“equal to the price of a beer”). However, consumers and providers 
highlight that user fees in 2007 could induce a significant burden on frequent users 
of services. Some physicians argue that “some of their patients had to forgo visits because 
they could not afford to pay”. However, GPs consider the amount of the user fees 
introduced in 2007 “ridiculous”, even “humiliating” for the efforts that physicians 
make when providing health care services.
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Table 4.2 Opinion of health care stakeholders about user fees – experiences
General statements from interviews and focus group discussions
Experiences
  C
onsum
ers
  Physicians
  Policy m
akers
Utilization of services
The utilization of services decreased after the implementation of user fees. x x x
The utilization of services did not decrease. (“People anyway have to go for prescrip-
tions.”) x x
Those who needed, could get to the doctor (access to services has not declined). x
Some patients forgo visits, because they could not afford to pay. x
Amount
Moderate (“Price of a bear, coffee, bus ticket, milk, ice cream…”) x x
For frequent users,  user fees can be a significant burden. x x
The amount was ridicules. (“No appreciation of physicians’ effort.”) x
Resource
The introduction of user fees would have been acceptable if they had been reinvested in 
provision and equipments to increase quality. x
The revenue disappeared, it was not reinvested, and no improvement was noticeable. x
The revenue was used to make up the shortage of the health care system. x
GPs could benefit from the collected revenue and could use it to develop their office. x x x
After the collection/administration process, hardly left any revenue. x
Physicians were not the beneficiary of the collected money. x
Technical issues
The collection of the user fees in 2007 resulted in too much administration work. x x
The configuration of the system was expensive. x
The collection of fees produces queues and increased waiting time. x
Physicians had to handle money, which affected patient-physician relationship. x
General perceptions
Complains about the quality of the services (e.g. long waiting, lack of personal atten-
tion, crowded health care facilities in bad condition, lack of resources, overwhelmed and 
impatient personnel).
x x
User fees became a political issue in 2007, which divided political parties and followers. x x x
The population referendum was a wrongheaded decision. x x
Exemption categories were not clear, abuses could occur. x
Note: “x” indicates if the statement occurs in the discussions with the stakeholder groups.
Consumers and physicians mention several technical problems with the operation of 
the system of user fees in 2007. They recall negative experiences with the administration 
process resulting in queues, increased waiting time, and “time-consuming paper work”. 
According to them, the costs of the collection and administration process almost 
exceeded the revenues collected from user fees. Also, participants often mention that 
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“physicians had to handle money during visits”, which impede the patient-physician 
relationship. 
Consumer and provider groups argue that the revenues from the fees were not 
reinvested in service provision neither in out-patient specialist nor in in-patient care. 
Participants also mention that physicians were involved in the “hard work” regarding 
the administration, furthermore physicians had to handle patients’ anger about the 
fees, but they were not the beneficiaries of the revenues. Nevertheless, consumers and 
providers appreciate that in some GP practices, user fees were reinvested in health 
care provision, e.g. in new equipment or the renovation of the office.
At the same time, policy makers and insurers indicate that the drop in the utilization 
of health care services was the most relevant positive result of the user fees introduced 
in 2007. They suggest that due to this reduction, time and resources became available, 
thus, physicians “could spend more time with patients, who really needed care”. 
All stakeholder groups agree that user fees became a political issue in 2007 and 2008 
in Hungary, which divided political parties and their followers. Participants and 
respondents from different groups perceive the population referendum initiated by 
the main opposition party of the parliament (at that time the right wing party) as a 
wrongheaded decision. The following arguments are provided. First, the opposition 
to user fees expressed by the majority of the voters during the referendum reflected 
mostly the political orientation of the voters and not their opposition to the fees. 
Furthermore, the discontent with the governing parties, e.g. the decreasing support 
due to the unpopular restrictive fiscal implementations and grave conflicts in 
internal affairs12, could have been reflected in the results as well. Besides, those, who 
were not in favor of the other planned elements of the health care reforms, such as 
the transformation of the insurance system (i.e. replacing the single-payer insurance 
model by several competing for-profit Health Insurance Management Funds), might 
have also voted against the fees. Nevertheless, the following argument against the 
referendum is also popular among participants: “Who would vote for paying extra?” 
Acceptability
As described above, policy makers and insurers support the existence of user fees as 
a tool to reduce unnecessary utilization of health care services and to stimulate the 
health-consciousness of patients.
Physicians refer mostly to ethical reasons when opposing the idea of user fees. 
For example, they have concerns about the access to services among low-income 
patients. Consumers rather argue that those who pay insurance contributions should 
be entitled for health care services free of charge. A frequently asked question is: “I 
have been paying contributions, so why should I pay more?”. 
12  For more information see: BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5362034.stm
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Table 4.3 Opinion of health care stakeholders about user fees – acceptability of user fees
General statements from interviews and focus group discussions
Acceptability of user fees
  C
onsum
ers
  Physicians
  Policy m
akers
Those who paid contribution should be entitled for health care services free of charge. /  
“I paid contribution why should I pay more?” x x
If I had to pay, I would expect quality service. / I would not pay for this quality. x
I would prefer the system of supplementary insurance for “extra” services. x
Instead of social health insurance, we should pay based on the utilization. x
Patients should pay for "extra" services (e.g. shorter waiting time, better hotel service…) x x
We should follow the example of Western countries. (Referring to the TV series) x
If it helped the health care system, I would pay. x
The basic benefit package should be clearly defined. x
Note: “x” indicates if the statement occurs in the discussions with the stakeholder groups.
However, some consumers (e.g. working individuals, families with children, students) 
are not totally against user fees, but agree that if they had to pay, they would expect 
better quality. Also, the idea of user fees (or other kind of contributions) is accepted by 
consumer groups in the case of services which they consider “extra”. They mention shorter 
waiting times for an appointment, cleaner hospital wards, more personal attention and 
better hotel services (one-bed room, television) as examples for such “extra” services. 
They often refer to the Western European experiences “the system should work like in 
Western countries, patients pay extra for extra services e.g. one-bedded room or television”. 
Quantitative data analysis
As a result of the cluster analysis, three basic attitude groups are distinguished 
based on the individual answers in the standardized questionnaire. Altogether, 44 
participants/respondents are classified. One consumer and two policy makers were 
not classified due to the incomplete answers to the questions.
Out of the three groups, two rather agree with the necessity of user fees in Hungary. 
The difference between these two groups is that the first group mostly considers 
the decrease of unnecessary utilization of health care services as the most important 
objective of user fees, in accordance with the defined policy goals in 2007. While 
the second group considers that the most important goal of these fees should be the 
generation of additional resources for the health care system or for the providers. The 
first group might have been the main supporters of the user fees introduced in 2007. 
The second group is not against the implementation of such fees, but supposedly 
did not support the system of user fees introduced in 2007, as they have a different 
opinion of the objectives of the fees. The third group, the group of “skeptics”, is 
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either neutral or disagrees with the existence of user fees. According to them, if user 
fees existed, their main objective should be the generation of additional health care 
resources. The characteristics of the three attitude groups are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Attitude groups towards user fees – results of the cluster analysis
Characteristics Group 1“Supporters”
Group 2
“Skeptics”
Group 3
“Oppositions”
N 14 15 16
User fees should exist
Mean Lickert Scale (1-5)
Rather yes N (%)
Rather no N (%)
4.79
8 (57%)
6 (43%)
4.07 
15 (100%)
0 (0%)
2.34
4 (26%)
12 (74%)
Objective:
Decrease unnecessary visits N(%)
Resource N(%)
14 (100%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
15 (100%)
5 (31%)
11 (69%)
Some patients should be exempted.
Yes (%)
No (%)
10 (71%)
4 (29%)
10 (67%)
5 (33%)
16 (100%)
0 (0%)
Stakeholders:
Consumer N (% of total consumers)
Provider N (% of total providers)
Policy maker N (% of total policy makers)
3 (12%)
6 (43%)
5 (100%)
13 (50%)
2 (14%)
0 (0%)
10 (38%)
6 (43%)
0 (0%)
Policy makers and health insurers  fall mostly in the first group of “supporters”, while 
most of the consumers fall either in the second (specifically, students, working people 
and families with children) or the third “skeptics” group (specifically, pensioners and 
people from village). According to the individual responses, health care providers in 
our study were divided - most of them belonging to either the first or the third group 
(see Table 4.4). 
4.4 Discussion
Discussion of the limitations
In this chapter, we combine qualitative methods with quantitative techniques to 
describe experiences, expectations and approval of user fees of health care stakeholders 
in Hungary.
First, we have to refer to the validity of our study, which is largely qualitative. In 
qualitative research the categories of credibility, dependability and transferability are 
used to describe the trustworthiness of the research results (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
To assure the credibility of our study we have included participants from different 
backgrounds, interests and with different experiences: various groups of health care 
consumers and providers, as well as health insurers and policy makers working at 
different levels of the health care system. With regard to the dependability, we consider 
that there were no major changes or reforms in the Hungarian health care sector during 
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the data collection, specifically with regard to user fees. Our findings might be also 
transferable for other Central European countries, where health care services were 
provided free of charge during the communist regimes, especially Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic, because of the similar experiences with user charges. 
However, we have to acknowledge some limitations of the qualitative methods, 
such as the limited generalizeability due to the small sample size. Moreover, the data 
collection took place one year after the abolishment of the user fees in Hungary, 
thus we do not have information about the period before the referendum. Also, 
quantitative results should be interpreted cautiously, only in the context of the 
qualitative data. This is the reason why we aim to identify only basic attitude groups 
instead of presenting statistics of the sample. 
Discussion of the results
Both quantitative and qualitative results suggest that expectations towards user 
fees are the main fault-line between the policy-makers and the health insurance 
representatives in contrast to the consumers and the providers. This points out that 
the main reason behind the unpopularity of the user fees in Hungary can be that 
consumers and providers do not support the stated policy goals of the introduction 
of user fees in 2007, i.e. the decrease of unnecessary visits and the replacement of 
informal payments. According to them, the present health care system would rather 
call for additional resources in order to improve quality and outcomes. 
Consumers in our study would rather accept user fees if the revenues were reinvested 
in provisions to improve the quality of health care services. This attitude could be 
explained by the discontent of the population with the quality of health care services, 
also expressed during the focus group discussions. Previous studies also show that 
individuals are more willing to pay for health care services provided with better quality 
and quicker access (Kersnik, 2001; Harris, 2002; Pavlova, 2002). This willingness to 
pay for better quality care partly explains the existence of informal payments in CEE 
countries as well (Lewis, 2007; Gaál et al., 2006a; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Ensor, 
2004). Thus, formal patient payments might have more potential in decreasing 
informal payments, if user fees contribute to the improvements in quality and access 
of services.
One of the problems with the user fees in Hungary is the mistrust of consumers, 
that the state can achieve an adequate and effective provision of health care services. 
Also, participants stated their doubts that the revenues collected would be reinvested 
in health care provision. This attitude is however not surprising. Based on empirical 
evidence, the National Audit Office (NAO) in Hungary has also frequently pointed 
out in its reports the lack of transparency and ineffective use of health care resources 
in the Hungarian health care sector (Kovács, 2010). In addition to this, negative 
personal experiences with the fee collection mechanism might also enhance the 
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resistance against user fees. However, it is probable that these pitfalls could have 
been improved in the process of time. 
4.5 Conclusion and policy implications
This chapter has focused on the experiences and expectations of health system 
stakeholders in Hungary related to user fees for public health care services as well as 
the approval of these fees. We can conclude from the analysis that the unpopularity 
of the user fees in Hungary cannot be explained only by social perceptions rooted in 
the communist period, neither by its additional financial burden for the population. 
We have found that health care consumers are not against paying user fees, but they 
expect better quality and access to health care services.
According to our results, an acceptable goal of the introduction of user fees in Hungary 
could be the generation of additional financial resources in order to improve quality 
of service provision. However, this was not a stated policy objective of the user fees in 
2007, which might partly explain the rejection of these fees. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that stakeholders noticed no improvement in service quality and lacked the 
reinvestment of the revenues collected into service provision. It should be also taken 
into consideration that the introduction of the user fees was only one element of 
the complex reform efforts aiming at the decrease of the public deficit. Thus, it is 
difficult to differentiate whether the rejection of the user fees expressed during the 
referendum in 2008, addressed the fees or other contested areas of the reform. 
The lesson for policy makers in the Central European region might be that a 
successful implementation of user fees requires social and political consensus on the 
policy objectives. This calls for more policy discussion and close communication 
with the public to clarify the expectations and objectives of user fees. Even if the 
policy objective of user fees is to control utilization of services, further research is 
needed on how the collected revenues could be reinvested in health care provision to 
provide better quality services for consumers, and on how to motivate providers, to 
assure the fees’ acceptance in future.
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Exploring consumers’ attitudes towards 
informal patient payments - the case of Hungary 
Under Review.
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Abstract
Background: Previous studies on informal patient payments have mostly focused on 
the magnitude and determinants of these payments while the attitudes of health care 
actors towards these payments are less well known. 
Objective: This study aims to reveal the attitudes of Hungarian health care consumers 
towards informal payments to provide a better understanding of this phenomenon. 
Method: For the analysis, we use data from a survey carried out in 2010 in Hungary 
involving a representative sample of 1037 respondents. We use cluster analysis 
to identify the main attitude groups related to informal payments based on the 
respondents’ perception of and behavior related to informal payments. Multinomial 
logistic regression is applied to examine the differences between these groups in 
terms of socio-demographic characteristics, as well as past utilization and informal 
payments paid for health care services.
Results: We identify three main different attitudes towards informal payments: 
accepting informal payments, doubting about informal payments and opposing 
informal payments. Those who accept informal payments (mostly young or elderly 
people, living in the capital) consider these payments as an expression of gratitude and 
perceive them as inevitable due to the low funding of the health care system. Those who 
doubt about informal payments (mostly respondents outside the capital, with higher 
education and higher household income) are not certain whether these payments are 
inevitable, perceive them as similar to corruption rather than gratitude, and would 
rather use private services to avoid these payments. We find that the opposition to 
informal payments (mostly among men from small households and low income 
households) can be explained by their lower ability and willingness to pay.
Conclusions: A large share of Hungarian health care consumers has a rather positive 
attitude towards informal payments, perceiving them as “inevitable due to the low funding 
of the health care system”. From a policy point-of-view, the change of this consumer 
attitude will be essential to deal with these payments in addition to other policy strategies.
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5.1 Introduction
Informal payments for health care services present an important and challenging 
policy issue in most of the Central and Eastern European countries (Ensor, 2004; 
Gaál et al., 2006a). These payments violate the transparency in the financing of the 
health care systems and jeopardize the accountability of the providers. They also 
lead to inefficient use of health care resources (Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2002; Gaál et 
al., 2006a) and inequalities in access to health care services (Balabanova and McKee, 
2002; Mastilica and Bozikov, 1999; Szende and Culyer, 2006). 
The definition of informal payments varies across the literature and reflects cultural 
differences in the perception of informal payments (Gaál et al., 2006a; Gaál and 
McKee, 2005; Stepurko et al., 2010). However, authors agree that these payments 
are unofficial, i.e. they are outside the official payment channels (not registered by 
the state and made without an official receipt of payment). Various types of informal 
payments can be distinguished based on who initiates the payments (the patient or 
the provider), who receives the payment (medical staff, institution), who makes the 
payment (patient or relatives), what the nature of the payment is (cash or in-kind), 
when the payment is made (given ex-ante or ex-post), what the purpose/motivation 
of these payments is (patient’s gratitude, tip or fee for service) (Stepurko et al., 2010). 
Also the legal status of informal payments might differ across countries (whether 
it is explicitly forbidden by the law). They can be legal (not forbidden or even 
permitted by the law), or illegal (forbidden by law although sometimes condoned by 
governments) (Stepurko et al., 2010).
Overall, informal payments are seen as a rather complex phenomenon interrelated with 
different socio-cultural, legal-ethical and economic factors in a country. These factors 
have been extensively discussed in the literature (Ensor, 2004; Gaál et al., 2006a; Szende 
and Culyer, 2006; Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2007; Gaál and McKee, 2005). According to the 
socio-cultural explanation, informal payments are considered as a tip and expression 
of patient’s gratitude (e.g. Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Gaál and McKee, 2005). 
Based on the legal-ethical considerations, the existence of informal payments can be 
explained by the lack of control and accountability of governance structures (Gaál and 
McKee, 2005). The economic explanation mostly refers to the shortage of resources in 
the health care sector, low salaries of physicians and the existence of an informal market 
for services provided with better quality (e.g. (Gaál and McKee, 2005; Thompson and 
Witter, 2000)). However, the differentiation between these factors is rather difficult 
due to the “shadow” nature of the informal payments (i.e. the returns of informal 
payments cannot be measured and they are not compellable). Also, these factors might 
differ across countries. In low and middle income countries (e.g. Ukraine, Tajikistan, 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia), informal payments are an important source of 
health care financing (Lewis, 2000; Rechel and McKee, 2009). While in Central 
Europe (in Hungary for example), informal payments mostly contribute to the salary 
of health care personnel (Gaál et al., 2010).
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Most of the empirical studies on informal patient payments aim to estimate the 
magnitude of these payments and their determinants, while there is less scientific 
evidence on the perception of health care actors related to these payments payments 
(Gaál et al., 2006b; Stepurko et al., 2010). To be able to understand why informal 
payments are widespread, the perceptions and attitude of health care consumers 
towards these payments are one of the key factors (besides factors on the provider 
side). Thus, evidence on this issue may support policy making related to the 
eradication of informal payments. 
In this study, we address the issue of informal payments, defined as unofficial cash 
or in-kind payments given to the health care personnel, in Hungary where such 
payments are widespread, especially in hospital care (for more information on 
informal payments in Hungary see Chapter 1 and 3). The attitude of the Hungarian 
government towards informal payments has been rather controversial during the 
last decades. On the one hand, several Ministry Committees and policy measures 
have addressed the problem of informal payments in Hungary, including media 
campaigns against informal payments, the increase of the salaries in the public sector 
as well as the introduction of co-payments for health care services. However, despite 
these arrangements, there were no significant changes regarding the magnitude of 
these payments during this period (Gaál et al., 2006b; and Chapter 3) On the other 
hand, the national regulations do not explicitly forbid informal patient payments. 
Since July 2012, the Labor Code in Hungary prohibits receiving informal payments. 
However, the employer has the right to dispense the employees from this decree. 
Thus, in a way, the government tolerates informal payments in the health care sector. 
The reason for this tolerance might be that informal payments contribute to the 
system funding by complementing the income of health care personnel (Lewis, 
2002; Gaál et al., 2006a; Lewis, 2000). 
This idea is supported by the standpoint of the medical profession, as the Ethic 
Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber declares that “…one of the explanations 
of the existence of informal payments is the low salary of the physicians and the 
dysfunction of the health care system” 13, quoted in (Gaál and McKee, 2005). The 
studies show that indeed, in Hungary, informal payments are paid to the medical staff 
and contribute to their salary (Gaál et al., 2006b; Bognár et al., 2000). However, they 
also point out that these payments are unequally distributed among physicians: 5% 
of them receive 60% of the informal payments (Gaál et al., 2006b). This can imply 
that beneficiaries of informal payments might have the power to block important 
changes in the health care system to maintain the status quo.
Regarding the consumer side, the literature on Hungary suggests that informal 
payments are not only the expression of gratitude of health care consumers, but a kind 
13 The Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber.
 Available at: http://www.mok.hu/upload/mok/document/MOK_etikai_kodex.pdf
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of “fee for service” to receive better quality, quicker access and more attention (Gaál 
and McKee, 2005). More precisely, health care consumers pay informally because 
they are afraid that they will have less chance to obtain these services and benefits if 
they do not pay informally to the health care personnel (Szende and Culyer, 2006; 
Gaál and McKee, 2005; Mihályi, 2004). Gaál and McKee (2004) consider informal 
payments as a reaction to the “declining” performance in the health care system (Gaál 
and McKee, 2004). According to the authors, dissatisfied health care consumers, who 
have no possibility to satisfy their needs elsewhere or cannot openly complain, are 
using informal channels (such as informal payments) to obtain the care they desire.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the perceptions of Hungarian health care 
consumers related to informal payments. For the analysis, we use data from a survey 
carried out in 2010 in Hungary on a country-representative sample. We use cluster 
analysis to identify the main attitude groups related to informal payments. We also 
use multinomial logistic regression to examine the differences between these groups 
in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, as well as past utilization and informal 
payments for hospital services. 
The results of the study may support policy making aiming to deal with informal 
payments. Although we focus on Hungary, our results are also relevant for other 
countries where informal payments are widespread. 
5.2 Data and method
Data collection
The data used in the analysis, were collected in July 2010 in a household survey, carried 
out as a part of an international research project. The objective of the survey was 
to collect data on past payments for health care services during the last 12 months, 
attitudes towards informal payments, preferences and willingness to pay for health care 
services. The dataset contains a country representative sample of 1037 respondents. 
(More information on the survey and data collection can be found in Appendix A).
The questionnaire
The questionnaire includes questions about the respondents’ perception of informal 
cash payments and gifts in kind given to physicians and the health care staff, as 
well as questions about the behavior of health care consumers related to informal 
payments. Informal payments were defined at the outset of the questionnaire as 
consisting of informal cash payments (such as gratitude cash payments or under-the-
table cash payments) and gifts in kind for receiving medical services. It was specified 
in the questions that such payments can be given to physicians, medical staff or other 
personnel in health care facilities.
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The exact wording of the questions used in our analysis is presented in Box 5.1 and 
a copy of the questionnaire is provided in the Appendix B. The questions in the first 
block in Box 5.1 inquire the respondents whether five statements on behavior related 
to informal payments apply to them personally. Questions in the second block (see 
Box 5.1) inquire whether respondents agree with six different statements about 
informal payments. In particular, respondents were asked whether they consider 
informal payments as a form of corruption or as gratitude, whether they accept 
informal payments as inevitable because of the low health care funding, and whether 
they agree that these payments should be eradicated.
Box 5.1 Statements on informal payments used in the cluster analysis
Do the following statements apply to YOU PERSONALLY? (yes/somewhat/no)
•	 q1: I will feel UNCOMFORTABLE if I leave the physician's office without a 
gratitude cash payment or gift in kind.
•	 q2: I would RECOGNISE the hint of physicians or medical staff for an infor-
mal cash payment or a gift in kind.
•	 q3: I will REFUSE to pay if a physician or medical staff ask me to pay infor-
mally for a medical service.
•	 q3: I will PREFER to use private medical services if I have to pay informally for 
public medical services.
•	 q4: If I have SERIOUS PROBLEMS with my health, I will be ready to pay as 
much as I have in order to get better medical services.
Do you AGREE with the following statements? (yes/somewhat/no)
•	 q5: Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are similar to 
corruption.
•	 q6: Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption.
•	 q7: Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are an expression 
of gratitude.
•	 q8: Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are an expression of grati-
tude.
•	 q9: Informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff are 
INEVITABLE because of the low funding of the health care sector.
•	 q10: Cash or gifts in kind, given informally to physicians and medical staff, 
should be ERADICATED.
Other parts of the questionnaire included questions on the utilization and payments 
for physician services (including any physician in primary and out-patient specialist 
care both in the public and private sector, excluding dentists) and hospitalization 
(including 1 day surgery as well as longer hospitalizations) during the preceding 12 
months as well as socio-demographic characteristics. 
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Analysis
We divide the respondents into attitude groups based on their individual responses. By 
applying the method of hierarchical cluster analysis with the Ward method, we explore 
patterns in the respondents’ answers. Ward method ensures the homogeneity and 
relatively equal size of the attitude groups. In a cluster analysis, the number of clusters 
is subjective. However, there are statistical tests, which can be used as a guidance to 
identify the “optimal” number of clusters. The two most frequently applied statistical 
tests - Duda-Hart test and Calanski Harabas test, provide us with a test on each stage 
of the clustering for deciding on whether or not the splitting of a cluster is justifiable 
(Duda et al., 2001; Milligan and Cooper, 1985). In our analysis, both tests suggest 2 
clusters as the best option (one group for and one group against informal payments). 
However, we decide to use 3 clusters, as we find it interesting to study the differences 
within the group of those who are against informal payments. Finally, we set the final 
clusters using k-centered clustering with 3 groups, setting starting points as random 
3 observations. Differences between the variables are calculated using the method of 
Euclidean-distance. We use ANOVA to test whether the clusters significantly differ 
from each other in terms of the variables used in the cluster analysis using test.
After the formation of the three groups, we apply multinomial logistic regression analysis 
to examine the association between socio-demographic characteristics and cluster 
memberships. We estimate two models. In the first one, we use the cluster indicator 
(Group = 1, 2, 3) as a dependent variable and socio-demographic characteristics (such 
as age, gender, education of the respondent, logarithm of the monthly net household 
income, size of the household, place of residence of the household) as explanatory 
variables. In the second model, we also include past utilization and informal payments 
for physician or hospital services as explanatory variables. To examine the effect of past 
utilization and payments, we have formulated three different groups for each service: 
those who did not visit a physician or were not hospitalized during the last 12 months; 
those who visited a physician or were hospitalized but did not pay informally; those who 
visited a physician or were hospitalized and paid informally. To define these groups, in 
the regression analysis, we include two indicators per service: (1) for not using a given 
service and (2) for using the services and paying informally. The categories that refer 
to using a given services and not paying informally are taken as reference categories.
5.3 Results
Results of the cluster analysis
Altogether, 924 persons gave valid answers to all questions in Box 5.1 and were classified 
into three groups (following the procedure described in the method section): Group 1 
consists of 311 members, Group 2 with 316 members and Group 3 with 297 members. 
Table 5.1 presents the characteristics of the three groups based on the variables used in 
the cluster analysis. According to the results of ANOVA analysis (Table 5.2) the groups 
significantly differ in terms of all variables used in the cluster analysis. 
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Table 5.1 Perceptions of informal payments – results of the cluster analysis
Group I II III Total
N 311 316 297 924
q1: I will feel UNCOMFORTABLE if I leave the physician's office without a gratitude cash payment or gift in 
kind
No 170 (54.7%) 214 (67.7%) 252 (84.8%) 636 (68.8%)
Somewthat 72 (23.2%) 50 (15.8%) 30 (10.1%) 152 (16.5%)
Yes 69 (22.2%) 52 (16.5%) 15 (5.1%) 136 (14.7%)
q2: I would RECOGNISE the hint of physicians or medical staff for an informal cash payment or a gift in kind.
No 37 (11.9%) 30 (9.5%) 57 (19.2%) 124 (13.4%)
Somewhat 72 (23.2%) 67 (21.2%) 74 (24.9%) 213 (23.1%)
Yes 202 (65.0%) 219 (69.3%) 166 (55.9%) 587 (63.5%)
q3: I will REFUSE to pay if a physician or medical staff ask me to pay informally for a medical service.
No 134 (43.1%) 67 (21.2%) 49 (16.5%) 250 (27.1%)
Somewhat 85 (27.3%) 88 (27.8%) 51 (17.2%) 224 (24.2%)
Yes 92 (29.6%) 161 (50.9%) 197 (66.3%) 450 (48.7%)
q4: I will PREFER to use private medical services if I have to pay informally for public medical services.
No 171 (55.0%) 3 (0.9%) 212 (71.4%) 386 (41.8%)
Somewhat 76 (24.4%) 68 (21.5%) 70 (23.6%) 214 (23-2%)
Yes 64 (20.6%) 245 (77.5%) 15 (5.1%) 324 (35.1%)
q5: If I have SERIOUS PROBLEMS with my health, I will be ready to pay as much as I have in order to get 
better medical services.
No 27 (8.7%) 23 (7.3%) 119 (40.1%) 169 (18.3%)
Somewhat 67 (21.5%) 87 (27.5%) 123 (41.4%) 277 (30.3%)
Yes 217 (69.8%) 206 (65.2%) 55 (18.5%) 478 (51.7%)
q6:1 Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption.
No 163 (52.4%) 7 (2.2%) 12 (4.0%) 182 (19.7%)
Somewhat 127 (40.8%) 105 (33.2%) 73 (24.6%) 305 (33.0%)
Yes 21 (6.8%) 204 (64.6%) 212 (71.4%) 437 (47.3%)
q7: Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption.
No 237 (76.2%) 79 (25.0%) 61 (20.5%) 377 (40.8%)
Somewhat 68 (21.9%) 112 (35.4%) 91 (30.6%) 271 (29.3%)
Yes 6 (1.9%) 125 (39.6%) 145 (48.8%) 276 (29.9%)
q8: Informal CASH payments to physicians and medical staff are an expression of gratitude.
No 17 (5.5%) 125 (39.6%) 157 (52.9%) 299 (32.4%)
Somewhat 86 (27.7%) 134 (42.4%) 117 (39.4%) 337 (36.5%)
Yes 208 (66.9%) 57 (18.0%) 23 (7.7%) 288 (31.2%)
q9: Gifts IN KIND to physicians and medical staff are an expression of gratitude.
No 7 (2.3%) 53 (16.8%) 95 (32.0%) 155 (16.8%)
Somewhat 47 (15.1%) 138 (43.7%) 141 (47.5%) 326 (35.3%)
Yes 257 (82.6%) 125 (39.6%) 61 (20.5%) 443 (47.9%)
q10: Informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff are INEVITABLE because of the 
low funding of the health care sector.
No 51 (16.4%) 137 (43.4%) 180 (60.6%) 368 (39.8%)
Somewhat 117 (37.6%) 90 (28.5%) 80 (26.9%) 286 (31.0%)
Yes 144 (46.3%) 89 (28.2%) 37 (12.5%) 270 (29-2%)
q11: Cash or gifts in kind, given informally to physicians and medical staff, should be ERADICATED.
No 128 (41.2%) 15 (4.7%) 15 (5.1%) 158 (17.1%)
Somewhat 130 (41.8%) 79 (25.0%) 58 (19.5%) 267 (28.9%)
Yes 53 (17.0% 222 (70.3%) 224 (75.4%) 499 (54.0%)
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Regarding the perceptions of informal payments, most of the respondents in Group 
2 and Group 3 agree (65 and 71 percent respectively) or somewhat agree (33 and 25 
percent respectively), that informal cash payments to physicians and medical staff are 
similar to corruption. Respondents in Group 1 either do not agree (52 percent) or 
only somewhat agree (41 percent) with this statement.
In Group 1, most of the respondents agree (67 percent) or somewhat agree (28 
percent) that informal cash payments to physicians and medical staff are an expression 
of gratitude. Most of the respondents in Groups 2 and 3 somewhat agree (42 and 39 
percent) or do not agree (40 and 53 percent) with this statement.
The results are similar regarding gifts in kind. However, in general, the shares of 
those who agree that gifts in kind given to physicians and medical staff are similar to 
corruption are lower in Group 1, 2 and 3 (2, 40 and 50 percent respectively) compared 
to cash payments (7, 65 and 71 percent). The shares of those who agree that gifts in 
kind given to physicians and medical staff are an expression of gratitude are higher in 
all groups (83, 40 and 21 percent) compared to cash payments (67, 18, 8 percent).
Most of the respondents in Group 1 agree (46 percent) or somewhat agree (38 
percent) that informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical 
staff are inevitable because of the low funding of the health care sector. Group 2 is 
rather divided regarding this question, most of the respondents do not agree (43 
percent), while 29 and 28 percent somewhat agree or agree with this statement. In 
Group 3, most of the respondents do not agree (61 percent) or somewhat agree (27 
percent) with this statement.
In Group 1, most of the respondents somewhat agree (42 percent) or agree (41 
percent) that cash or gifts in kind given informally to physicians and medical staff, 
should be eradicated. However, Group 2 and 3 are more likely to agree with this 
statement (in Group, 70 percent agree and 25 percent somewhat agree while in 
Group 3, these shares are 75 and 20 percent).
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Table 5.2 Perceptions of informal payments – results of ANOVA
Group I Group II Group III ANOVA
 Questions mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) F (p)
q1 0.68 (0.82) 0.49 (0.76) 0.20 (0.51) 33.93 (0.000)
q2 1.53 (0.70) 1.60 (0.66) 1.37 (0.79) 8.40 (0.000)
q3 0.86 (0.84) 1.30 (0.80) 1.50 (0.76) 49.81 (0.000)
q4 0.66 (0.80) 1.77 (0.45) 0.34 (0.57) 449.50 (0.000)
q5 1.61 (0.64) 1.58 (0.62) 0.78 (0.74) 148.42 (0.000)
q6 0.54 (0.62) 1.62 (0.53) 1.67 (0.55) 391.09 (0.000)
q7 0.26 (0.48) 1.15 (0.79) 1.28 (0.78) 195.03 (0.000)
q8 1.61 (0.59) 0.78 (0.73) 0.55 (0.64) 224.37 (0.000)
q9 1.80 (0.45) 1.23 (0.72) 0.89 (0.72) 160.73 (0.000)
q10 1.30 (0.73) 0.85 (0.83) 0.52 (0.71) 80.67 (0.000)
q11 0.76 (0.72) 1.66 (0.57) 1.70 (0.56) 226.10 (0.000)
Note: Wording of the questions can be found in Table 5.1 and in Box 5.1.
Regarding the respondents’ perceived behavior towards informal payments, 
respondents in Group 3 are less likely to feel uncomfortable when leaving the 
physician’s office without a gratitude cash payment or gift in kind (85 percent would 
not feel uncomfortable) compared to Groups 1 and 2 (55 percent and 68 percent 
respectively). Groups 1 and 2 are more likely to feel uncomfortable in this situation 
(in Group 1 22 percent would feel uncomfortable, and 17 percent in Group 2) 
compared to Group 3, where only 5 percent would feel uncomfortable. Respondents 
in Group 3 are also less likely to recognize the hint of physicians or medical staff for 
an informal cash payment or a gift in kind (19 percent would not recognize such 
hint) compared to the Groups 1 and 2 (12 percent and 10 percent respectively). 
Respondents in Group 1 are less likely to refuse to pay if a physician or medical staff 
asks them to pay informally for a medical service (43 percent would not refuse to 
pay) compared to Groups 2 and 3 (21 and 17 percent respectively). Respondents in 
Group 2 are more likely to prefer to use private services to avoid paying informally 
(78 percent would use private services), while Group 3 is less likely to prefer to use 
private services (only 5 percent would use). This share is 21 percent in Group 2. 
Respondents in Group 3 are less likely to be ready to pay as much as they have in 
order to get better medical services in case of serious health problems, 40 percent 
would not be ready to pay as much as they have, compared to 9 percent and 7 
percent in Groups 1 and 2 respectively. 
Based on the above characteristics of the three groups, we define Group 1 as accepting 
informal payments, Group 2 as doubting about informal payments and Group 3 as 
opposing informal payments.
75
Attitudes towards informal patient payments
Results of the multinomial logistic regression 
Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 5.3 
separately for the three attitude groups, i.e. for those who accept (Group 1), doubt 
(Group 2) and oppose (Group 3) informal payments respectively. 
The results of the multinomial logistic regression models are presented in Table 5.4 
and 5.5. In particular, Table 5.4 shows the predicted probability of belonging to each 
attitude groups. Table 5.5 presents the original and estimated cluster memberships. In 
the first model (where only socio-demographic features are included as independent 
variables), 43.5 percent of the cases are well predicted. In the extended model (where 
the past utilization and informal payments are also included as independent variables) 
47.1 percent of the cases are predicted correctly.
The probability of belonging to Group 1 (accepting informal patient payments) is 
significantly higher for those who are under the age of 35 (by 8 percentage points), 
or above 60 (by 9 percentage points). This probability is significantly higher also for 
those who are living in the capital (by 12 percentage points), however, significantly 
lower for those who are living in a village (by 8 percentage points). Tertiary education 
also increases the probability of belonging to this group by 10 percentage points. 
The probability of belonging to Group 2 (doubting informal patient payments)  is 
significantly higher for women (by 6 percentage points), at the same time significantly 
lower for those who are either living in the capital (by 17 percentage points) or have 
finished primary education (by 12 percentage points). The probability of belonging 
to Group 3 (who opposing informal patient payments) is significantly higher for 
men (by 7 percentage points), while each additional household member decreases 
the probability of belonging to this group by 3 percentage points.
When we include the past utilization and informal payments for health care services 
in the model, we observe that these variables explain group membership very well. 
Those who visited a physician during the last 12 months and paid informally for this 
type of service, are more likely to belong to Group 1, which mostly accepts informal 
payments (the probability increases by 27 percentage points), and are less likely 
to belong to Group 3, which mostly opposes informal payments (the probability 
decreases by 22 percentage points). Those who paid informally for hospitalization 
during the last 12 months are also less likely to belong to Group 3 (the probability 
decreases by 16 percentage points). However, those who were not hospitalized during 
the last 12 month, are more likely to belong to Group 2 which has doubts about 
informal payments (the probability increases by 9 percentage points).
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Table 5.3 Attitude towards informal payments – socio-demographic characteristics by clusters
Group I II III Total Missing
N 311 316 297 924 113
Socio- demographic characteristics
Age group
<35 104 (33.4%)* 100 (31.7%) 87 (29.3%) 291 (31.5%) 36 (31.9%)
35-59 119 (38.3%)** 148 (46.8%) 130 (43.8%) 397 (43.0%) 33 (29.2%)***
≥60 88 (21.9%)*** 68 (18.0%)*** 80 (26.9%) 236 (25.5%) 44 (38.9%)***
Gender
Man
Woman
144 (46.3%)
167 (53.7%)
140 (44.3%)**
176 (55.7%)**
151 (50.8%)
146 (49.2%)
435(47.1%)
489(52.9%)
46 (40.7%)
67 (59.3%)***
Residence
Village
Town
Capital
71 (22.8%)***
166 (53.4%)
74 (23.8%)***
101 (32.0%)
182 (57.6%)***
33 (10.4%)***
92 (31.0%)
149 (50.2%)
56 (18.9%)
264 (28.6%)
497 (53.8%)
163 (17.6%)
39 (34.5%)
55 (48.7%)
19 (16.8%)
Education
Primary
Secondary/vocational
Tertiary
64 (20.6%)
197 (63.3%)
50 (16.1%)***
40 (12.7%)***
233 (73.7%)***
43 (13.6%)**
71 (23.9%)
198 (66.6%)
28 (9.4%)
175 (18.9%)
628 (68.0%)
121 (13.1%)
35 (31.0%)***
67 (59.3%)**
11 (9.7%)
Health
Very bad. bad
Fair
Good
Very Good. excellent
43 (13.8%)
82 (26.4%)
98 (31.5%)
88 (28.3%)
28 (8.9%)**
79 (25.0%)**
134 (42.4%)***
75 (23.7%)
38 (12.8%)
90 (30.3%)
88 (29.6%)
81 (27.3%)
109 (11.8%)
251 (27.2%)
320 (34.6%)
244 (26.4%)
14 (12.4%)
33 (29.2%)
35 (31.0%)
31 (27.4%)
Age
Mean
Sd
46.4
(18.4)
44.6***
(15.9)
47.0
(17.2)
46.0
(17.2)
49.4*
(19.96)
Income
Mean
Sd
N
164 727**
(81 808)
301
188 230***
(100 351)
299
152 787
(100 081)
292
168 697
(95 441)
892
157 021***
(79 959) 
105
Household
Mean
Sd
2.6
(1.2)
2.9***
(1.3)
2.5
(1.3)
2.7
(1.3)
2.5
(1.5)
Past utilization and payments
Physician visit
N 310 315 296 921 112
Not visited
Visited and not paid
Visited and paid
60 (19.4%)
158 (51.0%)***
92 (29.7%)***
55 (17.5%)
211 (67.0%)**
49 (15.6%)***
61 (20.6%)
214 (72.3%)
21 (7.1%)
176 (19.1%)
583 (63.3%)
162 (17.6%)
31 (27.7%)**
69 (61.6%)
12 (10.7%)*
Hospitalization
N 311 315 297 923 113
Not hospitalized
Hospitalized not paid
Hospitalized and paid
228 (73.3%)***
34 (10.9%)**
49 (15.8%)***
258 (81.9%)
27 (8.6%)***
30 (9.5%)***
239 (80.5%)
45 (15.2%)
13 (4.4%)
725 (78.6%)
106 (11.5%)
92 (10.0%)
92 (81.4%)
16 (14.2%)
5 (4.4)**
Note. Stars indicate significant difference from the 3rd group in terms of mean (t test), or proportion (z-test). 
In the case of “missing” group, stars indicate significant difference from the Total. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  
*** p<0.01.
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Table 5.4 Attitude towards informal payments – results of the multinomial logistic 
regression analysis
Model Model 1 Model 2 (extended model)
VARIABLES Pr(cluster=1)
Pr
(cluster=2)
Pr
(cluster=3
Pr
(cluster=1)
Pr
(cluster=2)
Pr
(cluster=3
Age<35 7.54* -3.67 -3.87 7.83* -2.87 -4.95
(1.89) (-0.99) (-1.03) (1.91) (-0.75) (-1.32)
Age≥60 8.48* -4.74 -3.74 6.36 -4.09 -2.27
(1.92) (-1.15) (-0.92) (1.39) (-0.96) (-0.55)
Gender: woman 1.73 5.68* -7.41** 0.99 5.32 -6.32*
(0.53) (1.75) (-2.26) (0.29) (1.60) (-2.00)
Residence: capital 12.4*** -16.9*** 4.55 12.1** -16.9*** 4.72
(2.70) (-4.49) (1.00) (2.54) (-4.28) (1.02)
Residence: village -7.56** 2.55 5.00 -8.66** 2.41 6.25
(-2.02) (0.68) (1.29) (-2.26) (0.63) (1.58)
Education: primary 5.78 -12.1*** 6.32 5.28 -11.4*** 6.17
(1.25) (-2.96) (1.40) (1.10) (-2.68) (1.33)
Education: tertiary 9.64* -2.34 -7.30 9.74* -2.23 -7.51
(1.83) (-0.48) (-1.50) (1.78) (-0.45) (-1.56)
Health status: bad, 7.38 -3.66 -3.72 4.72 -2.99 -1.72
very bad (1.36) (-0.70) (-0.77) (0.84) (-0.54) (-0.33)
Ln(income) -0.71 8.26** -7.55** -3.06 8.63*** -5.56*
(-0.23) (2.56) (-2.54) (-0.96) (2.60) (-1.87)
Number of household 0.69 2.16 -2.84* 1.16 2.40 -3.56**
members (0.47) (1.52) (-1.96) (0.77) (1.64) (-2.41)
Not visited physician - - - 6.89 -6.05 -0.84
- - - (1.46) (-1.44) (-0.20)
Visited physician and - - - 27.1*** -4.91 -22.2***
paid informally - - - (5.34) (-1.05) (-5.91)
Not hospitalized - - - -0.55 8.81* -8.26
- - - (-0.10) (1.72) (-1.57)
Hospitalized and paid - - - 8.18 7.90 -16.1***
informally - - - (1.00) (0.92) (-2.68)
Intercept (probability) 34.26 32.72 33.03 34.24 33.76 32.00
Observations 892 892 892 888 888 888
Pseudo R-squared 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0704 0.0704 0.0704
Chi2 test 77.34 77.34 77.34 137.3 137.3 137.3
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Socio-demographic characteristics of those respondents, who were not classified 
due to missing responses, are also presented in Table 5.3. They are significantly 
older, more frequently women, finished primary education, and have a significantly 
lower household income, compared to those who answered all questions presented 
in Box 5.1 and were included in the analysis. According to the predictions of the 
extended model (see Table 5.5), including socio-demographic features, as well as past 
utilization and payments for health care services, 45 percent of those with missing 
responses would belong to Group 3.
Table 5.5 Attitude towards informal payments – original and predicted cluster mem-
bership
Model 1
Cluster/predicted cluster 1 2 3 Predicted N Missing Total
1 107 (35.7%) 109 (36,3%) 85 (28.3%) 301 10 311
2 57 (19.2%) 171 (57,6%) 71 (23.9) 299 17 316
3 76 (26.1%) 106 (36,4%) 110 (37.8%) 292 5 297
Missing 30 (28.6%) 37 (35,2%) 38 (36.2%) 105 8 113
43.5% of the cases the predictid cluster is equal to the original cluster
Model 2 (extended model)
Cluster/predicted cluster 1 2 3 Predicted N Missing Total
1 112 (37.3%) 98 (32.7%) 90 (30.0%) 300 11 311
2 61 (20.5%) 152 (51.2%) 84 (28.3%) 297 19 316
3 49 (16.8%) 88 (30.2%) 154 (52.9%) 291 6 297
Missing 26 (25.0%) 31 (29.8%) 47 (45.2%) 104 9 113
47.1% of the cases the predictid cluster is equal to the original cluster
5.4 Discussion
Discussion of the results
In this study, we have identified three different attitude groups of Hungarian health 
care consumers based on their opinion and perceived behavior concerning informal 
payments. This section discusses the main findings to obtain better insights in the 
consumers’ motivation to make informal payments for health care services.
We find Group 1 – involving either young people or elderly who predominantly live 
in the capital – to be the most tolerant towards informal payments as they mostly 
perceive these payments as inevitable due to the low funding of the health care 
system. The perception and attitude of this group corresponds with the “economic” 
explanation of informal payments, which refers to the shortage of resources in the 
health care sector, low salary of physicians and the existence of informal market 
for services with better quality (Gaál et al., 2010; Gaál et al., 2006b; Lewis, 2000).
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Thus, one of the explanations for this attitude might be the perceived low quality of 
health care services in Hungary. Qualitative results show that health care consumers are 
not satisfied with the performance of the health care system, and associate the low quality 
with the lack of financial and human resources in the Hungarian health care system 
(see Chapter 4; Baji and Gulácsi, 2010). This perception might create a motivation for 
health care consumers to pay informally for health care services in order to obtain better 
care. According to the theory of Gaál and McKee (2004), who extend Hirschman’s 
theory of “Exit, Voice, Loyalty” on the informal payments phenomenon, informal 
payments can be interpreted as a reaction to the “declining” performance in the health 
care system. Dissatisfied health care consumers who have no possibility to satisfy their 
needs elsewhere (exiting the system is not possible) or cannot openly make complains 
(voice is not an option) are using informal channels, such as payment or connections 
to improve their situation, i.e. to assure better care (Gaál and McKee, 2004). The same 
idea is behind the theory of “Alternative Politics”, which refers to the “do-it-yourself” 
approach adopted by citizens to address their dissatisfaction with governmental services 
and find other means (e.g. informal payments) of satisfying their needs (Cohen, 2011).
Another explanation for the tolerant attitude towards informal payments observed 
in Group 1 is the perceived low salary of the health care personnel, which according 
to the Group might legitimate the existence of informal payments. The definition 
of informal payments in the Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber – 
presented in the background section - suggests that informal payments keep physicians 
working in public health care institutions. Consequently, informal payments are an 
indication of the solidarity of health care consumers with the medical personnel. A 
similar finding was also reported in a previous study in Hungary, where 70% of the 
respondents agree or rather agree that the existence of informal payments indicate 
that physicians are “underpaid”. Also, 67% of the respondents in that study agreed 
or rather agreed that until physicians do not get proper salary they have the right 
to accept informal payments (Bognár et al., 2000). This may explain our finding 
that individuals in Group 1 consider informal payments as inevitable and that they 
feel rather uncomfortable when leaving the physician’s office without gratitude cash 
payments or gifts in kind. They would also not refuse to pay informally if asked by 
the medical personnel. 
Individuals in Group 1 do not consider informal payments as a corruption practice, 
consequently, they would not use private services either to avoid these payment. 
The explanation of this finding might be that the national legislation itself, do 
not explicitly forbid these payments (as mentioned in the background section). 
Furthermore, the Ethical Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber openly declares 
that these payments “within certain limits are legal and legitimate” 14.
Group 2 – with individuals mostly living outside of the capital, completed higher 
14 The Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber.  
Available at: http://www.mok.hu/upload/mok/document/MOK_etikai_kodex.pdf
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education, and having a higher household income, doubts informal payments. This 
group is divided regarding the statement that informal payments are inevitable because of 
the lack of resources in the health care system. However, they definitely consider informal 
cash payments as a corruption practice, and would rather use private services to avoid these 
payments. This attitude group rather supports the “legal-ethical explanation” of informal 
payments. According to this explanation, informal payments are rather the consequence 
of the lack of control and accountability of the governance (Gaál et al., 2006b), than of 
the lack of resources in the health care system. We also find that individuals in this group 
are both willing to pay for their health (they are the most ready to pay as much as they can 
in case of a serious health problem) and able to pay for health care services (since we find 
a significantly higher household income in this group compared to other groups). Thus, 
in their case, the extension of formal payment channels or the development of the private 
health care market might be an option to deal with informal payments.
Group 3 (mostly men from small households and low household income) is the least 
tolerant group towards informal payments and it is least likely to accept to pay informally 
for health care services as well. Individuals in this group consider informal payments 
as a corruption practice and do not agree that these payments are inevitable because 
of the low funding of the health care system. Similar to Group 2, the attitudes of this 
group correspond with the “legal-ethical explanation” of informal payments. However, 
our results suggest that this is not the only explanation for the attitude of this group. We 
find that although this group considers informal payments as a corruption practice, they 
would not use private services to avoid these payments. Besides, this is the group where 
the least respondents accept to pay for their health care in case of a serious health problem. 
These findings might suggest that they are less willing to pay for health care in general 
because either they object to pay for health care services in any form (formal or informal) 
or they are less able to pay for services (as we find a significantly lower household income 
among this group). Thus, they might be opposed to the increase in private financing in 
health care and the extension of formal payment channels. Since they are less likely to pay 
informally, they might also experience discrimination in the provision compared to those 
who accept informal payments and pay informally (Group 1 and 2).
As we mentioned in the introduction, previous studies on informal payments have 
mostly focused on the magnitude of the payments. In a recent systematic literature 
review, Stepurko et al. (2010) identify only six studies examining consumers or patients’ 
attitude towards informal payments in different countries (Stepurko et al., 2010; see 
Burak and Vian, 2007; Tatar et al., 2007; Shishkin et al., 2003; Belli 2003; Balabanova 
and McKee, 2002; Shahriari et al., 2001)These studies are rather divided regarding 
their conclusions, namely the attitudes reported in these studies vary from strongly 
negative to tolerant, depending on the motivation of the payment. Another six studies 
examine the perception of informal payments. Three studies report that informal patient 
payments are perceived as tradition and gratuity (Liaropoulos et al., 2008; Belli et al., 
2004; Shahriari et al., 2001), and two studies report that these payments are perceived 
as illegal behavior and corruption (Cockcroft et al., 2008; Litvak et al., 2001). One 
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study mentions both perceptions (Balabanova and McKee, 2002). Similarly to our 
findings, the above-mentioned studies also report that consumers tolerate informal 
payments when these payments are initiated by the patient, or can be explained by the 
economic conditions, e.g. lack of resources, low salary of the physicians (See e.g. Belli 
2003; Cockcroft et al., 2008). In contrast to previous studies however, we use attitudes 
and perceptions to identify attitude groups that prevail in a country and to examine 
the characteristics of these groups. This enables us to better understand the motivations 
of different attitude groups in Hungary. The application of our analysis on data from 
other countries could show the cross-country relevance of our conclusions.
Discussion of the limitations
In this section, we highlight some limitations of our study. The data collection was 
carried out via face-to-face interviews. This reduces non-responses, as the interviewer 
can guide the respondent (Saris and Gallhofer, 2007). However, informal payments 
are a sensitive topic. Therefore, when answering the questions on informal payments, 
some respondents could feel uncomfortable and would give socially desirable answers. 
Although we recognize that the collection of sensitive data via a self-administrated 
questionnaire has a higher potential to reduce this bias (Johnson and Clarke, 2003; 
Onsembe, 2002), we opted for a face-to-face interview in our survey to reduce 
the non-response. Altogether 113 respondents did not answer some questions and 
therefore were excluded from the cluster analysis. To address this issue we compared 
the socio-demographic characteristics of this group to those respondents who gave 
valid answers to identify significant differences between them.  
Furthermore, we find that half of the respondents (51 percent) agree (or rather agree) 
that informal payments are an expression of gratitude, but at the same time consider 
these payments similar to corruption. This might suggest that respondents give 
inconsistent answers. However, the same phenomenon is found in a previous study 
as well (Gaál and McKee, 2005). Hungarian health care consumers often use the 
term gratitude to explain the motivation behind informal payments, even though in 
most of the cases they pay informally in order to receive better quality care, quicker 
access or more attention. One explanation of this puzzle might be that in Hungary 
the expression “gratitude” is used to denominate informal payments. Nevertheless, 
the Ethic Codex of the Hungarian Medical Chamber also defines these payments as 
an expression of gratitude. 
5.5 Conclusion and policy implications
In this study, we have identified the main attitudes toward informal patient payments 
among Hungarian health care consumers: accepting informal payments, doubting 
informal payments and opposing informal payments. 
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From a policy point of view, the attitude of the first group is the most challenging, as 
they considers informal payments as an expression of gratitude and at the same time 
inevitable because of the low funding of the health care system. This corresponds 
with the economic explanation of informal payments, which is also enhanced by the 
health care providers’ side in Hungary.
The behavior of the second group – those who doubt informal payments - is more 
promising from a policy point-of-view. They regard these payments as similar to 
corruption and would use private services to avoid these payments. Thus, in their 
case, the extension of formal payment channels or the private market of services 
might be an option to deal with informal payments, as they are both willing and able 
to pay for health care services. 
We find that the reason behind the opposition towards informal payments observed 
in the third group is their lower acceptance and ability to pay for the services, rather 
than the “unofficial nature” of these payments. In their case, policy makers should 
focus on equity issues as they might also experience discrimination in the provision 
compared to those who accept informal payments and pay informally. 
If the government wants to make a commitment to fight against informal payments, 
one of the essential steps should be the change of this positive attitude towards 
informal payments found in this study. Until health care consumers get the message 
both from the government and from the health care personnel, that these payments 
are acceptable and legitimate (moreover necessary), it cannot be expected that tolerant 
attitude towards informal payments will change. The tolerant attitude might change 
if these payments would be strongly discouraged by the government regulations. 
Also, they will be less acceptable for the public if it is highlighted that informal 
payments are not the solution to the wage problems for the majority of the health 
care personnel as only a small group of physicians benefit from these payments (these 
problems require other solutions). On the contrary, informal payments create adverse 
incentives for their beneficiaries, which can be against the general policy objectives, 
and they might have the power to block important changes in health care system to 
maintain the status-quo (Gaál et al., 2006a).
We recognize however, that the change in public attitudes will be only one step in 
policy strategies aiming at the eradication of informal patient payments. It should 
complement (rather than substitute) other important steps such as improving quality 
of and access to public health care services, as well as securing sufficient resources 
for the public health care sectors. Moreover, the issue of informal payments cannot 
be addressed as a separate problem of the health care system alone. Fundamental 
changes in and outside the health care system are necessary to achieve appreciable 
results regarding the eradication of these payments.
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The link between past informal payments and 
willingness of the Hungarian population to 
pay formal fees for health care services – results 
from a contingent valuation study
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Abstract
Objective: In this Chapter we examine the willingness to pay formal fees for health 
care services and how this willingness to pay is associated with past informal pay-
ments. 
Method: We use data from a survey carried out in Hungary in 2010 among a repre-
sentative sample of 1037 respondents. Contingent valuation method is used to elicit 
the willingness to pay official charges for health care services covered by social health 
insurance if certain quality attributes regarding the health care facility, access to the 
services and health care personnel are guaranteed. A bivariate probit model is applied 
to examine the relationship between willingness to pay and past informal payments. 
Results: We find that 66 percent of the respondents are willing to pay formal fees 
for specialist visits and 56 percent are willing to pay for planned hospitalizations, if 
these services are provided with certain quality and access attributes. We find that the 
willingness to pay formal fees is positively associated with past informal payments. 
The probability that a respondent is willing to pay official charges for health care 
services is 22 percentage points higher for specialist examinations and 45 percentage 
points higher for hospitalization if the respondent paid informally during the last 12 
months. 
Conclusion: To establish an adequate system of formal patient payments in Hunga-
ry, the regulation, measurement and monitoring of the quality of health care services 
covered by the social health insurance are essential. The introduction of formal fees 
should be accompanied by adequate service provision to assure the acceptance of the 
fees. Furthermore, our results suggest that the problem of informal patient payments 
may remain even after the implementation of user fees.
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6.1 Introduction
Currently, in Hungary, there are no official co-payments for most of the health care 
services covered by social health insurance (see Chapter 1). However, health care 
consumers often complain about poor service quality and attribute this to the lack 
of human and financial resources (see Chapter 4; Baji and Gulácsi, 2010). Hence, 
those who are able to pay, either purchase services on the private health care market, 
which is done quite frequently in dental care, gynecology and diagnostic services, or 
pay informally for health care services covered by the social health insurance in the 
hope of getting better quality care (Gaál et al., 2006a; Gaál and McKee, 2005). Em-
pirical evidence shows that informal payments are widespread in Hungary, especially 
for in-patient care, where around half of the patients pay informally to health care 
personnel (see Chapter 2; Gaál et al., 2006b; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Bognár et 
al., 2000). 
Previous qualitative studies suggest that Hungarian health care consumers are not 
against paying official charges for the use of health care services covered by the social 
health insurance, but they expect better quality and access in return (see Chapter 4; 
Baji and Gulácsi, 2010). In this chapter, we aim to test this finding using quantitative 
data collected in 2010 in Hungary among a country-representative sample. Using 
a contingent valuation method, we examine whether health care consumers in 
Hungary are willing to pay officially for health care services covered by the social 
health insurance if certain quality attributes (regarding the health care facility, 
access to the services and health care personnel) are guaranteed. We are particularly 
interested in the link between the willingness to pay and past informal payments.
Given the focus of the study, we need to refer to the former experiences with user 
fees in Hungary, implemented in 2007 and abolished one year later as a result of a 
population referendum, where more than 80 percent of the voters supported the 
abolishment of the fees (for more information see Chapter 1 and 4). Consumers also 
expected that the revenues collected through user fees would be reinvested in the 
provision of services, but did not perceive any change in the quality of care after the 
implementation of these fees (see Chapter 4; Baji and Gulácsi, 2010). Furthermore, 
consumers continued to pay informally. The probability of paying informally 
decreased in the short run only among those health care consumers who were less 
able to pay (see Chapter 3).
The Hungarian case is not unique. Experiences in Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries (i.e. Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic) show that the 
implementation of user fees for health care services is a rather sensitive political 
issue (see Chapter 1 and 4; Tambor et al., 2011; Hall, 2009; Rechel and McKee, 
2009). In this region, informal payments are a common characteristic of health care 
provision (e.g. Rechel and McKee, 2009; Lewis, 2002). As these payments create 
adverse incentives for their beneficiaries, which might impede the realization of the 
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goals of health care reforms, and lead to inefficient use of resources as well as to 
inequalities in access to health care, it is a desirable policy objective to eradicate 
them (Gaál et al., 2010; Gaál et al., 2006a; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Ensor, 2004; 
Lewis, 2002). Policy makers in CEE countries often promote the implementation 
of official user fees by saying that formal payments will eradicate or “formalize” 
informal payments (see Chapter 1 and 3; Stepurko et al., 2010; Schneider, 2008). 
This was also the stated policy aim of the implementation of user fees in Hungary 
in 2007 (see Chapter 1, 2 and 3). However, there is no evidence in the literature, 
which supports this expectation. On the contrary, in CEE countries where user fees 
were implemented, patients still pay informally (Atanasova et al., 2011; Pavlova et 
al., 2011; Gaál et al., 2010).
Our study contributes to the knowledge on the acceptance of user fees, by providing 
insight on the relationship between willingness to pay formally and informally. The 
results of our study may support policy making on the implementation of user 
fees, and help to identify the main challenges regarding the relationship and the 
interference of informal payments and official charges.
6.2 Data and method
Data collection
For the analysis, we use data from a survey carried out in July 2010 as a part of an 
international research project. The aim of the survey was to collect data on willingness 
of health care consumers to pay official fees for health care services covered by the 
social health insurance as well as data on past utilization of and payments for services. 
For more information on the data collection and on the sample characteristics, see 
in Appendix A. 
The Contingent Valuation design
The questionnaire included questions on the utilization of and informal payments 
for physician services and hospitalization during the last 12 months (see Tables A1 
and A2 in the Appendix A) as well as questions on socio-demographic characteristics. 
The questionnaire also contained two contingent valuation tasks (see Appendix B 
for the exact wording) to elicit the willingness to pay official fees for each of the 
following two health care services covered by the social health insurance:
1) consultation and examination by a medical specialist in case of a major health 
problem, i.e. unfamiliar symptoms that make the patient concerned;
2) hospitalization for a planned surgery, i.e. 5-days spent in hospital and no life-
threatening illness.
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Respondents were asked to imagine that they could obtain these services with good 
quality and quick access if they pay an official fee to the health care facility (e.g. polyclinic, 
clinic or hospital). A visualization card was presented to respondents to describe the 
definition of good quality and quick access (i.e. modern medical equipment, renovated 
health care facility, polite staff with good reputation and skills, maximum 30 minutes 
travel time to the health care facility, maximum 10 minutes waiting time in front of 
the physician office, maximum 1 month waiting time for a planned surgery). Also, the 
card contained three payment intervals for each of the two services. 
After the interviewer explained the information on the visualization card, respondents 
were asked whether they would be willing to pay an official fee to the health care 
provider in order to obtain these services with good quality and quick access as 
described on the card. Respondents, who stated that they were willing to pay, were 
asked to define the amount which they are willing and able to pay based on the 
payment intervals indicated on the visualization card. Those respondents, who could 
not indicate an exact amount could choose an interval. The centre of the interval was 
used in the analysis. Respondent who answered that they were not willing to pay for 
a given service, were asked about the reason of unwillingness to pay, giving them the 
following options: object to pay, not able to pay or both.
The scenario was developed based on the experiences of focus group discussions prior 
to the survey as well as based on a pre-test of the scenario. During the focus group 
discussions, participants were asked to express their expectations regarding the quality 
and delivery of health care services. The definition of good quality and access was 
developed based on the qualitative data from the focus group discussions, following 
the framework of Berki and Ashcraft (1980). In particular, the attributes specified 
the physical and human resources involved in care provision (i.e. health care facility, 
equipment and personnel), as well as the spatial, temporal and psychological access 
to services (i.e. waiting time, travelling time and staff attitude). The scenario was 
pre-tested on 30 respondents with different socio-demographic characteristics via 
face-to-face interviews. During this pre-test, debriefing was used to test whether the 
respondents understood the scenario. The necessary changes were implemented after 
the pre-test to assure the reliability of the data collection. The payment intervals, 
used in the main survey, were also developed based on this pre-test.  
Our contingent valuation design (a combination of a referendum question, payment 
intervals and open-ended question) allowed us to measure the exact willingness to 
pay of the respondents, which cannot be achieved if only referendum questions and 
payment intervals are used. At the same time, it also provided the respondents with 
price tags, which helps to assure the reliability of the responses, thus, avoiding the 
main weakness of the open-ended questions. The combination of different types of 
contingent valuation questions is expected to improve the predictive validity of the 
willingness-to-pay data (Whynes et al., 2005; Ryan et al., 2004; Donaldson et al., 
1997). However, we acknowledge that the payment card utilized in this study creates 
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a threat of anchoring based on the fact that respondents see a number of prices (e.g. 
Lucas et al., 2007).
We emphasize that the scenario provided no information about the informal payments in 
the given situation (i.e. respondents were not told that informal payments would disappear 
with the introduction of user fees). Given that some informal payments are initiated by 
patients, we could not make assumptions on their behavior when describing the scenario. 
But in the formulation of the scenarios and during the survey, we ensured respondents 
that they could obtain the services with good quality and quick access as defined on the 
card if they paid official charges. This was done as the pre-test showed that an alternative 
scenario that suggested payments to the state or insurer to facilitate service improvements, 
is often rejected by the respondents because of distrust. Despite our attempts to assure 
reliability of the data collection, given the nature of the stated preference methods, some 
hypothetical bias cannot be avoided. Thus, the results should be interpreted with the 
acknowledgment of the hypothetical nature of the willingness-to-pay data. 
Regression analysis
Given the construction of the contingent valuation task, we expect that respondents 
use a two-step decision strategy about willingness to pay. First, they decide whether 
they are willing to pay, and conditional on this, they decide on the exact amount. 
Therefore, in the first step of the analysis, we explore whether respondents are willing 
to pay official fees, as well as the relation of this decision with their past actual 
informal payments. We assume that the willingness to pay (Ywtp,i = 1 if willing to pay, 
0 otherwise) depends on some observable factors (Xi) such as socio-demographic 
characteristics, health care utilization, and some unobservable factors. The occurrence 
of past informal payments (Yinf,i =1 if paid informally, 0 otherwise) also depends on 
the same observable factors (Xi) as well as some unobservable factors.
To reveal the association between willingness to pay and observable factors, 
controlling for the occurrence of informal payments, we compute the partial effects 
of the observable factors (Xi) on the conditional probability of willingness to pay: 
Pr(Ywtp,i=1|Yinf,i=1, Xi) and Pr(Ywtp,i=1|Yinf,i=0, Xi).
We do not attempt to identify a causal relationship between the two decisions (past 
informal payments and willingness to pay). However, we assume that some of the 
unobservable factors (e.g. the general attitude towards payments for health care 
services) affect both the decision to pay informally and the willingness to pay official 
fees. Thus, past informal payments of the consumers provide information about the 
willingness to pay through these unobservable factors. 
We apply a bivariate probit model, where the equations for willingness to pay and 
past informal payments are jointly estimated allowing correlation between the 
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unobservable factors, i.e. the covariance between the two error terms is not equal to 
zero (see Greene, 2007 p. 823). In the bivariate probit model, we assume that the 
two error terms are jointly normally distributed, with correlation (rho) between the 
unobservable factors.
In the second step of the analysis, linear regression analysis is carried out to examine 
the effect of socio-demographic characteristics and past utilization on the amount of 
the informal payments for those respondents who indicate they are willing to pay 
(including the logarithm of the payment on the left side of the equation). We include 
a dummy variable as a proxy to indicate whether the respondent paid informally in 
the past, to be able to examine differences between respondents who paid informally 
for the utilization of services and those who did not. We also build models to examine 
the association between the logarithm of the exact yearly amount of past informal 
payments and the logarithm of the willingness to pay amount controlling for socio-
demographic characteristics and health care use.
We include socio-demographic characteristics in the equations as independent 
variables (such as age, gender, education, place of residence, perceived health status, 
number of household members and the logarithm of the net monthly household 
income) as well as information on past utilization of health care services (i.e. how 
many times the respondent visited a physician or was hospitalized during the last 
12 months, and whether the respondent had to forgo visits or hospital admission 
because he/she could not afford to pay either for the service or for the transportation/
travel).
We estimate models separately for specialist consultation/examinations and for a 
planned surgery to explore the willingness to pay for each of these services. Also, 
we examine users (those who visited physician/were hospitalized during the last 12 
months) and non-users separately. Previous findings in the literature on contingent 
valuation indicate differences in the willingness to pay between actual users and non-
users/potential users, i.e. lower willingness to pay estimates for those who have no 
prior experience (Hanley et al., 2003; Ryan, 1996). 
We acknowledge that there are some limitations of the analysis. First, in the linear 
regression model, the dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent paid 
informally is endogenous due to the unobserved factors mentioned above. We tested 
for the robustness of our results by omitting this dummy from the regression. Since 
the parameters seemed to be robust to the inclusion of this variable, we present here 
the model where the payment variable is included as a proxy.  The small sample size 
also does not allow us to estimate models very precisely in some cases. Finally, we have 
no information on the type of physician and hospital services, which were utilized 
during the past 12 months. Given that informal payments are more frequent for 
some services (e.g. surgery or delivery) than for others, the type of service used might 
also influence the probability of paying informally. This may lead to a selection bias. 
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Other potential caveats include recall biases related to both past informal payments 
and service utilization, as the 12-month recall period used in the study is rather long 
(de Bruin et al., 1996). We use a 12-month period to assure a sufficient number 
of respondents who have been hospitalized in the sample. We use the same recall 
period for both physician visits and hospitalizations to assure comparability between 
services. Additionally, the sensitivity of the questions regarding informal payments 
can also result in a low response rate or biased answers, which might lead to selection 
bias (Saris and Gallhofer, 2007). However, in our study, the response rate is relatively 
high (76 percent), and the number of missing values concerning the questions on 
informal payments is less than 1 percent. 
Finally, in the analysis, we do not examine the reasons for unwillingness to pay, 
which can also hold some policy relevance, and would be an interesting topic for 
future research.
6.3 Results
Descriptive statistics on the socio-demographic features of the respondents as well 
as past utilization and informal payments are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in 
Appendix A. About 80 percent of the respondents visited a physician in the last 12 
month, on average 6.6 times, and 21.0 percent of them paid informally, on average 
59.2 euro15 (sd=77.3) per year. As much as 21.1 percent of the respondents were 
hospitalized during the last 12 month. Almost half of them (44.3 percent) paid 
informally, on average 130.8 euro (sd=163.0) per year. 
Regarding the contingent valuation results on willingness to pay (see Table 6.1), 
688 (66.3 percent) of the respondents indicated that they are willing to pay for a 
consultation and examination by a medical specialist in order to obtain services with 
good quality and access as described on the visualization card, 45 (6.5 percent) of 
them did not provide any indication of the amount (neither a payment interval nor 
an exact amount), and 155 (22.5 percent) failed to indicate the exact amount but 
only indicated the payment interval. We used the centre of the interval for these 
respondents. The rest of the respondents, 488 (70.9 percent) indicated an exact 
amount within the chosen interval. For those who indicated either an exact amount 
or interval, the average willingness to pay is 13.9 euro (sd=21.07) per examination. 
As many as 346 respondents indicated the reason of their unwillingness to pay (3 
missing): 116 were not able to pay, 131 objected to pay and 99 both objected and 
were not able to pay.
Altogether, 581 respondent (56.0 percent) indicated that they are willing to pay 
for a planned surgery, 37 (6.4 percent) of them did not indicate any interval or fee 
15 The exchange rate used in the survey was 285 HUF=1 EUR, which was due at the time of the data collection.
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amount, 138 (23.8 percent) respondents indicated only a payment interval, and 
406 (69.9 percent) indicated the exact amount within the chosen interval. For those 
who indicated the exact amount or the interval, the average payment is 101.0 euro 
(sd=65) per hospital admission. Altogether, 446 respondents indicated the reason for 
a negative answer (10 missing), 164 of them were not able to pay, 151 objected to 
pay and 131 of them both objected and were not able to pay.
Table 6.1 Results of the contingent valuation task - distribution of the willingness to 
pay amounts
Specialist exmination N Planned surgery N
Total sample 1037 Total sample 1037
Willing to pay 688 Willing to pay 581
Indicated an exact amount 488 Indicated an exact amount 406
0-5 euro 92 0-50 euro 78
5-10 euro 148 >50, ≤100 euro 190
10- 15 euro 89 >100, ≤150 euro 74
15-20 euro 90 >150, ≤200 euro 48
20 – 30 euro 7 More then 200 euro
30-40 euro 37 - -
More then 40 euro 25 - -
Indicted only an interval 155 Indicted only an interval 138
Less than 5 euro 38 Less than 100 euro 66
Between 5-10 euro 75 Between 100-200 euro 63
More than 10 euro 42 More than 200 euro 9
Missing 45 Missing 37
Not willing to pay 346 Not willing to pay 446
Not able to pay 116 Not able to pay 164
Object to pay 131 Object to pay 151
Both object and unable to pay 99 Both object and unable to pay 131
Missing 3 Missing 10
The regression results are presented in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 separately for a 
specialist examination and a hospitalization for a planned surgery. Among health 
care users, we find a significant positive correlation (rho) between the unobservable 
factors influencing the willingness to pay user fees, and the past informal payments, 
0.43 and 0.68 for physician visit and hospitalization respectively.
We find that the willingness to pay formal fees is different across health care users who 
paid informally during the past 12 months, and those who did not. The conditional 
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probability of the willingness to pay for a specialist visit is 88.8 percent for those who 
paid informally and 65.2 percent for those who did not pay. Even higher differences 
are found in the case of planned surgery (82.8 vs. 36.9 percent) respectively. We 
find that the direction of the effect of the explanatory variables on the conditional 
probability of willingness to pay is the same in both groups, i.e. for those who paid 
and those who did not pay informally. 
In the case of a specialist examination, respondents with a higher household income 
are more likely to be willing to pay formally and at the same time they are associated 
with a higher probability to pay informally as well. In the case of elderly users and 
users from the capital, we observe a higher probability to pay informally compared 
to other socio-demographic groups. However they have a lower probability to be 
willing to pay formally. In particular, age and living in the capital have a significant 
and positive effect on the probability of paying informally for physician visits during 
the last 12 month. They have a significant and negative impact on the conditional 
probability of willingness to pay formal fees. The marginal effect of a one year change 
in the age of the respondent at the mean is -0.1 percentage points for those who paid 
informally and -0.2 percentage points for those who did not; for living in the capital 
the marginal effects are 7.6 and 10.9 percentage points respectively.
We find that some population groups are less willing to pay formally. However, they 
do not significantly differ from other population groups regarding past informal 
payments. For those who forgo visits, the probability of willingness to pay formal fees 
is 4.5 and 9.2 percentage points lower (respectively for those who paid and did not 
paid informally). Disability pension is also associated with lower probability to be 
willing to pay (the marginal effects are 8.1 and 12.9 percentage points respectively). 
At the same time, these factors do not have a significant influence on the probability 
of paying informally.
Regarding the willingness to pay for a planned surgery, we find some differences in 
the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the conditional willingness to pay 
compared to physician visits. Forgone hospital admissions and living in the village 
are associated with a lower probability of willingness to pay (the marginal effect 
are -46.3 and -34.0 percentage points for forgone admission, and -13.9 and -16.8 
percentage points for living in the village respectively for those who paid informally 
and for those who did not). However, these variables are not associated with the 
occurrence of past informal payments. 
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Table 6.2 Contingent valuation for specialist examinations – results of the regression analysis
SPECIALIST Users
Variables
Model
Yinf,i 
biprobit
Ywtp,i 
biprobit
Pr(Ywtp,i=1|Yinf,i=1) 
marg.effect%
Pr(Ywtp,i=1|Yinf,i=0) 
marg.effect%
Ln(amount) 
linear
Paid informally - - - - 0.167**
- - - - (2.019)
Number of visits 0.058*** 0.011 -0.19 0.07 -0.003
(6.259) (1.201) (-1.00) (0.21) (-0.475)
Has forgone physician visit -0.177 -0.265** -4.48* -9.24** 0.035
(-1.393) (-2.444) (-1.70) (-2.21) (0.393)
Age 0.006* -0.005* -0.14** -0.22** -0.001
(1.888) (-1.683) (-2.38) (-2.04) (-0.263)
Woman 0.146 0.092 0.85 2.62 -0.120*
(1.333) (0.936) (0.41) (0.71) (-1.762)
Capital 0.321** -0.177 -6.71* -9.23* -0.624***
(2.177) (-1.304) (-1.96) (-1.73) (-6.367)
Village 0.157 0.131 1.56 4.01 -0.056
(1.269) (1.163) (0.69) (0.96) (-0.740)
Secondary education 0.163 0.045 -0.25 0.69 0.094
(1.300) (0.398) (-0.11) (0.16) (1.138)
Tertiary education 0.169 0.189 2.53 6.00 0.035
(0.992) (1.112) (0.84) (1.00) (0.358)
Ln (income) 0.372*** 0.433*** 6.29*** 14.3*** 0.212**
(3.164) (4.478) (2.62) (3.97) (2.578)
Household members -0.101** -0.018 0.35 -0.07 -0.033
(-2.112) (-0.462) (0.43) (-0.05) (-1.294)
Bad health status 0.027 0.043 0.69 1.49 -0.159
(0.164) (0.300) (0.25) (0.28) (-1.221)
Disability pension 0.053 -0.314* -8.13* -12.9** -0.084
(0.283) (-1.935) (-1.74) (-1.98) (-0.740)
Constant -3.349*** -1.441*** 88.8 65.2 7.084***
(-5.766) (-3.017) - - (17.89)
Athrho 0.455*** - - - -
(5.556) - - - -
Observations 785 - - - 506
LL -812.4 - - - -
Rho 0.426 - - - -
p 0.000 - - - -
Chi2/F 112.5 - - - 5.30
p 0.000 - - - 0.000
R2 - - - - 0.110
Note: Robust z and t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We find that a higher willingness to pay is associated with tertiary education, larger 
households as well as with living in the capital. The findings for the capital are 
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just the opposite from what we find for physician visits, i.e. a significantly higher 
probability that the respondent is willing to pay (with marginal effects of 12.4 and 
19.7 percentage points), while a negative effect (however not significant) on the 
probability of having made informal payments during the past 12 month. Higher 
household income is associated with a higher probability of paying informally, but 
not with a higher probability of willing to pay formal fees. 
Among those who are willing and able to pay for specialist visits, women as well as 
respondents from the capital are willing and able to pay significantly lower amounts 
(11.3 and 46.4 percent less, respectively). However, a higher household income is 
associated with higher amounts. Among those, who are willing and able to pay for 
a planned surgery, respondents from the village and with bad/very bad perceived 
health status are willing to pay significantly lower amounts (44.7 and 37.1 percent 
less respectively).16
Those who paid informally for physician visits during the last 12 month, are willing 
to pay higher amounts for specialist examination (18.2 percent more), while we find 
no difference regarding the amount of the payment among respondents are willing 
and able to pay for a planned surgery. Among those who paid informally, we find no 
significant relation between the exact amount of the annual informal payments and the 
willingness to pay amounts; neither in the case of physician services nor in the case of 
hospitalization (results are not shown in the Table 6.2). However, these models include 
a rather low number of observations, thus they have to be interpreted with reservations.
The results of the probit model for planned surgery17 suggest that respondents who were 
hospitalized before (but not in the past 12 months), are significantly more likely to be 
willing to pay for hospitalization (with a marginal effect of 19.0 percentage points). 
Higher household income is associated with a higher probability that the respondent 
is willing to pay officially. Among recent users however, the probability to be willing to 
pay officially is lower (with the marginal effect of 9.8 percent points) for respondents 
living in the capital compared to respondents from other towns. Respondents living in 
the capital or in a village are willing to pay significantly lower amounts for a planned 
surgery (18.9 and 15.8 percent less) compared to respondents living in other towns. A 
lower income is also associated with a lower willingness to pay.
16 Significant positive coefficient for those who forgone hospital admission due to inability to pay (3 respondents 
with the average amount of 50 167 HUF). 
17 Among those who had not visited physician during the last 12 months, the probit model is not significant at 
10% significance level, which might be explained by the low sample size and possible heterogeneity among 
these respondents. However, the coefficients suggest that respondents living in the capital are also less likely to 
be willing to pay for specialist visits, similarly to users.
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Table 6.3 Contingent valuation for a planned surgery – results of the regression analysis 
PLANNED 
SURGERY Users Non-users
Variables
Model
Yinf,i
biprobit
Ywtp,i 
biprobit
Pr(Ywtp,i=1|Yinf,i=1) 
marg.eff%
Pr(Ywtp,i=1|Yinf,i=0) 
marg.eff%
Ln(amount)
linear
Ywtp,i 
probit
Pr(Ywtp,i=1)
marg.eff%
Ln(amount)
linear
Paid - - - - 0.208 - - -
informally - - - - (1.646) - - -
Number of 
hospitalization 0.046 0.057 1.05 1.65 0.046 0.48*** 19.0*** 0.141*
/Ever been 
hospitalized. (1.144) (1.296) (0.76) (0.85) (1.504) (4.156) (4.21) (1.650)
Has forgone -0.096 -1.123** -46.3*** -34.0*** 0.657*** -0.760 -29.1* 0.023
hospitalization (-0.241) (-2.552) (-3.01) (-5.37) (4.570) (-1.612) (-1.82) (0.103)
Age 0.003 0.007 0.18 0.26 0.001 -0.003 -0.13 -0.001
(0.687) (1.404) (1.13) (1.23) (0.279) (-1.106) (-1.11) (-0.483)
Woman 0.202 0.049 -01.69 -1.70 -0.105 0.134 5.26 -0.004
(1.117) (0.263) (-0.32) (-0.22) (-0.824) (1.408) (1.41) (-0.053)
Capital -0.398 0.271 12.4** 19.7* -0.153 -0.248* -9.82* -0.210**
(-1.557) (1.024) (2.45) (1.79) (-0.830) (-1.893) (-1.89) (-2.232)
Village 0.095 -0.349* -13.9* -16.8** -0.593*** -0.013 -0.50 -0.172**
(0.455) (-1.675) (-1.92) (-2.18) (-4.296) (-0.117) (-0.12) (-2.370)
Secondary 0.362* -0.057 -7.86 -9.73 -0.076 0.160 6.24 -0.033
education (1.665) (-0.263) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-0.593) (1.504) (1.51) (-0.463)
Tertiary 0.006 0.632 14.3** 29.0* 0.046 0.219 8.43 0.098
education (0.017) (1.627) (2.55) (1.84) (0.222) (1.410) (1.45) (0.977)
Ln (income) 0.502*** 0.477** 7.06 11.7 0.267 0.38*** 15.0*** 0.104*
(2.862) (2.107) (1.07) (1.29) (1.653) (3.754) (3.75) (1.687)
Household -0.175** 0.028 3.71* 4.68 0.018 -0.027 -1.04 0.006
members (-2.519) (0.387) (1.71) (1.52) (0.343) (-0.622) (-0.62) (0.260)
Bad health  0.085 0.156 3.46 5.44 -0.463** 0.157 6.09 0.053
status (0.367) (0.673) (0.57) (0.58) (-2.489) (0.901) (0.92) (0.372)
Disability -0.275 0.155 8.26 0.12 0.277 -0.222 -8.82 -0.185
pension (-0.854) (0.498) (1.39) (1.04) (1.598) (-1.183) (-1.18) (-1.351)
Constant -2.59*** -2.701** 82.8 36.9 8.776*** -1.98*** 56.9 9.521***
(-3.062) (-2.380) - - (9.635) (-3.887) (29.89)
Athrho 0.824*** - - - - - - -
(5.897) - - - - - - -
Observations 214 - - - 109 768 - 411
LL -249.4 - - - - . - -
Rho 0.677 - - - - - - -
p 0.000 - - - - - - -
Chi2/F 49.18 - - - 7.133 51.85 - 1.996
p 0.002 - - - 0.000 0.000 0.023
(Pseudo) R2 - - - - 0.285 0.058 - 0.052
Note: Robust z and t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6.4 Discussion
Willingness to pay for quality
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, based on previous qualitative data (see 
Chapter 4; Baji and Gulácsi, 2010), we expect that health care consumers in Hungary 
are not against official fees for health care services if these services are provided with 
good quality and access. In this study, we confirm this expectation as we find that 
the majority of the respondents are willing to pay for health care services provided 
with certain quality and access attributes (as described in the contingent valuation 
task). Thus, Hungarian consumers are not against paying official fees. However, they 
expect value for their money. They would be willing to pay for high quality services, 
which are far from given at the moment in Hungary (Eris, 2012). Consequently, the 
improvement of the quality of services seems to be essential for the public acceptance 
of these fees. The Hungarian experience with user fees introduced in 2007 also 
shows that without appreciable improvements in the service quality, the fees remain 
unpopular among the public (see Chapter 4). In this field however a lot should be 
done in Hungary. In particular, currently the number of available health care quality 
indicators is limited, the quality of the provided services is hardly monitored and no 
quality requirements are included in the regulations (Eris, 2012).
As expected based on previous studies (Danyliv et al., 2012; Tomini et al., 2011; 
Tomini and Maarse, 2011; Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1967), a higher 
willingness to pay is associated with a higher ability to pay (indicated by the 
household income) and vice versa. In the case of vulnerable social-economic groups 
(e.g. elderly people, people on disability pension and those who forgone visits or 
hospital admission), we observe a lower willingness to pay even after controlling 
for income and service utilization. These population groups, who are not willing or 
able to pay, may oppose the implementation of user fees. As previous experiences 
suggest, public acceptance is crucial for the successful implementation of user fees 
(see Chapter 4). Therefore, these groups require special attention from a policy point 
of view. The lack of adequate exemption mechanisms for those who are unable to pay 
user fees, might create a barrier to access which might result in higher morbidity rates, 
emergency care admissions and mortality (Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008; Atella et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, those, who are able but not willing to pay officially, need 
special attention in the communication and public discussion of user fees policies. 
The confidence of this population group in the necessity of formal payments is 
crucial for the successful implementation of formal charges. 
This study has addressed the consumer side and reveals a demand for good quality care. 
However, the derived willingness to pay only helps to estimate the social value of the services. 
The results should not be directly applied to set prices (e.g. Ryan and Watson, 2009). 
The issue, whether the willingness to pay derived in our study would be “theoretically” 
sufficient to finance the promised improvement of the service quality, requires further 
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research on the supply side. Therefore, further study should address the current quality 
of health care services, as at the moment the quality of the services is hardly measured 
(Eris, 2012), to be able to identify investment priorities and their financial requirements. 
The link between willingness to pay official fees and past informal payments
In this chapter, we have also focused on the relationship between willingness to pay 
formal fees and past informal payments. Our results have some policy implications 
on this issue as well. We find that controlling for income, those who are already 
paying informally are significantly more willing to pay formal fees for health care 
services provided with certain quality and access attributes. In other terms, those 
who are willing (irrespective of their income situation), are already paying for health 
care services, however through informal payment channels. 
However, this finding does not necessarily indicate that formal and informal payments 
are substitutes for health care consumers. Specifically, in Hungary, informal payments 
are directly pocketed by physicians (mostly the head/manager) and contribute to 
their income. This way, informal payments can affect the choice of physician or 
attitude of the personnel, and in some cases even the access to services. However, 
these payments are not likely to be reinvested in the health care facilities (to improve 
the equipment or maintenance, which are also presented in our visualization card). 
According to previous studies, the attributes connected to the heath care personnel 
are the most valued by health care consumers (see Chapter 7; Pavlova et al., 2003). 
This suggests that consumers will not give up the informal payments as long as 
they cannot achieve these benefits by paying formally. Thus, it is probable that the 
problem of informal payments will remain even after the implementation of user 
fees, especially if these payments serve different objectives.
The results also suggest that some population groups (e.g. elderly and respondents 
from the capital) might prefer to pay informally (as we find that they are more likely 
to pay informally, but less likely to be willing to pay formal fees). Based on the 
explanation above, they may think that informal payments will remain important 
after the implementation of the fees. Thus, they are against formal payments as 
they do not want to pay twice. In some CEE countries where formal charges were 
implemented, we find evidence of the co-existence of formal and informal payments 
(Atanasova et al., 2011; Pavlova et al., 2011; Gaál et al., 2010).
When we interpret the results for the capital, we have to take into account that 
consumers from Budapest are already experiencing better quality and access of health 
care services. Several studies have indicated that in Budapest, consumers have better 
access to health care services than in other parts of the country (Vitray et al., 2011; 
Belicza, 2006). This might explain the lower willingness to pay in the capital. It is 
interesting that service users from the capital are less willing to pay for physician 
services where they are more often paying informally. At the same time, they are more 
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willing to pay for a planned surgery, where informal payments are less widespread 
compared to other towns or villages. 
These results imply that policies have to take into account that that consumers do 
not mind to choose the informal payment channels. Thus, health care consumers, 
who are able and willing to pay, might continue to pay informally if they can achieve 
further benefits. The implementation of user fees is hardly a sufficient policy tool on 
its own to diminish informal payments, although this expectation is often promoted 
by policy makers. This finding is in accordance with previous experiences with user 
fees in Hungary, which show that after the implementation of user fees informal 
payments decreased only among vulnerable social groups, who are less able to pay 
for services (see Chapter 3).
Finally, those who are less likely to pay informally are less willing to pay formal fees 
as well. Especially among those who were hospitalized and did not pay informally the 
willingness to pay formal fees is rather low, 37 percent). This might suggest that these 
consumers are against all kinds of payments (formal and informal) and consider that 
health care services should be provided free of charge, without any co-payments. This 
population group might also provide strong opposition to the implementation of user 
fees and they need special attention in the communication on the objectives of the fees.
6.5 Conclusion and policy implications
In this study, contingent valuation method has been applied to examine the willingness 
of the Hungarian population to pay official charges for health care services provided 
with certain quality and access attributes, as well as the relationship between the 
willingness to pay formal fees and past informal payments. 
We find that overall, the majority of the Hungarian population is willing to pay of-
ficially for health care services. However, they expect value for their money. They are 
willing to pay for high quality services, which are far from given at the moment. Thus, 
the introduction of formal payments in future, should assure adequate quality and ac-
cess (measurable, and visible for the patient) otherwise user fees might not be accepted 
by the population similarly to the introduction of user fees in 2007. To establish an 
adequate system of formal patient payment in Hungary, the regulation, measurement 
and monitoring of the quality of the services covered by the social health insurance are 
essential. At the moment, the lack of clear regulations on service quality guaranteed 
by social health insurance, creates undesirable incentives for charging/paying informal 
payments which leads to adverse incentives for providers and inequalities in access for 
consumers (Szende and Culyer, 2006). Furthermore, our findings provide a hint that 
formal payments are not able to substitute for informal payments, in spite of the expec-
tations of policy makers. Thus, formal fees might induce a double financial burden for 
patients, making the implementation of user fees less acceptable to the public.
7 Chapter 7
Preferences of Hungarian consumers for quality, 
access and price attributes of health care services 
– result of a discrete choice experiment
This chapter draws upon: 
Baji P, Pavlova M, Gulácsi L, Groot W. (2012): Preferences of Hungarian consumers 
for quality, access and price attributes of health care services – result of a discrete 
choice experiment. Society and Economy, 34 (2):293–311.
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Abstract
Objective: The aim of the study is to estimate the effect of the improvement of 
health care service attributes (quality, access, and price) on patients’ choice of health 
care providers, as well as the differences among the socio-demographic groups. 
Method: In 2010, a survey was carried out in Hungary among 1037 respondents 
to study consumer preferences and willingness to pay for health care services. The 
method of discrete choice experiment is used to elicit preferences of health care 
consumers. We also estimate the marginal willingness to pay for the improvement in 
attribute levels by calculating marginal rates of substitution. 
Results: The results show that respondents from a village or the capital, with low 
education and bad health status are more driven by the changes in the price attribute 
when choosing between health care providers. Respondents value the skills and 
reputation of the physician, and the attitude of the personnel the most, followed 
by modern equipment and maintenance of the office/hospital. Access attributes 
(travelling and waiting time) are less important factors in their choice. 
Conclusion: In this study, we have provided evidence that health care consumers 
in Hungary are ready to accept higher prices for health care services provided with 
better quality and access. Our finding also indicates that priority should be given to 
investments in human resources.
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7.1 Introduction
Previous qualitative studies suggest that consumers are not satisfied with the quality of 
health care services provided by the social health insurance in Hungary (see Chapter 
4; Baji and Gulácsi, 2010). They mostly complain about long queues, long waiting 
times, lack of personal attention, poor maintenance of the health care facilities and 
shortage of equipment. The low quality of health care services provided by the social 
health insurance is often associated with the lack of financial and human resources in 
the health care facilities. According to previous studies (see Chapter 4 and 6), health 
care consumers are not against contributing to the cost of the health care services by 
paying official fees, if these services are provided with good quality and access.
The objective of this study is to examine the preferences of health care consumers 
for quality, access and price attributes of health care services. In particular, we use 
the method of discrete-choice experiment (DCE) to study the relative importance 
of various service attributes to consumers, as well as the value that consumers attach 
to the improvements in service quality and assess. We also estimate how relative 
attribute importance and improvement valuation differ among socio-demographic 
groups. For the analysis we use data from a national survey carried out in 2010 in 
Hungary among a country representative sample.
The DCE method18 is broadly applied in the field of economic evaluation of specific 
health care products, procedures or programs (i.e. health technology assessment). The 
application of the method for the assessment of health policies is however limited. In 
this chapter, we demonstrate how the method can be used to inform policy makers 
on consumers’ preferences for the improvements in health care services and thus, on 
consumers’ willingness to accept official fees for health care. 
Our study may support the establishment of sustainable patient payment policies 
acceptable for the public. The results on consumer preferences can also help to 
indicate the investment priorities in the health care system and may also be useful for 
18 DCE belongs to the stated preference methods, which are used to elicit consumer preferences when the 
consumer behavior is not observable, for example, when the market for a given good/service does not exist or is 
still being developed. In this case, preferences can be derived from surveys where consumers are presented with 
hypothetical options and are asked to state their preferences for these options. Stated preference methods are 
frequently applied within the framework of cost-benefit analysis, mainly in the field of health, environmental 
and transport economics, to advise on the social desirability of providing various commodities and services using 
public resources (see Vroomen and Zweifel, 2011; Lancsar and Louvier, 2008; Hanley et al., 2003; Ryan and 
Gerard, 2003; Telser and Zweifel, 2002; Ryan et al., 2001). In DCE, respondents are faced with hypothetical 
choice sets of goods and services characterized by certain attributes. Each profile is a bundle of selected attributes 
with specific levels. The profiles differ from each other in the levels of their attributes. The respondents are asked 
to choose the profile that they prefer most. It is assumed that an individual derives unique utility from each 
attribute level. It is also assumed that respondents evaluate the utility that they expect to derive from a product/
service by combining the utility that they expect from each attribute characterizing the given product/service. 
Consequently, respondents choose the profile that they associate with the highest level of utility. Thus, the 
respondents’ preferences for a given profile contain information about the overall utility that respondents expect 
to derive form that profile. 
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the actors in private health care sector (e.g. health insurance companies and health 
care providers to plan new products in the private health care market). 
7.2 Method
Data collection
We use data from a national survey, which was carried out as a part of an international 
research project. The objective of the survey was to provide quantitative data on 
past payments for health care services, data on preferences and willingness of the 
population to pay for health care services. More details on data collection can be 
found in Appendix A. 
The DCE design
In this chapter, we use the data from the two DCE experiments included in the 
questionnaire: the DCE on out-patient services (visit to a specialist) and the DCE on 
in-patient services (planned surgery). In each of the two DCE, the service (specialist 
visit or planned surgery) is presented to the respondents in the form of alternative 
profiles that contain combinations of attributes of health care services (see Table 7.1). 
The selection of attributes and attribute levels are based on focus group discussions, 
where the participants describe their expectations about good quality health care 
services. Attributes of the services selected are referring to the quality of physical 
and human resources needed to provide care (i.e. health care facility, equipments, 
and personnel) as well as to the temporal, spatial and physiological access to services 
(i.e. waiting time, travelling time, staff attitude). These attributes correspond to the 
framework of Berki and Ashcraft (1980) on quality and access of health care services. 
(The same definition is used in the contingent valuation study in Chapter 6.) We 
keep the number of attributes and their levels at a minimum to assure the feasibility 
of data collection. 
Respondents are asked to choose between the two options (basic profile and 
alternative profile) to indicate which specialist they would visit in the case of a major 
health problem with unfamiliar symptoms, and alternatively, which hospital they 
would choose in the case of a planned surgery with not life-threatening conditions 
which requires 5 days stay in hospital (see Table 7.2). As explained in the previous 
section, it is expected that each individual derives unique utility from each attribute 
level and chooses the profile that maximizes his/her utility. For more information 
about the analysis of our DCE data, see Box 7.1.
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Table 7.1 Discrete Choice Experiment – attributes and attribute levels
Specialist services
Attributes Attribute levels
ATR1 Medical equipment 0 = Outdated 1 = Modern
ATR2 Reputation and skills of the physician 0 = Unknown 1 = Known to be good
ATR3 Maintenance of the office 0 = Outdated 1 = Renovated
ATR4 Attitude of the staff 0 = Impolite 1 = Polite
ATR5 Travel time to the office 60 minutes 15 minutes
ATR6 Waiting in front of the office 45 minutes 10 minutes
ATR7 Patient visit fee 10 euro (2850 HUF) 5 euro (1425 HUF),
Hospitalization
Attributes Attribute levels
ATR1 Medical equipment 0 = Outdated 1 = Modern
ATR2 Reputation and skills of the surgeon 0 = Unknown 1 = Known to be good
ATR3 Maintenance of the interior 0 = Outdated 1 = Renovated
ATR4 Attitude of the staff 0 = Impolite 1 = Polite
ATR5 Travel time to the hospital 3 hours 1 hours
ATR6 Waiting time for the operation 4 months 1 month
ATR7 Patient hospitalization fee 100 euro (28500 HUF), 200 euro (57000 HUF)
Eight choice-sets for specialist services and eight choice-sets for hospital services 
are defined. Each choice-set contains one basic profile (that remained constant 
throughout all eight choice sets) and one alternative profile (see an example in Table 
7.2). The alternative profiles are selected from all possible profiles (27 = 128), by 
using an orthogonal main-effect fractional factorial design (Addelman, 1962). The 
basis profile is chosen to minimize the overlap between profiles in a choice-set and 
to represent a potentially realistic situation: a low-price level, as well as one attractive 
and one unattractive level for each of the following aspects: health care personnel 
(attitude and skills), conditions (maintenance and equipment) and access (travelling 
and waiting). 
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Table 7.2 Discrete Choice Experiment – example of a choice set
CARD: Choice of a physician – major health problems
Physician A Physician B
Medical equipment Modern Outdated
Reputation and skills of the physician Unknown Known to be good
Maintenance of the office Renovated Renovated
Attitude of the staff Impolite Impolite
Travel time to the office 60 min 15 min
Waiting in front of the office 10 min 45 min
Patient visit fee 5.- euro 5.- euro
Box 7.1 The theoretical background of the discrete choice experiment methodBox 7.1 The theoretical background of the discrete choice experiment method
The theoretical background of the DCE method
Consumers choose between services based on their utility level. The utility driven by the service is the 
following:
(1)
Where
U ij utility that respondent j associates with profile i
X i non-price attributes in profile i
P i price attribute in profile i
S j variables respondent j
c constant
a, b model coefficients
k number of non-price attributes
n number of respondent variables 
It is expected that each individual derives unique utility from each attribute level and chooses the profile that 
maximizes his/her utility. We suppose that the consumer choose the alternative profile in contrast to the basic 
profile, if the utility derived from the alternative profile is higher (or equal) to the utility derived from the basic 
profile.
(2)   ),,( jAlAlAl SPXU - ),,( jBlBlBl SPXU =
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BaAl
kk
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where υ , μ random errors within and between respondents
After the estimation of model parameters ( 1α ... kα , pα ) from (2) we can calculate the marginal rate of 
substitution between non-price (x) and price-related (p) health care attributes, which can be interpreted as the 
amount of money that respondents are willing to pay for one unit change in the attribute level to stay on the 
same utility level.
(3)
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Analysis
For the analysis of the DCE data, we use binary probit regression with random effects 
(software package LIMDEP 7.0). The choice of the profile (selection or rejection of 
the basic profile) is taken as the dependent variable. Initially, we include all attribute 
differences and all interactions (see the model in Box 7.1) as independent variables 
(see independent variables in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A). Then, we reduce 
the model using a backward stepwise procedure where statistically insignificant 
independent variables are systematically removed from the model. This way, we 
obtain a reduced model that contains only statistically significant independent 
variables (where p≤0.10).
We also calculate the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between non-price 
and price attributes, and we use the MRS as an indicator of respondents’ marginal 
willingness to pay and relative importance that respondents attach to a change in a 
given service attribute (e.g. Vroomen and Zweifel, 2011; Telser and Zweifel, 2002). 
The MRS is seen as an indicator of the marginal willingness to pay for a change 
in the non-price attribute, i.e. the increase in official fees that compensates for the 
improvement of a non-price attribute assuming a constant utility level. We should 
highlight that the marginal willingness to pay derived from DCE should be used 
with caution and cannot be seen as actual amounts that respondents are willing 
to pay (e.g. Ryan and Watson, 2009). It is suggested to use rather as an ordinal 
perspective to set investment priorities. 
7.3 Results
Socio-demographic characteristics
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A. The results of 
the DCE are presented in Table 7.3. All main effects of the attributes are significant, 
except for travelling time to the hospital in the case of hospital services. This means 
that all attributes included in the two DCE affect the choice of service irrespective of 
the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. In general, better equipped and 
renovated physician office/hospitals, as well as skilled physicians and polite personnel 
are preferred. Shorter waiting time in front of the physician office and shorter waiting 
time for the operation as well as shorter travelling time to the physician office are also 
preferred. Travelling time to the hospital has a significant effect on the choice only 
for respondents with a household income of less than 250 euro per month. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms of socio-demographic characteristics and 
the coefficients of the main effects of the attributes indicate the differences in 
preferences across the socio-demographic groups. The same sign of the coefficient of 
the main effect of an attribute and the interaction terms of the socio-demographic 
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characteristics with this attribute indicate that this attribute has a relatively greater 
impact on the choice of services in the given socio-demographic group compared 
to the base socio-demographic category. In case of opposite signs, the attribute’s 
influence on the choice is lower in the given socio-demographic group. 
The “reputation and skills of the surgeon” is a more important attribute for women 
and respondents with a tertiary education than for the rest of the sample (for both 
physician and hospital services). At the same time, skills and reputation of the surgeon 
is a less important factor for respondents with primary education or respondents 
from the capital. The “attitude of the personnel” is a more important attribute for 
women and respondents from villages when using specialist services compared 
to other socio-demographic groups. However, it is a less important attribute for 
respondents over 65 and with a household income higher than 1000 euro. 
Preferences for “medical equipment” differ across socio-demographic groups in the 
case of specialist services, while they are rather similar (i.e. interaction terms are 
not significant) in the case of hospital services except for respondents with tertiary 
education. Preferences for the attribute “maintenance of the hospital interior” in case of 
hospital services also differ by socio-demographic groups, while we find no differences 
for the importance of the “maintenance of the office” in the case of specialist services.
“Travel time to the physician office” is more important for respondents from villages, 
and respondents living on a disability pension than for the rest of the sample. Also, 
we find no significant differences concerning the importance of “waiting time in 
front of the office” in general, except for respondents from the capital who have a 
stronger preference for a shorter waiting time than the rest of the sample. This is also 
the case for “waiting time for the operation”, which is a more important attribute for 
respondents from villages than for other socio-demographic groups. 
Regarding the price attribute, significant negative coefficients of the interactions 
between price and socio-demographic characteristics show that for vulnerable social 
groups the choice of services is strongly affected by changes in the price attribute. 
Respondents from a village, with bad health status, as well as those who are living 
alone or disabled are more strongly affected by the price when choosing between 
specialist services. Similarly, for hospital services, respondents from a village, with 
low education, who are living alone and disabled are more strongly affected by the 
price. For respondents from the capital, the choice of physician is also more affected 
by the price changes.
We find that respondents under 30 or over 65 years are less affected by the price when 
choosing between services. Also, the choice of respondents with tertiary education 
and with a household income of more than 1000 euro per month, is less affected by 
price changes in the case of specialist services.
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Table 7.3 Discrete Choice Experiment – results of the probit analysis
Variables and interactions of the variables Specialist services Hospital services
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Constant 0.1031 0.0508 -0.0991 0.0507
Medical equipment (ATR1) 0.4812 0.0419 0.2796 0.0358
Reputation and skills (ATR2) 0.6373 0.0459 0.5960 0.0438
Maintenance of the office /interior (ATR3) 0.4134 0.0387 0.3628 0.0444
Attitude of the staff  (ATR4) 0.5455 0.0474 0.3535 0.0469
Travel time (ATR5) -0.0072 0.0009 - -
Waiting (ATR6) -0.0102 0.0012 -0.1473 0.0130
Price (ATR7) -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
Medical equipment * OLD -0.2510 0.0711 - -
Medical equipment * CAPITAL 0.2125 0.0726 - -
Medical equipment * VILLAGE 0.1588 0.0819 - -
Medical equipment * TERTIARY EDUCATION - - 0.2902 0.0868
Medical equipment * DISABILITY PENSION 0.1200 0.0687 - -
Reputation and skills * FEMALE 0.1135 0.0492 0.0799 0.0459
Reputation and skills * CAPITAL - - -0.4424 0.0750
Reputation and skills * VILLAGE 0.1609 0.0671 - -
Reputation and skills * PRIMARY EDUCATION - - -0.1815 0.0644
Reputation and skills * TERTIARY EDUCATION 0.2191 0.0748 0.4776 0.0732
Maintenance of the office /interior * PRIMARY EDUCATION - - -0.1468 0.0798
Maintenance of the office /interior * YOUNG 0.2376 0.0717 - -
Maintenance of the office /interior * CAPITAL - - -0.1838 0.0886
Maintenance of the office /interior * TERTIARY EDUCATION - - 0.2325 0.0984
Attitude of the staff  * VILLAGE 0.1458 0.0641 - -
Attitude of the staff  * OLD -0.1390 0.0661 - -
Attitude of the staff  * FEMALE 0.1367 0.0498 0.1416 0.0546
Attitude of the staff  * CAPITAL - - -0.2961 0.0833
Attitude of the staff  * TERTIARY EDUCATION - - 0.2997 0.0876
Attitude of the staff  * RICH -0.3425 0.0991 -0.3587 0.1000
Travel time * VILLAGE -0.0026 0.0015 - -
Travel time * POOR - - -0.1509 0.0478
Travel time * DISABILITY PENSION -0.0038 0.0015
Waiting * CAPITAL -0.0050 0.0022 - -
Waiting * VILLAGE -0.0474 0.0199
Price * YOUNG 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Price * OLD 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Price * CAPITAL -0.0003 0.0000 - -
Price * VILLAGE -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000
Price * PRIMARY EDUCATION - - -0.0000 0.0000
Price * TERTIARY EDUCATION 0.0001 0.0001 - -
Price * BAD HEALTH -0.0002 0.0000 - -
Price * RICH 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000
Price * LIVING ALONE -0.0001 0.0000 - -
Price * DISABILITY PENSION -0.0001 0.0000 - -
Rho 0.1841 0.0162 0.2023 0.0170
Observations 8296 8296
Respondents 1037 1037
LogLikelyhood -4792.93 -4810.75
Chi2 235.54* 262.04*
Note: all coefficients are significant, p<0.10. The explanation of the variables is presented in Table A1 of 
Appendix A.
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Figure 7.1 Marginal rates of substitutions in diff erent socio-demographic groups – 
specialist examination
Figure 7.2 Marginal rates of substitutions in diff erent socio-demographic groups – hos-
pitalization
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Marginal rates of substitution 
Figure 7.1 and 7.2 present the MRS for the different non-price attributes. The MRS 
is higher for respondents below 30, with tertiary education, and with a household 
income higher than 1000 euro. It is lower for vulnerable social groups such as 
disabled and those with a bad health status. 
The MRS is the indicative for the relative importance of attributes to the respondents, 
when choosing between health care services. In general, in the case of specialist 
services, respondents more value attributes associated with the characteristics of the 
health care personnel. The MRS of reputation of the physician in the base category 
is 7.2 euro and the MRS of the attribute “attitude of the personnel” is 6.2 euro. 
This means that if the specialist has a good reputation, health care consumers value 
the specialist visit higher (7.2 euro more) compared to an unknown specialist. 
These attributes are followed by modern equipments and maintenance of the office 
(MRS=5.5 and 4.7 euro). Access attributes (travelling time, and waiting time in 
front of the office) seem to be less important attributes for consumers (MRS=3.7 
and 3.5 euro for the change from 60 to 15 minutes of travelling time and 45 to 10 
minutes waiting time in front of the office). 
In the case of hospital services, the MRS shows that respondents value a skilled 
surgeon with a good reputation the most (MRS=146.0 euro) compared to other 
attributes. It is followed by the decrease of the waiting time (from 3 months to 1 
month) for the operation (MRS=108.2 euro) and also the attitude of the personnel 
(MRS=86.6 euro). Less important attributes are the interior of the hospital ward 
(MRS=88.9 euro), and the state of medical equipments in the hospital (MRS= 68.5 
euro). Travelling time to the hospital has a significant role only in the choice of 
respondents from the lowest income category, less than household income 250 euro 
per month.
7.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, we have examined the preferences of the Hungarian health care 
consumers for health care services using the DCE method. The DCE method is 
frequently applied to examine patient’s preferences and to model the consumers’ 
choice on the hypothetical market. In our study, we examine the preferences of 
Hungarian consumers for physician and hospital services, as well as the value that 
different socio-demographic groups attach to the improvements of these services. 
We find that health care consumers in Hungary highly value the improvements of 
health care services. This is in accordance with previous findings on the attitude 
of health care consumers towards co-payments (see Chapter 4 and 6). Young and 
elderly consumers with tertiary education and with higher household income are 
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willing to accept a higher price for the improvement of the quality of health care 
services. Previous studies have also argued that people with higher education are 
more likely to invest in their health (Tomini et al., 2011; Mincer and Polachek, 
1974; Becker, 1967). In accordance with the results of the contingent valuation 
methos (see Chapter 6), vulnerable social groups (e.g. consumers from a village, with 
primary education, with bad health status and those who are living alone or living on 
a disabled pension) are less willing to accept payments for health care improvements. 
Consumers from the capital are also less willing to accept payments for improvements 
of the services. As we have already motioned the explanation of this finding might be 
that consumers from the capital are already experiencing better quality and access of 
health care services (see Chapter 6). Several studies have indicated, that in Budapest, 
consumers have much better access to health care services than in other parts of the 
country (Vitray et al., 2011; Belicza, 2006).
Also, health care consumers value the quality attributes connected to the health care 
personnel the most, i.e. the skills and reputation of the physician, as well as the 
attitude of the health care personnel. Medical equipments and the maintenance of 
the health care facility are also considered as important factors. However, waiting 
time in front of the office and travelling time to the health care facility are less likely 
to affect the choice of health care consumers. It seems that one hour of travelling to 
the specialist’s office and even 3 hours of travelling time to the hospital is acceptable 
for consumers. In Hungary, this means that consumers do not mind to travel to the 
capital to be hospitalized, as the capital is accessible within 3 hours from most parts 
of the country. This might also suggests that the quality of the provided services 
differs between territories and confirms that health care consumers are not against 
travelling if they receive better quality care. A lower importance of access compared 
with clinical quality is also reported in several previous studies (e.g. Pavlova et al., 
2003; Harris, 2002; Acharya and Cleland, 2000).
We also identify differences in the preferences by socio-demographic groups. 
Women in general value the attitude of the staff and reputation of the physician/
surgeon relatively higher than men. People from the capital attach relatively lower 
importance to the attitude of the personnel and the reputation of the surgeon in case 
of hospital services, but put higher value on the state of medical equipment and a 
short waiting time in case of specialist services. Travelling time to the hospital is a 
significant determinant of the choice only for low-income households. They might 
be less able to afford travel costs.
7.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
In this chapter, we have examined the preferences of the Hungarian health care 
consumers for health care services. Also, we also estimated consumers’ willingness to 
pay for the improvement of service attributes. 
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In our study, we provide evidence that health care consumers in Hungary are ready 
to accept higher prices for health care services provided with better quality and 
access. This suggest, that consumers are not against paying official charges, however 
in return they expect improvements in service attributes. 
We have found that health care consumers attach a higher value to the reputation 
of the specialist/surgeon and the attitude of the health care personnel compared to 
other attributes of health care services. Thus, according to consumer preferences, 
professional and personal skills should be remunerated. This finding indicates that 
priority should be given to investments in human resources. Especially, as indicated 
by the OECD, the outflow of health care workers, motivated by the salary levels 
below the average income in the economy, is one of the main challenges in the 
Hungarian health care sector (Eris, 2012). These preferences also explain the 
existence of informal patient payments paid to the health care personnel and make 
the eradication of these payments more challenging. 
We have also indicated that vulnerable socio-demographic groups are more reluctant 
to accept high payments for health care services. It has been proven that such 
payments lead to unequal access to health care services (e.g. forgone visits), and with 
this, higher morbidity, emergency care admissions and mortality (Austvoll-Dahlgren 
et al., 2008; Atella et al., 2006). Thus, policies on patient payments should consider 
the negative equity effects of increasing formal charges as these payments induce a 
relatively higher burden on vulnerable socio-demographic groups who are less able 
to pay for health care services. The adequate exemption mechanisms for these groups 
should be set up based on the ability to pay to prevent adverse effect on equity. This is 
an especially relevant issue in Hungary as the health status of the population is one of 
the worst among European countries (Gaál et al., 2011; Eris, 2012; OECD, 2012). 
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General discussion of the findings
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8.1 Introduction
The main aim of the dissertation has been to examine past experiences and to 
identify challenges and perspectives regarding out-of-pocket patient payments for 
health care services in Hungary. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we have examined past 
experiences with the implementation of user fees in Hungary in 2007. Besides the 
exploration of the scope and magnitude of patient payments in Hungary, we have 
particularly focused on the equity effects during the reform period and the effect of 
the introduction of user fees on informal payments. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, 
we have examined public acceptance, perceptions and attitudes of the Hungarian 
population towards patient payments, separately for formal and informal payments. 
While in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, we have elicited the willingness of Hungarian 
health care consumers to pay official fees for health care services as well as we reveal 
consumer preferences for different attributes of health care services using stated 
preference methods. We have also paid special attention to the examination of the 
interrelation of willingness to pay formal fees and past informal payments.
In this chapter, we present and discuss the main findings of the dissertation in the 
form of six statements. Following the two main research questions, the first three 
statements reflect on past experiences with patient payments and point out the 
lessons to be learned from previous reforms. The last three statements call attention 
to the future challenges and perspectives of these payments based on findings on 
attitude and willingness to pay. 
8.2 Lessons to be learned from previous experiences with the 
implementation of user charges
In the following, we present three statements related to the first research aim of 
the dissertation, to show the lessons to be learned from the experience with the 
implementation of user charges in 2007.
Statement 1: The introduction of user fees in Hungary was associated with 
a reduction of informal payments among the low-income 
households. The equity effects of these changes are unclear.
In the dissertation, we have confirmed our expectations formulated based on previous 
studies, namely that the implementation of co-payments leads to a relatively greater 
burden on worse-off households (Gelormino et al., 2011; Albreht and Klazinga, 
2009; Mastilica and Bozikov, 1999). At the same time, we observe that the increase 
of formal payments was partly compensated by the decrease of informal payments, 
especially in low-income households.
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We observe that during the one year period (2007) when user fees were charged for 
the utilization of health care service, household expenditure on informal payments 
decreased and became less regressive, i.e. the decrease of these payments was higher 
in lower-income households (see Chapter 2). The reduction of informal payments 
can partly be explained by the drop in the utilization of services, which was recorded 
during this period. Physician visits and hospital admission decreased by 15-20 
percent after the implementation of user fees (Kőrösi et al., 2009; Boncz et al., 2008; 
Nagy et al., 2008). However, we observe a higher decrease in the expenditure on 
informal payments among low-income households, which also suggests that worse 
off households tried to compensate the increase of formal payments by decreasing 
their expenditure on informal ones. Another finding of the dissertation, namely that 
the probability of paying informally for hospitalization decreased among elderly 
people shortly after the implementation of user fees, also suggests that those with 
lower ability to pay respond to the increasing burden of formal payments with the 
decrease of their expenditure on informal payments (see Chapter 3), as elderly people 
are likely to be among lower-income households in Hungary (Medgyesi et al., 1999). 
Overall, the results presented above suggest that the implementation of user fees can 
lead to the reduction of informal payments of those health care consumers who are 
not able to pay the double burden. However, this finding raises questions concerning 
equal access to health care services. It is possible that consumers, who are not able 
to pay informally for health care services, may not obtain the services that other 
consumers, who continue paying, obtain. In this way, the reduction of informal 
payments can create even greater inequalities between different income groups. 
Limitations: During the reform period, we observe a decrease in household 
expenditure on informal payments parallel to an increase in expenditures on formal 
payments. However, we cannot measure the causality of these changes. Furthermore, 
due to the lack of utilization data in the National Household Budget Survey, we 
cannot differentiate the effect of the drop in the utilization, recorded after the 
implementation of user fees, on informal payments. 
Policy implications: In general, the reduction of informal payments is a desirable 
policy aim because of the adverse effect of these payments on the health care system, 
i.e. inefficient use of resources, barrier to access, and adverse financial incentives 
for beneficiaries. However, if the decrease of these payments only occurs among 
the lower-income households (among those who are not able to pay for the double 
burden), the equity effects of this change are questionable. The unequal decrease of 
informal payments among households with different income can increase inequalities 
in access, i.e. those who are able to pay for the double burden, may have better 
access to health care services compared to those who are not able to pay. Thus, the 
implementation of user fees is a rather controversial policy tool to decrease informal 
payments of the households.
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Future research: The analysis of the equity in access during the reform period is not 
covered by this dissertation and should be the topic further research. According to 
the previous studies, co-payments imply a barrier to access especially for low-income 
households, who are more sensitive to price changes (Newhouse, 1997; Manning et 
al., 1987), which can result in a higher morbidity and mortality (Austvoll-Dahlgren 
et al., 2008; Atella et al., 2006). As mortality and morbidity indicators are rather 
poor in Hungary (the poorest among the OECD countries), the effect of the 
implementation of user fees on access is a relevant topic for further research. We also 
need further evidence whether those who do not pay informally experience more 
limited access to health care services compared to those who pay informally. 
Statement 2: Formal and informal payments are complements rather than 
substitutes. 
We find that after the implementation of user fees patients continue to pay 
informally and informal payments remain relevant (see Chapter 2). We do not find 
significant changes in the probability of paying informally for the last physician visit/
hospitalization in the short run after the implementation of user fees, except for 
elderly patients for hospitalizations where we observe a decrease in the probability 
of paying informally (see Chapter 3). Experiences from other Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries also show that after the implementation of formal 
charges, informal payments remain relevant (Atanasova et al., 2011; Pavlova et al., 
2011; Gaál et al., 2010). 
This finding suggests that formal payments do not substitute for informal payments, 
at least on a short term, and these payments rather co-exist and complement each 
other. The explanation for this might be that formal and informal payments serve 
different objectives, and consumers achieve different things by paying formally and 
informally. In Hungary, informal payments are directly pocketed by physicians 
(mostly by the head/manger) and contribute to their income. In this way, these 
payments may affect the choice of the physician, the attitude of the personnel, or in 
some cases even the access to services. At the same time, formal payments have more 
potential to be used to improve equipment or the maintenance of health care facilities 
if reinvested in health care provision. However, as identified in this dissertation, the 
attributes connected to the heath care personnel (i.e. the skills and reputation of the 
physician, as well as the attitude of the health care personnel) are more important 
for health care consumers than other service attributes, like the health care facility, 
equipments or even waiting time for the visits, or travelling time to the health 
care facility (see Chapter 7). In other words, Hungarian health care consumers are 
willing to travel and wait longer for the service, in order to be treated by skilled and 
polite medical staff. These results indicate the importance of the patient-physician 
relationship (e.g. the trust in the physician). Since informal payments are a relevant 
element of this relationship, it is quite probable that despite the formal charges, 
patients continue to pay informally directly to their physician, as an expression of 
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their gratitude or in the hope of getting extra services, better access or more personal 
attention. Or, they keep on paying informally, because of their fear that they do 
not obtain the care they need if they do not pay. The importance of the attributes 
connected to the health care personnel can also explain why some population groups 
(e.g. elderly people and consumers from the capital) prefer to pay informally for 
health care services (see Chapter 6). Particularly, informal payments serve different 
aims than formal payments, which aims are more valued by the population. 
Findings from our qualitative study also support this explanation. According to these 
results, health care consumers doubt that user fees in 2007 had the potential to 
eradicate informal payments. They argue that user fees in 2007 could not substitute 
for informal payments, as neither the measure nor the objectives, nor the beneficiary 
of informal payments was the same as those of user fees. Furthermore, user fees do 
not necessarily contribute to the improvement of service quality, as it was the case 
with user fees in 2007 according to consumers (see Chapter 4).
To conclude, the findings suggest that the problem of informal payments remains 
relevant even after the implementation of user fees. However, if formal payments do 
not substitute for informal payments, user fees induce a double financial burden on 
health care consumers, and make official charges less acceptable to the public.
Limitations: The data which are used to analyze the effect of the implementation of 
user fees on the probability of paying informally (in Chapter 3), were collected shortly 
after (i.e. 2 months after) the introduction of user fees. Therefore, these results reflect 
only the short-term effects of user fees on informal patient payments. It is probable that 
more time is needed to observe any change in the behavior of consumers and providers. 
Nevertheless, the decrease in the health care utilization was noticeable right after the 
implementation of user fees (Kőrösi et al., 2009; Boncz et al., 2008; Nagy et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, results of the dissertation suggest that informal payments of households 
remained relevant in the longer run as well (see Chapter 2). 
Policy implications: In CEE countries, where informal payments are widespread, the 
introduction of user fees is often promoted as a policy tool to eradicate or “formalize” 
informal payments (Stepurko et al., 2010; Schneider, 2008; Ensor 2004; Lewis, 
2000). In 2007, this was also one of the main policy objectives of the introduction 
of user fees in Hungary. However, there is no evidence in the literature, which clearly 
supports this suggestion. The results of the dissertation also raise concerns about this 
expectation. We find that after the implementation of user fees, informal payments 
remain relevant and the two payments co-exist. However, the increase of formal 
payments may indeed lead to a decrease in informal payments, specifically in low-
income households who are not able to pay for the double (formal and informal) 
price (see Statement 1). This mechanism can increase inequalities in access. Thus, the 
implementation of user fees is hardly sufficient and rather a controversial policy tool 
to diminish informal payments. 
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Future research: Future qualitative research should address the question, what can 
be achieved by informal payments, and under what conditions they can replace the 
informal ones. Research on consumer preferences and behavior will be important for 
the analysis of this issue.
Statement 3: The stated policy objectives of the user fees introduced in 2007, 
to control the utilization of health care services and to eradicate 
informal payments, were not supported by Hungarian health 
care consumers. 
According to the policy documents, the control of the utilization of services (“the 
curb of the unnecessary visits”), and the eradication of informal payments were the 
two main objectives of the implementation of user fees (Ministry of Health, 2006). 
However, we find that these objectives are not entirely supported by the public 
(see Chapter 4). The population is rather divided regarding the policy objective 
to control utilization. A group of consumers, mostly pensioners and families with 
children who are the most frequent users of services, do not agree that a decrease of 
the utilization of services is essential in Hungary. Moreover, they often refer to the 
negative effects of user fees on the access to services, i.e. those who cannot afford, will 
forgo physicians visits. 
Regarding the second policy objective, the eradication of informal payments, there is 
a consensus among health care actors, namely they all doubt that user fees introduced 
in 2007 had the potential to eradicate informal payments. As mentioned above, 
health care consumers argue that user fees in 2007 could not substitute for informal 
payments, as neither the measure nor the objectives, nor the beneficiary of informal 
payments were the same as those of user fees (see Statement 2).
The lack of support of the stated policy objectives might be one of the reasons why 
the fees were rejected by the population in the referendum, where more than 80 
percent of the participants voted for the abolishment of user fees. 
Limitations: In the dissertation, we have attempted to explain the unpopularity of 
the user fees introduced in 2007 among the Hungarian population, by revealing 
health care actors’ expectations towards and experiences with formal fees. However, 
it should be taken into consideration that other factors, mostly political, also 
contributed to the opposition of user fees. For example, the lack of support and trust 
in the government, the unpopularity of other restrictive arrangements in and outside 
of the health care sector, which aimed at the decrease of the public deficit, were also 
reflected in the results of the population referendum (see Chapter 4).
Policy implication: The Hungarian experience with the implementation of user fees 
confirms that public acceptance is crucial for a successful implementation of user 
fees. However, in Hungary the declared policy objectives of the implementation of 
119
General discussion
the user fees were not supported by the public, making the implementation of these 
charges more unpopular. 
Nevertheless, regarding the stated policy objectives, the enhancement of the efficient 
utilization of health care services is a reasonable goal in Hungary. The utilization of 
health care services (e.g. the number of physician contacts and hospital admission 
per capita) is one of the highest in OECD countries (see Chapter 1). However, 
health care outcomes are not in line with these outputs, as mortality and morbidity 
indicators are among the poorest in OECD countries. This draws attention to the 
lack of efficiency in the system (Eris, 2012; OECD, 2012). Furthermore, our results 
suggest that health care providers also find control of the utilization of visits necessary 
(see Chapter 4). As we have shown in this dissertation demand-side measures such 
as the implementation of user fees to improve efficiency in the system (i.e. control 
the utilization of services) are rather controversial (see Chapter 2). User fees induce 
a greater financial burden on low-income groups, lead to a barrier to access and this 
might imply a further decline in morbidity and mortality, which is far from desirable 
in Hungary. Thus, instead of demand-side incentives, supply-side measures (e.g. the 
revision of the referral system, the changes in the regulation of prescriptions, the 
enhancement of the managed care and the gatekeeper role of GPs, as well as structural 
reforms) should be considered by policy makers to control the utilization of services. 
These tools can enhance the efficient use of resources, but they are not associated 
with negative effects on equity. Particularly, these measures do not impose a barrier 
to the access of health care services for those who are not able to pay. Consequently, 
supply-side tools to control demand might be more acceptable for the public as well.
Regarding the second policy objective of user fees, as we have seen above, the 
potential of user fees to eradicate informal payments is questionable, as the measure, 
objective and beneficiaries of these payments are different from those of user fees. 
Furthermore, the mechanism how the implementation of user fees induces the 
reduction of informal payments is controversial (see Statement 1 and Statement 2). 
In this way, it is suggested not to emphasize the potential of user fees to eradicate 
informal payments in policy discussions. 
To conclude, consensus on the necessity and on the policy objectives of user fees is 
essential to the successful implementation of the fees. Thus, close communication 
with the public about their expectations and about the policy objectives of the fees is 
essential before the fee implementation. Regarding the sensitivity of the issue, strong 
political support and the consensus among political parties on this subject would be 
also desirable.
Further research: Further research should explore the reason for the high utilization 
of health care services in Hungary, to identify the causes and find adequate measures 
on the supply side to enhance a more efficient use of health care resources. Public 
opinion on the implementation of user fees could e explored further as well.
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8.3 Public attitude towards patient payments and willingness 
to pay
The following three statements are related to the second main aim of the dissertation, 
namely to identify challenges and perspectives for patient payments in the future, 
focusing on the public attitudes toward patient payments (formal and informal), as 
well as on willingness of the health care consumers to pay official fees for health care 
services.
Statement 4: Hungarian health care consumers are not against official 
payments for health care services, however they expect value for 
their money.
The results of our qualitative study suggest that the Hungarian population is rather 
discontent with the quality of health care services provided by the social health 
insurance (see Chapter 4). Health care consumers mostly complain about long 
queues, long waiting times, lack of personal attention, poor maintenance of the 
health care facilities and shortage of equipment. They associate the low quality of 
services with the lack of financial and human resources of health care providers. 
Consumers consider user fees as a potential solution to increase financial resources 
in the health care system. They would be willing to contribute for the costs of the 
provided services, if these fees assure the improvement of service provision. 
We have also tested these expectations (formulated based on the qualitative results of 
the dissertation in Chapter 4) on a representative sample of the Hungarian population 
(see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). We have applied stated preference methods, namely 
contingent valuation and discrete choice experiment to examine whether health care 
consumers are willing to pay official fees for health care services provided with good 
quality. The results of the contingent valuation study verify our expectations that 
the majority of respondents are willing to pay for health care services provided with 
certain quality and access (see Chapter 6). About 66 percent of the respondents 
would be willing to pay official fees for a specialist examination (on average 14 euro) 
and 56 percent for  planned surgery (on average 101 euro). Furthermore, the results 
of the discrete choice experiment study confirm that health care consumers are 
willing to pay for the improvement of some quality and access attributes of health 
care services (see Chapter 7).
The results of both stated preference methods (contingent valuation in Chapter 
6 and discrete choice experiment in Chapter 7) suggest that a higher willingness 
to pay and acceptance of fees is associated with higher household income and a 
higher education. Based on previous literature, these individuals are more likely to 
invest in their health (Tomini et al., 2011; Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 
1967). On the other hand, we find that vulnerable socio-demographic groups, such 
as elderly people, people on disability pension with lower household income and 
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low education, are less willing to accept formal fees for health care services. Lower 
willingness to pay is associated with lower ability to pay. However, after controlling 
for income and service utilization, we still observe a lower willingness to pay in these 
population groups. Thus, elderly people, those who are living on disability pension 
and individuals with lower education represent the opposition against payments for 
health care services, and may consider that health care services should be provided 
free of charge. 
Also, both the contingent valuation and the discrete choice experiment study 
results suggest that citizens from the capital are less willing to accept payments 
for improvements of the services. In Budapest, health care consumers are already 
experiencing better access of health care services (Vitray et al., 2011; Belicza, 2006), 
which might explain their lower willingness to pay.
Limitations: The application of stated preference methods has some limitations, 
especially the predictive validity of these methods is questionable, as decisions in a 
hypothetical scenario might not be reflecting real life decisions. Thus, the willingness 
to pay derived, should be used with caution (e.g. Ryan and Watson, 2009). The 
results can point to the investment priorities, but are not to be used to set prices.
Policy implications: According to our findings, Hungarian health care consumers 
are not against paying official fees for health care services, however, they expect better 
services in return. Thus, user fees should assure improvement in service quality, to be 
accepted by the public. The experiences with user fees (presented in Chapter 3) also 
show that without appreciable improvements in the quality of health care services, 
formal charges remain unpopular as user fees in 2007 (see Chapter 4; also Baji and 
Gulácsi, 2010). 
Thus, the implementation of user fees on its own is not a guarantee for the 
improvement in services quality. The issue of quality improvement is a challenging 
one in Hungary. There is some evidence indicating quality problems in health care 
provision. Previous studies suggest that timeliness and appropriateness of health care 
services is lacking in Hungry (Eris, 2012; OECD, 2012; Makai et al., 2009; Wagner 
et al., 2006; Gulácsi et al., 2004; Gulácsi et al., 2002b; Gulácsi, 2001; Gulácsi et al., 
2000). However, the number of available health care quality indicators is limited 
as well, the quality of the provided services is hardly monitored and no quality 
requirements are settled in regulations (OECD, 2012; Gulácsi, 2001). The lack of 
quality measurement and reporting also creates undesirable incentives for health care 
actors to use informal payment channels (Szende and Culyer, 2006). Thus, quality 
measurement should be the first essential step to establish sustainable policies on 
patient payments.
The quality measurement would be essential and beneficial for several reasons. 
First, with quality measurement the provision of health care services would be 
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compellable (i.e. it would be clear for consumers what the value for their money 
is) and comparable across providers both in the private and public sector. Quality 
measures help to identify the main problems and main investment priorities in the 
system. Furthermore, this helps to diminish the informal payments channels as well. 
Besides, quality indicators could help in the specification of health care services, 
used in national legislation. Such indicators could be used to define characteristics 
and requirements of services covered by the social health insurance and at the same 
time appoint those services or service attributes for which co-payments are charged.
The practice of Western European countries to set up quality measurements 
standards can be adopted in Hungary (Kelley and Hurst, 2006). Quality indicators 
should cover not only the structure (characteristics and inputs to health care), but 
also the process (the appropriateness of delivery of appropriate care to the relevant 
population at risk) and the outcome (measures of health improvements) of health 
care services as well (Donabedian, 2003; Donabedian, 1980).19 In the context of 
user charges, the indicators of access and equity would be especially relevant to be 
monitored in order to avoid adverse effects.
Finally, population groups who are against user fees and not willing to pay for 
the quality improvements require special attention in the policy discussion and 
communication to convince them about the necessity of the payments. Also, 
exemption mechanisms based on ability to pay should be considered to avid negative 
equity effects of user fees. 
Future research: Further research may address the expectations of health care 
consumers about the quality of services. Our study covers only a few dimensions 
of services, mostly those which were considered to be the important for health care 
consumers during focus group discussions. Further research should be carried out 
on the supply side as well, on the current quality of health care services, to be able 
to identify the investment priorities with their financial requirements. Studies could 
examine the potentials of pay-for-performance systems, which reward providers for 
quality.
Statement 5: For Hungarian health care consumers the perceived “poor service 
quality and low salary of physicians” legitimate the existence of 
informal payments.
We have shown in this dissertation that informal payments are still widespread in 
Hungary, even 20 years after the fall of the socialist regime. We have found that 
19 In high income countries, the most frequently applied indicators are effectiveness, safety, patient-centeredness- 
patient focus or responsiveness (the patient’s experiences with care), access, equity and efficiency. Furthermore, 
measures of accessibility of care, appropriateness of care, competence or capability of health care workers, 
continuity of care and timeliness are also applied in some countries (Kelley and Hurst, 2006).
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almost half of the households expenses spent on health care services are informal 
payments (see Chapter 2). In 2007, 9 percent of the patients paid informally during 
their last visit to a GP (on average 2 euro), 14 percent for specialist visit (on average 
35 euro), and 50 percent paid informally for hospitalization (on average 58 euro) 
(see Chapter 3). We have found that in 2010 around one-fifth of the respondents 
who used physician services during the last 12 months, made informal payments, 
and almost half of the respondents who were hospitalized during the last 12 months, 
paid informally (see Chapter 6). These results are in accordance with the results 
of previous studies on informal payments in Hungary, and suggest that Hungarian 
health care consumers pay informally for medical services on a routine basis, 
especially in in-patient care (Gaál et al., 2006b; Szende and Culyer, 2006; Bognár 
et al., 2000). The findings also suggest that the measure of these payments has not 
changed considerably during the last two decades and remain the concomitant of the 
current health care system as well. 
In Chapter 5, we point out that health care consumers are tolerant towards informal 
payments as they consider these payments inevitable due to the lack of resources in the 
health care system. This perception is in accordance with the economic explanations 
of informal payments and supports the theory of Gaál and McKee (2004), who 
interpret informal payments as a reaction to the declining performance in the health 
care system, i.e. dissatisfied health care consumers who have no possibility to satisfy 
their needs elsewhere, are using informal channels to obtain services according to 
their expectations (Gaál and McKee, 2004). 
Limitations: Given the sensitivity of the issue of informal payments, respondents in 
our survey may feel uncomfortable in answering questions on informal payments, 
or may give socially desirable answers, which might lead to biased results. The use of 
self-administered questionnaires could avoid this problem, however might result in 
missing answers.
Policy implications: Hungarian health care consumers tolerate informal payments, 
because for them the perceived poor quality of services legitimates these payments. This 
attitude is enhanced by health care providers as well. According to the Ethical Codex 
of the Medical Chamber informal payments are legal and legitimate because of the low 
salary of physicians and dysfunctioning of the health care system. The average salary of 
the health care workers is indeed below the average income in Hungary. Furthermore, 
so far the national regulations do not explicitly forbid informal patient payments either. 
Since July 2012, the Labor Code prohibit receiving informal payments, however, the 
employer have the right to dispense their employers from this decree. 
Thus, in Hungary informal payments seem to be tolerated by all health care actors 
mainly because these payments contribute to the financing of the health care 
services by providing additional salary to the health care personnel. According to the 
estimations of Gaál et al. (2006) physicians may have earned between 60 and 236 
124
Chapter 8  
percent of their net official income from informal payments (Gaál et al., 2006b). 
However, it has to be highlighted that only a small group of physicians benefits from 
these payments (mostly head physicians and managers). Thus, informal payments 
hardly solve the wage problems for majority of the health care workers. For the 
beneficiaries, informal payments create adverse incentives, which can violate the 
general policy objectives, and they might have the power to block important changes 
in the health care system (e.g. quality improvement) to maintain the status-quo (Gaál 
et al., 2005). On the other hand, those who do not (or refuse to) benefit from these 
payments, salary levels remain under the average wage in Hungary, which induce the 
outflow of the physicians and other health care workers from the country (Eke et al., 
2011; OECD, 2012). The latest OECD report on the performance of the Hungarian 
health care system points out that one of the most pressing issues affecting the health 
care system is the outflow of the health care workers (OECD, 2012). 
To conclude, as long as health care consumers get the message both from the 
government and from the health care personnel, that these payments are acceptable 
and legitimate, moreover necessary, the positive attitude of consumers towards 
informal payments cannot be expected to change. However, in order to deal with 
these payments, it is necessary to address this positive attitude of consumers and 
other health care actors towards informal payments. These payments should be 
strongly discouraged by being considered as a corrupting practice subject to sanctions 
(OECD, 2012). At the same time, there is an instant need to address wage problems 
in the health care system, however, this should be handled as a separate issue. 
Further research: The application of qualitative methods should also be considered 
for exploring perceptions of health care consumers of informal payment. Furthermore, 
due to the sensitivity of the issue less is known about the opinion and attitude of 
the beneficiaries towards informal payments. A qualitative research with health 
professionals might provide better insight into the nature of informal payments. 
Statement 6: Past informal payments indicate a willingness to pay formal fees.
In the dissertation, we have found a significant and positive correlation between 
willingness to pay user fees, and the past informal payments of health care consumers 
(see Chapter 6). We observe that those who are paying informally, would be more 
willing to pay formal fees as well for services provided with good quality and access. 
The probability that the respondent is willing to pay formally for health care services 
is 22 percentage points higher for specialist visits and 45 percentage points higher for 
a hospitalization if the respondent paid informally during the last 12 months. In this 
way, past informal payments indicate a willingness to pay formal fees. 
However, we find that some population groups may prefer to pay informally, i.e. elderly 
people and people living in the capital are more likely to pay informally for physician 
visits, at the same time, they are less willing to pay formal fees for specialist services. 
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Finally, those who are less likely to pay informally are less willing to pay formally 
as well. Especially among those who were hospitalized and did not pay informally, 
the willingness to pay formal fees is rather low (37 percent) compared to those who 
paid (83 percent). Also, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that those who are against 
informal payments are against formal payments as well. 
Limitations: As mentioned above, the predicted validity of stated preference method 
used for the analysis is questionable. Furthermore, it is not clear from the survey, 
whether consumers would be willing to pay these fees instead or on top of their 
informal payments. 
Policy implications: Regarding the relationship between past informal payments and 
willingness to pay formal fees, we have found that those who are paying informally 
would not be against paying formally either. This suggests that the incentive behind 
the willingness to pay formal fees and informal payments is similar. Based on the 
previous findings, this incentive is the desire to achieve better quality care. Hungarian 
health care consumers associate the low quality of services with the lack of resources 
in the health care system and the financial problems of the health care providers. As 
we have found in this dissertation, this perception motivates consumers’ willingness 
to pay formal fees, as they see user fees as a potential to increase financial resources 
(see Chapter 4, 6, 7; also Statement 4). At the same time, this also explains informal 
patient payments as a reaction to the declining performance of the health care system. 
Thus, policy makers should be aware that health care consumers do not mind using 
informal payment channels to satisfy their needs.
The behavior of those, who seem to prefer informal payments compared to formal 
ones, is rather challenging from a policy point of view as they might provide 
opposition towards formal fees. They may think that informal payments will remain 
relevant after the implementation of user fees (in accordance with Statement 2), so 
they are against formal payments as they do not want to pay twice.
Those who are not paying informally and/or are against informal payments might 
also represent strong opposition to the implementation of user fees as they are less 
willing to pay formal fees as well. They might be against all kinds of payments for 
health care services and consider that health care services should be provided free of 
charge, without any co-payments (either formal or informal). Thus, they need special 
attention in the communication on the necessity and policy objectives of the fees.
Future research: The examination of the reasons for the unwillingness to pay formal 
fees as well as the reason for not paying informally for health care services (i.e. 
whether consumers object or are not able to pay) has also policy relevance and should 
be also addressed by future research. 
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8.4 Challenges and perspectives - some final remarks
As it was pointed out in the introduction of this dissertation, out-of-pocket patient 
payments for health care services provide a puzzling policy issue for Hungary. While 
consumers are used to pay substantial amounts of co-payments for pharmaceuticals, 
and are regularly paying for health care services covered by the social health insurance 
through informal payment channels, the implementation of user fees for health care 
services remains a rather sensitive political issue.
Experiences with the implementation of these fees in 2007 might hold back policy 
makers from the reintroduction of the fees in the future to avoid political resistance 
and unpopularity among the public. The current practice also suggests that policy 
makers are beware of the implementation of user fees, and they prefer to choose 
other ways to increase private resources in the financing of health care provision. 
The current policy of the government aims at the enhancement of the private 
health insurance system, which role has been limited in health care financing so 
far. However since the beginning of 2012, the government offers tax-subsidies for 
companies who purchase private health insurance for their employees.20 This change 
in the regulation can support the extension of private health insurance market as well 
as the private market of health care services. Some insurance companies have already 
come out with new health insurance products and have contracted with private 
providers. Actors on the private health insurance market see a potential in offering 
products with shorter waiting time for doctor visits, operation or diagnostics, and 
promise that private health insurance can substitute informal payments. However, 
this dissertation has focused on user fees for services covered by the social health 
insurance, some of the results (especially on consumer preferences and willingness 
to pay) may also be helpful and relevant to establish policies on the enhancement of 
private health insurance or the private market of health care services. Furthermore, 
the findings can be interesting for actors in the private sector to estimate potential 
demand, and to have better insight into consumers’ expectation and preferences.
Actually, the concept of private health insurance is in accordance with the expectations 
of health care consumers. Our qualitative results suggest that health care consumers 
expect the basic benefit package of services to be more clearly defined and to be 
provided free for all, while according to them, those who want “extra or better” 
services should pay. The extension of a parallel private sector would imply that those 
health care consumers, who are willing and able to pay, can opt for the private sector. 
However, it should also be noted that the extension of the parallel private sector has 
a questionable effect on the quality of services covered by the social health insurance. 
There is a hint that the extension of the private sector leads to a decline of quality of 
the public health care services, e.g. increasing waiting time, and the consequences of 
20 For more information see: http://www.biztositasiszemle.hu/cikk/hazaihirek/gazdasag/munkaltatoi_
egeszsegbiztositas_adomentes_juttataskent_adhatjak_dolgozoiknak.996.html
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double shift of physicians or the migration of physicians to the private sector (Gaál 
et al., 2004; Tuohy et al., 2004).
No matter which way is chosen by policy makers to extend the role of private resources, 
the key message of this dissertation should be kept in mind: consumers expect value 
for their money. They would be willing to pay for health care services if they received 
better quality care in return. This finding draws attention to the necessity of quality 
measurement and monitoring in Hungary. As discussed above, at the moment this is 
missing in Hungary. However, quality management would help to identify the main 
problems and main investments priorities in the system, to evaluate and compare 
performance of health care providers and to define requirements for services covered 
by the social health insurance, which consumers are entitled for. 
The lack of quality measurement also encourages informal payments channels. Due 
to the negative effect of informal payments on transparency, efficiency, access and 
undesirable incentives for health care providers, the OECD considers the eradication 
of informal payments as one of the main challenges in Hungary (OECD, 2012). 
The solution for the problem of informal payments was not specifically the focus 
of the dissertation as we have rather focused on the relationship between formal 
and informal payments. However, our results provide better insight into the 
phenomenon, and the results might support policy making on these payments as 
well. We find that informal payments are not only the heritage of the socialist period 
but the concomitant of the present health care system as well. These payments 
reflect on the deficiencies of health care provision (e.g. poor service quality, low 
salary of the health care workers, poor governance). Furthermore, these payments 
are also interrelated with other socio-cultural factors outside the health care system. 
According to Ludwing van Mises “If you want to abolish war, you must eliminate 
its causes”. The results of the dissertation suggest that the same stands for informal 
payments. The issue of informal payments cannot be addressed as a separate problem 
for the health care system to solve. Fundamental changes in and outside the health 
care system are necessary to achieve appreciable results regarding the eradication of 
informal payments. Hence, for Hungary, there is still a long way to go.
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Quantitative data and data collection
In Chapter 5, 6 and 7, we use data from a survey carried out in July 2010 as a 
part of an international research project. The questionnaire included questions on: 
past utilization of and payments for services; attitude towards informal payments; 
discrete choice experiment and contingent valuation tasks to elicit willingness to pay 
of the respondents to pay official fees for health care services covered by the social 
health insurance; and socio-demographic features of the respondents. The English 
wording of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.
The data were collected in July 2010 in a household survey among adult citizens 
(age 18+). The survey was conducted via face-to-face individual interviews at the 
respondents’ home. The aim was to have 1000 effective interviews per country that 
present samples representative for the country. The respondents were identified based 
on a multi-staged random probability method. During the first stage, sampling 
points in the country were selected. Within each of the seven regions in Hungary, 
the cities, towns and villages (rural area) included in the survey, were selected at 
random proportionally to regional and urban/rural characteristics of the population. 
In particular, the number of sampling points in the rural areas was calculated based 
on the ratio of the urban/rural population in the country. As the objective was to 
have 7-8 interviews per sampling point, in total, 132 sampling points (43 in rural 
area) have been included (36 in Central Hungary, 14 in Central Transdanubia, 13 
in West Transdanubia, 15 in South Transdanubia, 16 in North Hungary, 19 in 
North Lowland and 17 in South Lowland). In the second stage, to select addresses/
households of potential respondents, the random route method was used. For each 
sampling point, a starting point and direction were determined21. In the third stage, 
the selection of the respondent within the selected household was done using the 
“last birthday” principle. In this procedure, the interviewer asked to speak to the 
adult member of the household who had the last birthday. The last-birthday method 
is based on the assumption that the assignment of birthdates is a random process 
and also every household member has an equal chance of being selected (for further 
information see Oldendick et al., 1988; Gaziano, 2005).
As mentioned before, the aim was to have 1000 completed interviews (7-8 per 
sampling point). Thus, when the selection of a respondent at the third stage failed 
21 The household selected for the survey, was every forth address on the left hand side of the street in urban areas, 
turning left at intersections and, after reaching a dead end, going back to the last crossing and further proceeding 
at random. In a block-of-flats of up to four floors, every fifth apartment household was selected, counting 
from the first apartment on the left of the ground floor. In cases of unsuitable household, the interviewers 
approached the apartment next-door and continued doing this until reaching a suitable household. At that 
point, the interviews resume the standard step of every fifth apartment. In a block-of-flats of 5 floors and more, 
the selection was every tenth apartment. In rural areas, every fourth inhabitable house on both sides of the 
interviewer’s route was selected. In compounds of several houses behind a common fence, the interviewer had 
to select the fourth one from the left (counting from the gate), or if there were less than four houses behind a 
common fence, then the interviewer went out of the common yard, counting the houses as if they were along 
the street.
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(including the cases when the household or the respondent with the last birthday in 
the household could not be successfully contacted after 3 attempts, or the respondent 
refused or was unavailable to take part in an interview), a replacing respondent was 
identified in the same sampling point following the second and third stage of the 
selection method (i.e. random route method to identify the household and the last 
birthday principle to identify the respondent within the household). The interviews 
were carried out face-to-face by qualified and experienced interviews who attended a 
training prior to the survey to clarify the fieldwork standards and the specificities of 
the questionnaire. A high number of interviewers (130) were involved in the survey 
to avoid the interviewer bias that might occur when one interviewer carries out many 
interviews. Each interviewer carried out 6-8 interviews.
Altogether, 1376 respondents were successfully contacted22, out-of them 330 refused 
or were unable to participate in the survey. This resulted in a response rate (calculated 
as interviewed/successfully contacted respondents) of 76%. The final sample for 
Hungary contains data for 1037 respondents23, 104-285 interviews per region in 132 
sampling points. After the data collection, about 10% of all respondents interviewed 
were re-contacted either by telephone or in person to verify that the interview had 
been carried out. The verification procedure did not indicate problems.
All respondents were asked for an informed consent at the start of the interview. 
The survey targeted the general public (not specific patient groups) and had the 
form of a consumer survey. Therefore, there was no need for an approval of an ethics 
committee (also there was no experiment on patients). The data collection was 
performed in accordance with the ICC/ESOMAR International Code of Marketing 
and Research24. 
Sample characteristics
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1. The average age of the sample 
population is 46.3 years (sd=17.6), 46.4 percent of the respondents are men, 53.6 
percent living in a town, 17.6 percent in the capital, the rest (28.8 percent) is living 
in villages. Most of the respondents (67.0 percent) finished education at secondary 
level, and 49 percent of them are working. The average household income is 167 470 
HUF (sd=93 960 HUF). The data represents the Hungarian population well. Past 
utilization and payments for health care services are presented in Table A2.
22 In 178 cases the interviewer was not able to contact the household (e.g. nobody was at home after 3 visits, or the 
address was non-eligible - non-residential building, nobody lives at this address, empty dwelling/s, building) or 
was not able to contact the respondent who had the last birthday in the household (the respondent was not at 
home and the interviewer could not obtain appointment for a next visit).
23 Out of the 1046 interviews completed, in 9 cases, the interviews were discarded due to various deficiencies in 
data collected, such as over 40% non-answered questions or “don’t know” answers.
24 Deatails can be found at:
 http://www.esomar.org/uploads/public/knowledge-and-standards/codes-and-guidelines/ESOMAR_ICC-
ESOMAR_Code_English.pdf
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Summary
In Hungary, out-of-pocket household expenditure on health care has increased 
during the last decades, and now it accounts for around 26% of the total health care 
expenditure. The major part of these payments is expenditures on pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices (75-80 percent), where co-payments are substantial and have 
long been applied. Regarding out-of-pocket patient payments for health care services, 
which is the focus of this dissertation, the extent of official co-payments is limited, 
and most of the services covered by the social health insurance is provided free of 
charge for consumers. However, patients are regularly paying for health care services 
through informal payment channels to the health care personnel, in the hope of 
getting better quality services.
In 2007, the government implemented a one-euro user fee for the use of health 
care services covered by the social health insurance, as one element of a reform 
package, which aimed at the decrease of the public deficit. According to the policy 
objectives, user fees were expected to control the utilization of health care services, 
and diminish informal payments. However, the implementation of the fees met with 
strong political opposition and unpopularity among the public. Finally, this led to 
the abolishment of the fees one year after their implementation, in April 2008, as a 
result of a population referendum initiated by the opposition party in parliament. 
The implementation of user fees for health care services has proved to be a rather 
sensitive political issue, not only in Hungary but in other Central and Eastern (CEE) 
countries as well. Similarly to Hungary, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia user fees 
were revoked a few years after their implementation due to the political resistance in 
both countries. Thus, policy makers beware of the (re)implementation of user fees, 
to avoid becoming unpopular among the public. 
Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issue of patient payments for health 
care services in Hungary, the two main aims of the dissertations are (1) to show the 
lessons to be learned from the experience with the implementation of user charges in 
2007; (2) to identify challenges and perspectives for patient payments in the future, 
focusing on the public attitudes toward patient payments (formal and informal), as 
well as the willingness of health care consumers to pay official fees for health care 
services. The thesis also pays special attention on the relationship between formal 
and informal payments. We examine the effect of the introduction of user fees on the 
probability of paying informally, as well as the link between the willingness to pay 
formally and past informal payments.
The dissertation is divided into three main parts, each containing two chapters. The 
first part focuses on the past experiences with the implementation of user fees in 2007. 
In particular, Chapter 1 focuses on the impact of user fees on equity and Chapter 
2 analyzes the effect of these fees on informal payments of health care consumers. 
The second part (Chapter 4 and 5) considers the attitude of the population towards 
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formal and informal patient payments. The third part (Chapter 6 and 7) elicits the 
willingness of Hungarian health care consumers to pay formal fees for health care 
services as well as consumer preferences for different services attributes, using stated 
preference methods, namely contingent valuation and discrete choice experiment. 
To study the effects of the implementation of user fees we apply secondary data 
analysis. In Chapter 2, we analyze expenditure data from the Household Budget 
Survey carried out by the Central Statistical Office of Hungary for a four year 
period (2005-2008). To study the effect of the introduction of user fees on informal 
payments in Chapter 3, we use cross-sectional data on about 2500 respondents 
collected in April 2007, two months after the implementation of user fees. To study 
attitudes as well as willingness to pay, we have collected (1) qualitative data in 2009 
via focus group discussions and in-depth interviews as well as (2) quantitative data 
from a country representative sample among 1037 respondents collected in 2010. 
Below, we present the findings of the Chapters separately.
In Chapter 2, we have presented the scope and magnitude of out-of-pocket 
payments in Hungary, separately for expenditures on pharmaceuticals, formal and 
informal payments for health care services. We have also examined the changes in 
the progressivity of these payments during a four year period (2005-2008), using 
Kakwani indexes as a measure of progressivity.
Our results confirm the conclusions of previous studies, which found that out-of-
pocket payments are a regressive means of raising health care revenues. Out-of-pocket 
payments on health care are highly regressive in Hungary with a Kakwani index of 
-0.22. In particular, households from the lowest income quintile spend an about 
three times larger share of their income on out-of-pocket payments (6-7 percent 
of income) compared to households in the highest income quintile, who spent 2 
percent of their income on heath care. Expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices are the most regressive types of expenditures (Kakwani index -0.23/-0.24), 
and at the same time they represent a major part of the total household expenditure 
on health care (78-85 percent of total out-of-pocket household expenditure on 
health care). Informal payments are also found to be regressive, which implies that 
these payments impose a relatively higher burden on worse-off households. At the 
same time, expenditures on formal payments for health care services are the most 
proportional to income, as we can assume that households with higher income use 
proportionally more private services.
The burden of formal payments significantly increased after the implementation of 
user fees. Moreover, expenditures on formal payments became regressive (Kakwani 
index -0.1). This is in accordance with the findings of previous studies that health care 
reforms, which increase the role of out-of-pocket payments in health care financing, 
lead to a relatively greater burden falling on the low-income groups. In parallel, 
we observe a decrease in the expenditure on informal payments, which became less 
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regressive as well, i.e. the decrease was higher in the lower-income households. This 
finding may suggest that worse-off households tried to compensate the increasing 
burden of formal co-payments with a decrease in their expenditure on informal 
payments. However, due to the lack of utilization data in the Household Budget 
Survey, we cannot really claim the causality of this association. 
In Chapter 3 we have focused on the effect of the introduction of user fees in 2007 
on informal payments. As mentioned before, in CEE countries, where informal 
payments are widespread, the introduction of user fees is also motivated by their 
potential to eradicate or “formalize” informal payments. However, there is no evidence 
in the literature, which clearly supports this expectation. In Hungary, one of the 
main policy objectives of the introduction of user fees in 2007 was also to diminish 
informal payments, besides the objective to control the utilization of the services. 
In Chapter 3, we have addressed this issue. First, we have presented the pattern of 
informal payments in primary, out-patient specialist and in in-patient care in the 
period before and shortly after user fees for health care services were introduced. We 
have also examined the changes in the probability of paying informally in the short 
run using probit regression analysis. For the analysis we have used data on informal 
payments for the last visit to physician/last admission to hospital, collected in April 
2007, two months after the implementation of user fees.
In accordance with the literature on informal payments in Hungary, we have found 
that Hungarian patients pay informally for medical services on a routine basis. 
According to our results, for GP care, 9 percent of the patients paid informally 
during their last visit (2 euro on average), 14 percent paid informally for specialist 
care (35 euro on average), and 50 percent paid informally for hospitalization (58 
euro on average). We have not found significant changes in the probability of paying 
informally for the last physician visit/hospitalization in the short run after the 
implementation of user fees, except for elderly patients for hospitalizations, where 
we observe a decrease in the probability of paying informally. This group is associated 
with lower household income in Hungary, thus, they might be less able to pay for 
the double burden.
Our findings suggest that formal payments are not substitutes of informal payments, 
at least in a short run, but these payments rather co-exist and complement each 
other. However, it is probable, that a longer period is needed to perceive changes in 
patients’ behavior regarding informal payments. Furthermore, we have to consider 
that neither the objectives, nor the beneficiaries of informal payments are the same as 
those of the user fees. It is quite probable that patients, who are able to pay, continue 
to pay informally directly to their physician, in the hope of getting extra services or 
more personal attention. 
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Chapter 4 has been focused on the attitude of health care stakeholders towards formal 
patient payments. In this chapter, we have combined qualitative and quantitative 
methods to reveal the experiences and expectations of health system stakeholders in 
Hungary related to user fees as well as their approval of such fees. 
We have found that consumers do not support the stated policy objectives of the 
introduction of user fees in 2007, i.e. the decrease of unnecessary visits and the 
eradication of informal payments. A group of consumers (mostly pensioners and 
families with children who are the most frequent users of services), do not agree that 
a decrease in the utilization of services is essential in Hungary. Furthermore, health 
care consumers doubt that user fees in 2007 could substitute for informal payments, 
as neither the measure nor the objectives, nor the beneficiaries of informal payments 
were the same as those of user fees. The lack of support of the stated policy objectives 
might be one of the reasons why the fees were rejected by the population in the 
referendum. 
We have also found that health care consumers are not against paying user fees. 
However, consumers would rather accept these fees if the revenues were reinvested 
in health care provisions to increase the quality of health care services. This attitude 
can be explained by the discontent of the population with the quality of health 
care services, also expressed during the focus group discussions carried out for this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, consumers noticed no improvement in service quality and 
found that the revenues were not reinvested into the improvement of the quality 
of service provision in 2007. This might also contribute to the rejection of these 
fees. Furthermore, consumers do not trust the government that such fees will be 
reinvested in service provision. 
In Chapter 5, we have analyzed the attitudes and perceptions of health care 
consumers towards informal payments using data from a country-representative 
quantitative survey. We have combined cluster analysis with multinomial logistic 
regression to identify the main perception groups of informal payments. 
We have indentified three main different attitudes towards informal payments. Those 
who accept informal payments (either young or elderly people, living in the capital) 
consider these payments as an expression of gratitude and perceive them as inevitable 
due to the low funding of the health care system. Those who doubt about informal 
payments (respondents outside the capital, with higher education and household 
income) also consider these payments inevitable, but perceive them as similar to 
corruption rather than gratitude, and would rather use private services to avoid these 
payments. We found that the opposition to informal payments (mostly among men 
from small households and with low income) could be explained by lower ability and 
willingness to pay.
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Overall, Hungarian health care consumers tolerate informal payments as they 
consider these payments inevitable due to the lack of resources in the health care 
system. This perception is in accordance with the economic explanation of informal 
payments and supports the theory of Gaál and McKee (2004), who interpret informal 
payments as a reaction to the declining performance in the health care system25. The 
positive attitude of consumers is enhanced by health care providers as well. According 
to the Ethical Codex of the Medical Chamber in Hungary, informal payments are 
legal and legitimate because of the low salary of physicians and dysfunctioning of the 
health care system. So far, national regulations have not explicitly forbidden informal 
patient payments either. 
In Chapter 6, a contingent valuation method has been used to elicit information on 
the willingness of the Hungarian health care consumers to pay formal fees for health 
care services. Besides, we have also examined the relationship between willingness to 
pay formal fees and past informal payments.
Based on an earlier qualitative study (see Chapter 4), we expect that health care 
consumers are not against paying an extra contribution to the cost of health care 
services if these services are provided with good quality or access. In this chapter, 
we confirm this expectation. We have found that the majority of the Hungarian 
population is willing to pay official fees for health care services with certain service 
attributes. We have found that 66 percent of the respondents are willing to pay formal 
fees for specialist visits and 56 percent are willing to pay for planned hospitalizations, 
if these services are provided with certain quality and access attributes. 
We have also found that the willingness to pay formal fees is positively associated 
with past informal payments. The probability that a respondent is willing to pay 
official charges for health care services is 22 percentage points higher for specialist 
examinations and 45 percentage points higher for a hospitalization if the respondent 
paid informally during the last 12 months. Furthermore, the results suggest that 
some population groups (e.g. elderly and respondents from the capital) might prefer 
to pay informally, as we have found that they are more likely to pay informally, but 
less likely to be willing to pay formal fees.
In Chapter 7, we have used data from a discrete choice experiment to elicit 
preferences of health care consumers about the choice of health care providers. We 
have examined the effect of the improvement of service attributes (quality, access, and 
price) on patients’ choice, as well as the differences in preferences among different 
socio-demographic groups. We have also estimated the marginal willingness to pay 
for the improvement in attribute levels by calculating marginal rates of substitution.
25  See Gaál and McKee, 2004
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The results of this chapter show that the choice of respondents from a village or the 
capital, with low education and bad health status are more sensitive to the changes in 
the price when choosing between health care providers. While for young respondents 
with higher education and higher household income, we observe higher marginal 
willingness to pay for service attributes. Regarding service attributes, we observe the 
highest marginal willingness to pay for the improvement of the skills and reputation 
of the physician, as well as the attitude of the health care personnel. This means 
that health care consumers value the quality attributes connected to the health care 
personnel the most. Medical equipments and the maintenance of the health care 
facility are also considered as important factors. However, waiting time in front of 
the office and travelling time to the health care facility are less likely to affect the 
choice of health care consumers. In other terms, consumers are ready to travel or wait 
more for the service provision in order to be treated by skilled and polite personnel.
To conclude, we can learn from previous experiences with user fees in 2007 that out-
of-pocket payments are already relevant, and further, that an increase of co-payments 
may lead to greater burden falling into low-income groups. Thus, more attention 
should be paid to the protection of low-income households when implementing or 
extending patient charges, to avoid inequalities in access, which can lead to higher 
morbidity, as the health status of the Hungarian population is already lagging behind 
other European countries.
We have also shown that formal and informal payments are complements rather 
than substitutes as the beneficiary and objective of the two types of payments are 
different. It is quite probable that despite the formal charges, patients continue to 
pay informally directly to their physician as an expression of their gratitude or in 
the hope of getting extra services, better access or more personal attention. This is 
not surprising, as we have found that for consumers, physicians’ competence, skills 
and reputation are the most important attributes of health care services. This is also 
the reason, why some population groups (e.g. elderly, or people from the capital) 
prefer to pay informally. We have also learned that formal payments might lead to 
the decrease of informal payments for those who have budget constraints, as lower-
income households may try to compensate the increasing burden of formal payments 
with decreasing their expenditure on informal ones. In 2007, the introduction of 
user fees in Hungary was also associated with a reduction of informal payments 
among the low-income households. However, if the decrease of these payments 
occurs only among the lower-income households, who are not able to pay for the 
double burden, inequalities in access can increase, i.e. those, who continue to pay 
informally, may have better access to health care services compared to those who are 
not able to pay. Thus, the implementation of user fees is hardly a sufficient tool on 
its own to “formalize” informal payments. Furthermore, due to this controversial 
mechanism, it is suggested not to emphasize the potential of user fees to eradicate 
informal payments in policy discussions.
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We have also learned, that public acceptance of the policy aims of the implementation 
of user fees is crucial to the successful implementation of the fees. However, in Hungary 
the two main policy objectives of the implementation of user fees in 2007 were not 
entirely supported by the public, which might be one of the reasons why the fees 
were rejected. Thus, close communication with the public about their expectations 
and about the policy objectives of the fees is essential before the implementation of 
such fees.
Qualitative results have shown that the Hungarian population is rather discontent 
with the quality of health care services provided by the social health insurance. 
Consumers consider user fees as a potential solution to raise revenue for financing 
health care in order to improve the quality of health care provision. The results of 
the stated preference methods also indicate that Hungarian health care consumers 
are not against official payments for health care services, but they expect value for 
their money. However, we have found that those, who are willing, are already paying 
for health care services. In this way informal payments indicate a willingness to 
pay formal fees as well. Thus, it seems that the incentive behind the willingness 
to pay formal fees and informal payments are similar, namely the desire to achieve 
better quality care. The introduction of formal payments in future, should assure 
the improvement in quality and access, otherwise, user fees will remain unpopular 
among the public similarly to the introduction of user fees in 2007. For this, it 
would be essential to measure and monitor the quality of the services and settle the 
quality requirements in regulations. This would also help to reduce the informal 
payments channels. 
Finally, we have found that informal payments are not only the heritage of the 
socialist period but the concomitant of the present health care system as well. These 
payments reflect the deficiencies of health care provision (e.g. poor service quality, 
low salary of the health care workers, poor governance). Furthermore, Hungarian 
health care actors have a rather positive attitude towards these payments, as for 
them, the perceived “poor service quality and low salary of physicians” legitimate 
the existence of informal payments. However, these payments are not the solution 
to the wage problems of physicians, as only a small group of physicians benefits 
from these payments (mostly head physicians and managers), who have the power 
to block important changes in health care system to maintain the status-quo. For 
the other physicians and health care workers, salary levels remain below the average 
wages in Hungary, which induce an outflow of health care workers from the country. 
In order to deal with informal payments it is necessary to address the positive 
attitude of health care actors towards these payments, and these payments should be 
strongly discouraged in order to improve equity in health care financing and to avoid 
inequalities in access to health care.
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Samenvatting
In de laatste decennia is in Hongarije het percentage eigen betalingen (‘out-of-pocket 
payments’) van huishoudens aan de gezondheidszorg toegenomen. Momenteel 
bedragen de eigen betalingen 26% van de totale uitgaven voor de gezondheidszorg. 
Het grootste deel van deze eigen betalingen bestaat uit de uitgaven aan geneesmiddelen 
en medisch hulpmiddelen (75-80 procent), waar eigen bijdragen een substantieel 
onderdeel zijn en al lange tijd worden toegepast. Deze eigen betalingen van patiënten 
aan de gezondheidszorg is de focus van dit proefschrift. De omvang van officiële 
eigen bijdragen is beperkt en de meeste  diensten die vergoed worden door de sociale 
ziektekostenverzekering worden gratis aan de consument verstrekt. Echter, patiënten 
betalen regelmatig voor gezondheidszorg door middel van informele betalingen aan 
het personeel, in de hoop betere kwaliteit van diensten te krijgen. Als onderdeel van 
een breder pakket aan hervormingsmaatregelen, heeft de overheid in 2007 een één-
euro eigen bijdrage geïmplementeerd voor het gebruik van de gezondheidszorg die 
vergoed wordt door de sociale ziektekostenverzekering. Deze vergoeding was bedoeld 
om de kosten van de gezondheidszorg te beheersen en om informele betalingen te 
verminderen. Echter, de implementatie van de eigen bijdrage ondervond sterke 
politieke oppositie en was zeer impopulair bij het publiek. In 2008, een jaar na 
de implementatie, heeft een referendum onder de bevolking op initiatief van de 
oppositiepartij in het parlement geleid tot het afschaffen van de eigen bijdragen. 
De implementatie van eigen bijdrage voor de gezondheidszorg is een nogal gevoelige 
kwestie gebleken, niet alleen in Hongarije maar ook in andere Centraal - en Oost-
Europese landen. Beleidsmakers schrikken terug voor (her)invoering van de eigen 
bijdragen om te voorkomen dat ze impopulair worden bij het publiek. Gezien 
de complexiteit en gevoeligheid van eigen bijdragen  voor de gezondheidszorg in 
Hongarije, zijn de twee doelstellingen van dit onderzoek: (1) welke lessen moeten 
worden getrokken uit deze ervaring met de implementatie van een eigen bijdrage 
in 2007 (dat wil zeggen wat zijn de herverdelingseffecten van de invoering van de 
eigen bijdrage alsmede het effect van de eigen bijdrage op informele betalingen van 
zorgconsumenten). (2) wat zijn de perspectieven voor toekomstige invoering van 
eigen bijdragen, met de nadruk op de houding van het publiek tegenover een eigen 
bijdrage (formeel en informeel), alsmede de bereidheid van zorgconsumenten om te 
betalen voor het gebruik van gezondheidszorg. Daarnaast besteedt het proefschrift 
ook bijzondere aandacht aan de relatie tussen formele en informele betalingen. 
We onderzoeken het effect van de introductie van de eigen bijdrage op de kans 
op informele betalingen, evenals het verband tussen de bereidheid tot formele en 
informele betalingen. 
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift richt zich op de eerste doelstelling (Hoofdstuk 
2 en 3), met name op de ervaringen uit het verleden met de invoering van de 
eigen bijdrage. In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we, met behulp van gegevens van het 
huishoudbudgetonderzoek uitgevoerd door het centraal bureau voor de statistiek van 
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Hongarije, gekeken naar de veranderingen in progressiviteit van deze bijdrage gedurende 
een periode van vier jaar (2005-2008). Onze resultaten bevestigen de conclusies van 
eerdere onderzoeken die vonden dat eigen bijdragen een regressief middel zijn om 
inkomsten van de gezondheidszorg te verhogen (met een Kakwani index van -0.22). 
De last van formele betalingen is aanzienlijk toegenomen na de invoering van de eigen 
bijdrage en bovendien werden deze uitgaven meer regressief (dat wil zeggen dat de 
toename hoger was onder de lagere inkomens). Tegelijkertijd zien we een daling van 
de informele betalingen, deze werden minder regressief (dat wil zeggen dat de daling 
hoger was onder de lagere inkomens). Deze bevinding suggereert dat huishoudens die 
slechter af zijn getracht hebben om de toenemende last van formele eigen bijdragen te 
compenseren met een afname van hun uitgaven aan informele betalingen. In Hoofdstuk 
3 hebben we ons gericht op het effect van de invoering van de eigen bijdragen van 2007 
op informele betalingen. In Oost Europese landen (zoal Hongarije), waar informele 
betalingen wijdverbreid zijn, is de invoering van de eigen bijdrage ook gemotiveerd 
doordat het mogelijk leidt tot uitroering of “formalisering” van informele betalingen. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we met behulp van een probit-regressie-analyse gekeken naar 
de veranderingen in de kans op het betalen van informele betalingen op korte termijn. 
Voor deze analyse hebben we gebruik gemaakt van gegevens van een steekproef van 
2500 respondenten verzameld in april 2007, twee maanden na de invoering van de 
eigen bijdrage. Deze gegevens hadden betrekking op informele betalingen voor het 
laatste bezoek aan de arts/laatste opname in het ziekenhuis. 
In overeenstemming met de literatuur over informele betalingen in Hongarije, vinden 
we dat patienten in Hongarije gewend zijn informele betalingen te verrichten voor 
medische diensten. We hebben geen significante afname gevonden op korte termijn 
na de invoering van eigen bijdragen van de kans op informele betalingen voor het 
laatste arts bezoek / ziekenhuisopname, behalve voor oudere patiënten die werden 
opgenomen in het ziekenhuis. Omdat ouderen in Hongarije veelal een lager inkomen 
hebben  kunnen ze minder goed in staat zijn om deze dubbele lasten te dragen.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift (Hoofdstuk 4 en 5) onderzoekt de houding 
van de bevolking ten aanzien van formele en informele betalingen door patiënten. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden met behulp van een combinatie van kwalitatieve en 
kwantitatieve methoden de ervaringen en verwachtingen van de stakeholders in de 
gezondheidszorg in Hongarije met betrekking tot de verdeling van de kosten van 
zorg  onderzocht. 
We vinden dat in 2007 consumenten de gestelde beleidsdoelstellingen van de 
invoering van eigen bijdragen, dat wil zeggen de afname van onnodig zorggebruik 
en de uitroeiing van informele betalingen, niet ondersteunden. Een groep 
zorgconsumenten (voornamelijk gepensioneerden en gezinnen met kinderen die de 
meest frequente gebruikers zijn van de gezondheidszorg), is het er niet mee eens dat 
een daling van het zorggebruik in Hongarije noodzakelijk is. 
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Bovendien betwijfelen zorgconsumenten in 2007 of een eigen bijdrage ertoe 
leiden dat informele betalingen verdwijnen, omdat noch de maatregel, noch de 
doelstellingen noch de begunstigden van formele en informele betalingen hetzelfde 
zijn. Het gebrek aan steun voor de genoemde beleidsdoelstellingen is wellicht een 
van de redenen waarom in het referendum de eigen bijdragen werden verworpen 
door de bevolking.
We vinden ook dat zorgconsumenten niet tegen eigen betalingen zijn. 
Zorgconsumenten zouden deze kosten accepteren als de opbrengsten werden 
geherinvesteerd in de gezondheidszorg en gebruikt om de kwaliteit van de 
gezondheidszorg te verhogen. Deze houding is te verklaren uit de ontevredenheid van 
de bevolking over de kwaliteit van de gezondheidszorg, hetgeen ook werd uitgedrukt 
tijdens de focusgroep intetrviews die voor dit proefschrift zijn uitgevoerd.
In Hoofdstuk 5 hebben we met behulp van gegevens uit een landelijk representatief 
kwantitatief onderzoek de attitudes en percepties over informele betalingen 
geanalyseerd. We hebben hiervoor clusteranalyse met multinomiale logistische 
regressie gecombineerd. We vinden dat drie belangrijke percepties met betrekking 
tot informele betalingen kunnen worden onderscheiden: personen die informele 
betalingen accepteren, die er aan twijfelen en zij die zich ertegen verzetten.
Over het geheel genomen vinden we dat zorgconsumenten in Hongarije informele 
betalingen tolereren als ze deze betalingen als onvermijdelijk ervaren en als een 
gevolg van het gebrek aan middelen in de gezondheidszorg. Deze waarneming is 
in overeenstemming met de economische verklaring van informele betalingen. De 
positieve houding van de consument wordt ook versterkt door zorgverleners. Volgens 
de Ethische Codex van de Medische Kamer in Hongarije, zijn informele betalingen 
legaal en legitiem vanwege de lage salarissen van artsen en de slechte werking van het 
zorgstelsel. Tot nu toe heeft de nationale regelgeving de informele betalingen niet 
verboden.
In het derde deel van het proefschrift (Hoofdstuk 6 en 7) wordt met behulp van 
stated preference methoden, te weten contingent valuation en een discrete keuze-
experiment, de bereidheid van de Hongaarse zorgconsumenten tot formele betalingen 
voor de gezondheidszorg en de voorkeur van consumenten voor verschillende 
attributen van zorgdiensten onderzocht. In Hoofdstuk 6 is een contingent valuation 
methode gebruikt om gegevens te verzamelen over de bereidheid van de Hongaarse 
zorgconsumenten tot formele betalingenvoor gezondheidszorg. De verwachting 
wordt bevestigd dat zorgconsumenten niet tegen het betalen van een extra bijdrage 
voor diensten van de gezondheidszorg zijn als deze diensten worden geleverd met 
een goede kwaliteit of de extra bijdrage leidt tot betere toegankelijkheid van zorg 
(zie hoofdstuk 4). We hebben gevonden dat de meerderheid van de Hongaarse 
bevolking bereid is om voor diensten van de gezondheidszorg te betalen als de 
diensten een bepaalde kwaliteit en toegankelijkheid hebben. We hebben ook ontdekt 
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dat de bereidheid tot formele betalingen positief samenhangt met eerdere informele 
betalingen. Bovendien suggereren de resultaten dat sommige bevolkingsgroepen 
(bijvoorbeeld ouderen en respondenten uit de hoofdstad) misschien liever informeel 
betalen, omdat we vinden dat ze vaker informeel betalen, maar minder vaak bereid 
zijn om formeel te betalen. 
In Hoofdstuk 7 hebben we gebruik gemaakt van gegevens van een discrete 
keuze-experiment om de voorkeur van de zorgconsumenten over de keuze van 
zorgverleners aan het licht te brengen. Wij hebben het effect van de verbetering 
van de dienstverlening (kwaliteit, toegankelijkheid en prijs) op patiënten keuze 
geanalyseerd, evenals de verschillen in voorkeuren tussen verschillende socio-
demografische groepen. We vinden dat respondenten het meest bereid zijn om te 
betalen voor meer vaardigheden en een betere de reputatie van de arts en voor een 
positievere de houding van het gezondheidszorg personeel. Medische apparatuur en 
het onderhoud van de zorginstelling worden ook als belangrijke factoren beschouwd. 
Echter, wachttijd en reistijd naar de zorgfaciliteit zijn minder van invloed op de 
keuze van de zorgconsument. Met andere woorden, de consument is bereid om te 
reizen naar of te wachten voor de dienstverlening indien ze worden behandeld door 
ervaren, kundig en beleefd personeel.
Concluderend, de resultaten van de stated preference methoden geven ook aan dat 
de Hongaarse zorgconsumenten niet tegen officiële betalingen voor gezondheidszorg 
zijn, maar dat ze waar voor hun geld verwachten. Echter, we hebben gevonden dat 
degenen die bereid zijn om te betalen, al betalen voor gezondheidszorg. Op deze 
manier wijzen informele betalingen op een bereidheid om ook formeel te betalen. 
Zo lijkt het erop dat de prikkel achter de bereidheid voor formele vergoedingen 
en informele betalingen gelijk zijn, namelijk de wens om zorg van betere kwaliteit 
te verkrijgen. In de toekomst moet de invoering van formele betalingen zorgen 
voor verbetering van de kwaliteit en toegankelijkheid, anders zullen vergoedingen 
impopulair blijven bij het publiek net zoals de invoering van eigen bijdragen in 
2007. Daarvoor zou het van essentieel belang moeten zijn om de kwaliteit van de 
dienstverlening te meten en te bewaken en kwaliteitseisen in wet-en regelgeving vast 
te leggen. Dit zou ook helpen om informele betalingen te verminderen.
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Összefoglaló
Magyarországon az utóbbi két évtizedben a lakosság közvetlen (out-of-pocket) 
kifizetéseinek aránya folyamatosan növekedett az egészségügy finanszírozásában, 
és ma az egészségügy kiadások 26%-át teszik ki. Ezen kiadások többsége (75-80 
százalék) a gyógyszerekért és gyógyászati segédeszközökért fizetett térítési díj. Ezzel 
szemben az egészségügyi ellátásokért fizetett térítési díjak mértéke elhanyagolható, 
mert a társadalombiztosítás keretében az egészségügyi ellátások többsége 
ingyenesen vehető igénybe. Ennek ellenére a betegek mégis rendszeresen fizetnek 
az egészségügyi ellátásokért, mégpedig informális csatornákon keresztül, hálapénz 
formájában. 2007-ben a kormány a Konvergencia Program keretében kísérletet 
tett egy 1-eurós vizitdíj bevezetésére. A vizitdíj bevezetésének célja az „indokolatlan 
vizitek csökkentése” mellett a hálapénz visszaszorítása, „kifehérítése” volt. A vizitdíj 
bevezetése azonban társadalmi és politikai ellenállásba ütközött, és az akkori ellenzéki 
párt által kezdeményezett népszavazáson a válaszadók közel 80%-a támogatta a 
vizitdíj eltörlését. A népszavazás eredményeképpen a vizitdíj és a kórházi napidíj, 
2008 áprilisában, a bevezetésük után egy évvel, eltörlésre kerültek. A tapasztalat azt 
mutatja, hogy a vizitdíj és egyéb térítési díjak bevezetése, növelése kényes politikai 
kérdés, nemcsak Magyarországon, de más közép-és kelet-európai országokban is (pl. 
Csehország, Szlovákia). Éppen ezért a téma komplexitása és szenzitivitása további 
kutatásokat igényel, melyre e disszertáció keretében vállalkoztunk. A kutatás két fő 
célkitűzése a következő volt: (1) a 2007-es vizitdíj és kórházi napidíj bevezetésével 
kapcsolatos tapasztalatok feltárása (konkrétabban a vizitdíj bevezetésének a lakosság 
közvetlen kifizetéseire gyakorolt hatásának, valamint a hálapénzre gyakorolt 
hatásának vizsgálata); (2) a jövőbeli kihívások és lehetőségek azonosítása, különös 
tekintettel a lakossági attitűdökre, valamint az egészségügyi szolgáltatások iránti 
fizetési hajlandóság feltárására. A disszertáció kiemelt figyelmet fordít a hálapénz és 
a hivatalos térítési díjak közötti összefüggések elemzésére. Megvizsgáltuk a térítési 
díjak bevezetésének a hálapénzfizetésre gyakorolt hatását, valamint a hálapénzfizetés 
és a térítési díj-fizetési hajlandóság összefüggéseit. 
A disszertáció első része (2. és 3. fejezet) az első kutatási célra fókuszál, azaz a vizitdíj 
2007-es bevezetésével kapcsolatos tapasztalatok feltárására. A 2. fejezetben KSH 
adatok alapján vizsgáltuk a háztartások egészségügyi kiadásainak progresszivitását 
egy négy éves periódus alatt (2005-2008). Az elemzés során különböző típusú 
egészségügyi kiadások Kakwani indexét számítottuk ki. Eredményeink megerősítik 
a korábbi kutatások eredményeit, miszerint a közvetlen (out-of-pocket) kifizetés 
regresszív módja az egészségügy finanszírozásának (a Kakwani index -0,22), 
vagyis az alacsonyabb jövedelmű háztartások a jövedelmük nagyobb hányadát 
költik egészségügyre, mint a magasabb jövedelmű háztartások (2 vs. 6 percent). A 
háztartások terhei szignifikánsan nőttek a 2007-es reformok ideje alatt, a gyógyszerek 
és gyógyászati segédeszközök díjának emelése és a vizitdíj bevezetése után. Sőt, ezek 
a kiadások egyre regresszívebbé váltak (azaz a jövedelemarányos terhek növekedése 
nagyobb volt az alacsonyabb jövedelmű háztartások körében). Ezzel párhuzamosan 
172
Summary 
csökkentek a háztartások hálapénz kifizetései, és ezen kifizetések regresszivitása 
csökkent (azaz a terhek jövedelemarányos csökkenése nagyobb volt az alacsonyabb 
jövedelmű háztartások körében). Ez az eredmény arra utalhat, hogy az alacsonyabb 
jövedelmű háztartások megpróbálták kompenzálni a növekvő térítési díjak 
terheit a hálapénzre fordított kiadásaik visszafogásával. A 3. fejezetben a vizitdíj 
bevezetésének a hálapénz-fizetésre gyakorolt hatását vizsgáltuk. A közép- és kelet-
európai országokban (mint például Magyarországon is), ahol elterjedt a hálapénz, 
az egészségpolitikusok a térítési díjak bevezetését gyakran azzal indokolják, hogy 
a hivatalos térítési díjak hozzájárulnak a hálapénz megszűnéséhez, „kifehérítik” 
a hálapénzt. A 3. fejezetben probit regresszióval vizsgáltuk, hogy tapasztalunk-e 
csökkenést rövidtávon a hálapénz-fizetés gyakoriságában a vizitdíj és a kórházi napidíj 
bevezetése után. Az elemzés használt adatok a legutóbbi vizit/kórházi tartózkodás 
alatt fizetett hálapénzre vonatkoztak, az adatgyűjtés 2007 áprilisában történt, két 
hónappal a vizitdíj bevezetése után. A minta 2500 válaszadó adatait tartalmazza. A 
szakirodalommal összhangban azt látjuk, hogy a hálapénz fizetése „mindennapos” 
Magyarországon. Az idős betegeket kivéve nem találtunk szignifikáns csökkenést a 
hálapénz fizetés gyakoriságában a vizitdíj bevezetése után. Mivel idősek általában az 
alacsonyabb jövedelműek közé tartoznak Magyarországon, így elképzelhető, hogy ők 
nem képesek kifizetni a kettős terhet. 
A disszertáció második része (4. és 5. fejezet) a térítési díjakkal és a hálapénzzel 
kapcsolatos attitűdök feltárására fókuszál. A 4. fejezetben kvantitatív és kvalitatív 
módszertan kombinálásával megvizsgáltuk a lakosság vizitdíjjal kapcsolatos 
tapasztalatait, elvárásait és hogy milyen feltételek mellett tartják elfogadhatónak a 
térítési díjak bevezetését. Azt találtuk, hogy a lakosság a 2007-es vizitdíj és kórházi 
napidíj bevezetése kapcsán nem értett egyet a kitűzött egészségpolitikai célkitűzésekkel, 
a vizitek számának csökkentésével, és a hálapénz „kifehérítésével”. A lakosság egyes 
csoportjai (többnyire a nyugdíjasok és a gyermekes családok, akik a leggyakrabban 
veszik igénybe az egészségügyi ellátásokat), nem értenek egyet azzal, hogy szükséges 
lenne a vizitek számának csökkentése. Továbbá, a magyar lakosság kételkedik abban, 
hogy a vizitdíj meg tudná szűntetni a hálapénzt, mivel a kétféle kifizetés eltérő a 
célt szolgál, más a kedvezményezettje és a mértéke. Az egészségpolitikai célkitűzések 
támogatásának hiánya részben magyarázhatja a vizitdíj népszerűtlenségét és a 
népszavazás eredményét. Azonban a kutatási eredmények azt is mutatják, hogy a 
magyar lakosság nem ellenzi a térítési díjak bevezetését, viszont elvárják, hogy a 
beszedett díjak visszaforgatódjanak az ellátásba, és az ellátás minőségének javítását 
szolgálják. Ezt a hozzáállást jól magyarázza a lakosság elégedetlensége az egészségügyi 
ellátások minőségével. Az 5. fejezetben a hálapénz megítélését vizsgáltuk a magyar 
lakosság körében egy országos reprezentatív mintán végzett saját felmérés alapján. 
Klaszterezés és multinomiális logisztikus regressziós eljárások kombinálásával három 
fő csoportba soroltuk a válaszadókat: akik elfogadják, akik ellenzik a hálapénzt, 
valamint a kételkedőket. Összességében azt találtuk, hogy a magyar lakosság 
pozitív a hálapénzzel kapcsolatban, és a hálapénz-fizetést elkerülhetetlennek tartja 
az egészségügyben jellemző forráshiány miatt. Ez a felfogás összhangban van a 
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hálapénz közgazdasági magyarázatával. A lakosság pozitív hozzáállását az orvos-
szakma álláspontja csak erősíti. A Magyar Orvosi Kamara Etikai Kódexe szerint 
„a hálapénz legfőbb oka az orvosok megalázóan alacsony fizetése. Mögötte az 
egészségügyi rendszer működésének zavara áll.” Ezen kívül a hazai szabályozás sem 
tiltja egyértelműen a hálapénzt. 
A disszertáció harmadik része (6. és 7. fejezet) a magyar lakosság egészségügyi 
szolgáltatások iránti fizetési hajlandóságát és preferenciáit vizsgálja, feltárt 
preferenciaértékelési módszerek (feltételes értékelés és diszkrét választás) segítségével. 
A 6. fejezetben, a feltételes értékelés módszerét használtuk a lakosság egészségügyi 
ellátások iránti fizetési hajlandóságának feltárására. Az eredmények megerősítették 
korábbi várakozásainkat, miszerint a lakosság többsége hajlandó lenne térítési 
díjat fizetni az egészségügyi ellátásokért, ha azok jó minőséggel és hozzáféréssel 
biztosítottak (lásd 4. fejezet). A térítési díj fizetési hajlandóság és a hálapénz fizetés 
között pozitív az összefüggést találtunk. Továbbá, az eredmények arra utalnak, hogy 
a lakosság egyes csoportjai (pl. idősek, és a fővárosiak) szívesebben fizetnek hálapénzt, 
mint térítési díjat. A 7. fejezetben, a diszkrét választás módszerét alkalmaztuk a 
lakosság preferenciáinak feltárására. Megvizsgáltuk, hogy az egészségügyi ellátás 
jellemzőinek (minőség, hozzáférés, és az ár) megváltozása hogyan befolyásolja a 
válaszadók választását az egészségügyi ellátások között, valamint a preferenciák 
eltérését a különböző társadalmi csoportokban. A legmagasabb fizetési hajlandóságot 
az orvos szakértelme és hírneve, valamint az egészségügyi dolgozók attitűdje iránt 
találtunk. Az orvosi műszerek és a rendelő, kórház állapota is fontos tényezők voltak 
a választásban. Azonban, várakozási idő a rendelő előtt, és az utazási idő a kórházba/
rendelőbe kevésbé befolyásolta a válaszadókat a választásban. Más szavakkal, a 
magyar lakosság hajlandó többet várakozni és többet utazni azért, hogy szakképzett 
és udvarias egészségügyi dolgozók lássák el.
Összefoglalva, a feltárt preferenciaértékelő módszerekből származó eredmények azt 
mutatják, hogy a magyar lakosság nem ellenzi a térítési díjaknak, de értéket várnak 
a pénzükért. Ugyanakkor azt találtuk, hogy azok, akik hajlandóak lennének térítési 
díjat fizetni, jelenleg is fizetnek az egészségügyi ellátásokért, hálapénz formájában. Ily 
módon a hálapénzfizetés egyben a lakosság fizetési hajlandóságát jelzi. Úgy tűnik, hogy 
a fizetési hajlandóság - mind a hálapénzfizetés mind a térítési díjak esetében - a jobb 
minőségű ellátás iránti igényből fakad. Így a térítési díjaknak, amennyiben bevezetésre 
kerülnek a jövőben, biztosítania kell az egészségügyi ellátások minőségének javulást, 
különben ezek a díjak továbbra is népszerűtlenek maradnak a lakosság körében, a 
2007-es vizitdíjhoz hasonlóan. A minőség javítása érdekében elengedhetetlen lenne 
az egészségügyi ellátások minőségének mérésére és monitorozása, valamint a minőségi 
követelmények rögzítése a szabályozásban. Mindez a hálapénz felszámolásában is 
fontos szerepet játszana. 
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